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2Abstract
In this thesis I set out and defend a new form of ecophenomenology and 
environmental ethics based on Martin Buber’s dialogical philosophy. Buberian 
ecophenomenology is shown to be superior to established schools of 
ecophenomenology which are influenced by Edmund Husserl and Martin 
Heidegger.
In the first chapter I present a number of Husserl’s relevant ideas and discuss the 
Husserlian ecophenomenologies of Charles Brown and Erazim Kohák. While I am 
generally in support of Husserlian anti-naturalism, and Kohák’s discussion of the 
interplay between expectations and experiences is interesting, there is little else that 
Kohák and Brown argue for which I agree with. Most of the problems can be 
traced back to flaws within the Husserlian roots.
In the second chapter I explore aspects of Heidegger’s philosophy, particularly his 
anti-modernism, notion of dwelling, and account of technology. I am favourably 
inclined towards much of his position, especially his conviction that modern 
technology reveals the world as ‘standing reserve’. Michael Zimmerman highlights 
similarities between Heidegger and deep ecology and goes to some length to 
distance himself from the fascistic elements of Heidegger’s philosophy. While 
Zimmerman improves some elements of Heidegger, flaws remain within this 
school such as Heidegger’s rejection of value-thinking, and Zimmerman’s choice 
to downplay the effect had by economic and social structures on our relationship
with nature.
Finally, I discuss a number of Buber’s concepts from across his career. Unlike 
Husserl or Heidegger, Buber places absolute emphasis on our relationship with 
Others (God, people, and nature) as determinate of our mode of existence. 
Authentic existence requires that we relate to the Other with compassion, with an 
inclusive and open attitude. Only through this can we transcend our isolation and 
live with full meaning. I defend Buber’s dialogical pluralist ethics, and his original 
position that the relationship reveals to us the ethical behaviour. Though there are 
some weaknesses to his account, Buber shows that a strong ecophenomenology 
must take the ontological and ethical significance of relationship modes seriously.
3Acknowledgements
I am indebted to Dr Stuart Hanscomb and Dr Ben Franks for their years of 
supervision and guidance. Many thanks also to Dr David Borthwick, Dr Alex 
Guilherme, and Professor Sean Johnston for their involvement in this project. I 
would also like to thank the Crichton Foundation for their financial support. My 
parents, Christine and John, and my brothers, Mark and Jack, all deserve many 
more thanks than I have given them.
There are many members of the academic and non-academic staff at the Crichton 
campus who have made my time here deeply enjoyable. Since I began studying at 
the Crichton in 2008, it has been impossible to visit without encountering a friendly 
face. I am sad that the completion of this project brings my time here to an end. 
Above all, this thesis is dedicated to Amy Redden who makes me smile every day.
4Contents
Abstract 2
Author’s declaration 5
List of abbreviations 6
Introduction 7
Chapter One: 14
Husserlian Ecophenomenology
Chapter Two: 43
Heideggerian Ecophenomenology
Chapter Three: 75
Buberian Ecophenomenology
Conclusion 110
Appendix 117
Bibliography 119
5Author’s declaration
I declare that, except where explicit reference is made to the contribution of others, 
that this dissertation is the result of my own work and has not been submitted for 
any other degree at the University of Glasgow or any other institution.
Signature: 
Printed name:   Rory Fairweather
6List of Abbreviations
Texts by Martin Buber
BM Between Man and Man
D Daniel: Dialogues on Realization
EG Eclipse of God: Studies in the relation between religion and philosophy
IT I and Thou
PMB The Philosophy of Martin Buber
Texts by Martin Heidegger
BT Being and Time
BW Basic Writings
C Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)
DT Discourse on Thinking
PLT Poetry, Language, Thought
QCT The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays
Texts by Edmund Husserl
CES Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology
CM Cartesian Meditations
EJ Experience and Judgement
ID I Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological 
Philosophy (Book I) 
ID II Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological 
Philosophy (Book II)
IP The Idea of Phenomenology
LI Logical Investigations
PCIT On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893 – 1917)
PL The Paris Lectures
PRS ‘Philosophy as Rigorous Science’
7Introduction
The main aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that a strong system of environmental 
ethics can be supported by Martin Buber’s ecological phenomenology (hereafter 
ecophenomenology). Secondary to this aim is to highlight some of the 
shortcomings of ecophenomenology to date. For this I will analyse contributions 
from the two main schools of ecophenomenology: those based on the work of 
Edmund Husserl, and those based on that of Martin Heidegger. Both Husserl and 
Heidegger, and their supporters, fail to sufficiently emphasise the ontological and 
ethical importance of relationship forms in their phenomenologies. Buber, through 
his emphasis on compassionate dialogue, does not make the same mistake. Thus I 
argue that Buber makes an important and original contribution to 
ecophenomenology and environmental ethics.
Though ecophenomenology is largely based on works by Husserl, Heidegger,
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Emmanuel Levinas, it is a relatively new mode of 
analysis in environmental philosophy (Brown and Toadvine, 2003: 3). David 
Wood, a prominent scholar in this field, explains that phenomenology ‘concerns 
itself with the ways in which human beings find and construct meaning in the 
world’ (2003: 211). For ecophenomenologists our relationship with nature can be 
assessed (or rather, re-assessed) by carrying out a phenomenological critique of the 
structure of that relationship. How we live meaningfully with the natural world is 
the domain of ecophenomenology (Wood, 2003: 213). 
Because it is a relatively new area of environmental and continental philosophy 
there are few sources beyond the original texts to consult. Typically, 
ecophenomenology has been broken into two camps: Husserlians on the one side, 
Levinasians and Heideggerians on the other (Brown and Toadvine, 2003: xi).
Buber’s relevance to this discussion has gone almost entirely unnoticed to date. 
Indeed, he receives only one passing mention in Charles Brown and Ted 
Toadvine’s collection of papers on ecophenomenology and there are only several 
papers that discuss Buber’s contribution to ecological philosophy1 (2003: 66). Thus 
                                               
1 For example, see Tallmadge, 1981, Friskics, 2001. See also Booth, 1996, who briefly mentions 
Buber’s influence on Arne Næss.
8my research is aligned with an established methodology (ecophenomenology) but 
uses a largely original angle of analysis (Buberian dialogical ecophenomenology). 
My thesis is divided into three main chapters looking at Husserl, Heidegger, and 
Buber in turn. I begin with Husserl because he is widely regarded as the founder of 
phenomenology, and what followed was in part a response to, or rejection of, his 
work. In chapter one I discuss some of Husserl’s work, followed by the 
contributions made by Brown and Erazim Kohák. Husserl’s anti-naturalism and his 
notion of lifeworld seem to present themselves well to adaptation to ecological 
questions. 
Brown adopts Husserl’s emphasis on lived experience and anti-naturalism. He
advocates a pluralist system of ethics by way of a rejection of some Enlightenment 
universal ethical laws. Rather than having a subjective basis, moral behaviour 
requires that we are considerate of wider perspectives. And unlike absolute ethical 
theories, our judgements are subject to ongoing reassessment (Brown, 2003: 15). 
Brown argues that what sustains and enriches life is good, and what harms it is bad, 
and that through our ‘collective evolving wisdom’ we are progressing as a society 
(for example, away from slavery and racism). I criticise Brown’s contribution for 
lacking depth or sophistication, particularly on the issue of empathy (which Husserl 
is similarly weak on). There are others, as I show, that answer similar problems as 
Brown in a more nuanced and substantial manner.
Like Husserl and Brown, Kohák is critical of naturalism and is deeply critical of 
the destructive potential of science when not directed by a robust system of ethics. 
Kohák posits that reason is part of how we interact with the world, and that we can 
understand that world as value-laden. Reason, then, is a tool for interacting with the 
value-laden world, so it would be wrong to separate reason and value. But science 
and industry do just this, resulting in ‘heartless’ rationality. Kohák describes the 
structure of moral experience as including ‘purpose’. We describe things as good or 
bad because of how they promote or inhibit our (not necessarily selfish) purposes. 
We also experience things as good or bad based on how they meet our 
expectations. Finally, our experiences are enframed by our belief that life is 
inherently valuable. Like Brown, Kohák supports some notion of ‘flourishing’ –
9quality and quantity of life are important, thus diversity and harmony (or stability) 
within an ecosystem are good. 
Kohák is often controversial; he is openly critical of the current size of the human 
population, and he argues that it is not for us to ‘save [n]ature’, rather we should 
simply try to ‘save humanity from the consequences of its own shortsighted greed’ 
(2000: 163). There are several problems with Kohák, most pressing is his choice to 
ignore questions of isolation (or alienation) from nature. This is an area, I argue, 
where Buber excels. Ultimately, Husserlian ecophenomenology has many gaps and 
flaws. What it does do successfully is improved upon by Buber.
In chapter two, I discuss Heidegger’s work as well as Michael Zimmerman’s 
Heideggerian ecophenomenology. Heidegger’s later works on dwelling and 
technology lend themselves readily to environmental philosophy, but much of his 
other work informs this, including his account of Dasein as ‘shepherd of Being’, 
and his anti-modernism. His call to ‘let things be’, distinct from Husserl’s ‘to the 
things themselves!’, means ‘to open up to the ontological clearing in which things 
can disclose themselves’ (Zimmerman, 1993: 203). Dasein plays an important 
disclosive role, and the prominent position Heidegger gives to humans has led to 
calls of anthropocentrism, as I will discuss.
Dwelling is how authentic Dasein exists in the world. Heidegger notes the 
etymological connection between bauen (build/dwell) and (ich) bin and (ich) bist to 
show the link between dwelling and Being. Bauen also means ‘to cherish and 
protect, to preserve and care for, specifically to till the soil, to cultivate the vine’ 
(PLT 147). Thus, to be means to care for and cherish. To do this fully we must 
gather together ‘the fourfold’ – earth, sky, mortals, and gods. Earth and sky refer to 
the natural world – ‘the ripening corn, the changing seasons, the rising of the sun’ 
(Cooper, 1996: 83-84). Mortals signifies the need for awareness of our finitude and 
Being-in-the-world. Gods represents ‘higher things’ – art, philosophy, religion –
which stimulate reflection on the meaning of our existence. Dwelling and gathering 
the fourfold effectively means being fully aware of our existence, living in the 
fullest way possible, whilst caring for the world around us.
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Heidegger argues that technology is not neutral but instead is a mode of revealing 
things to us. Modern technology reveals things as mere objects for us to use or not 
use – what Heidegger calls the ‘standing reserve’. Trees are revealed as timber, 
people become ‘human resources’, and rivers are revealed as tourist attractions or 
locations for hydroelectric dams. Technology thus reveals only one dimension of 
reality. Heidegger has several criticisms of technology, not least that it ‘challenges’ 
nature to provide security for us (for example, warmth at the flick of a switch). This 
is an inauthentic desire to escape our insecurity (about our contingency). Heidegger 
favours older technology, such as artisanal crafts which respect their mediums, 
demonstrated by a carpenter who treats his wood carefully, and seeks to uncover its 
own distinctive qualities. 
According to Heidegger, values and ethics are inherently technological. Heidegger 
certainly believes that things (including people) matter to us – we cannot help but 
care for those we share the world with. But because he rejects value-thinking
(Wertdenken), he cannot support the belief that things have non-instrumental 
values. Heidegger writes that ‘thinking in values is the greatest blasphemy 
imaginable against Being’, and moreover that ‘through the characterization of 
something as “a value” what is so valued is robbed of its worth’ (BW 251). The aim 
for Dasein should be to ‘let things be’, not to appraise things. Only when we let 
things be can we dwell.
Zimmerman’s early Heideggerian ecophenomenology focuses on drawing 
connections between Heidegger and deep ecology. He demonstrates that both seek 
an ‘ontological shift’ or ‘reorientation’ away from anthropocentric dualism 
(prominent from the Enlightenment onwards) towards ecocentric egalitarianism, or 
what Zimmerman calls, a ‘higher humanism’ where we learn to ‘treat nonhuman 
beings with compassion and care... instead of treating everything as 
interchangeable raw material’ (1993: 200, 197). Both Heidegger and deep ecology 
argue that the prioritization of human concerns has been spurred on by naturalism, 
which has allowed us to interpret nature as ‘a lifeless machine’ for us to use or 
exploit (Zimmerman, 1993: 197). 
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Zimmerman seeks to distance his ecophenomenology from any possibility of 
fascism present in Heidegger. Importantly, he believes that Heidegger’s anti-
modernism goes too far, and instead he seeks to include emphasis on political 
freedom and progress within his own ecophenomenology. Zimmerman agrees with 
Heidegger that the Enlightenment ideal of ‘using scientific knowledge… to gain 
mastery over nature’ is abhorrent (2000: 4). But the rejection of this facet of 
modernity does not necessitate the abandonment of other ideas, such as liberty and 
progress. 
While Zimmerman overcomes some of Heidegger’s flaws, he does not criticise 
Heidegger’s rejection of value-thinking, meaning that the notion of Heideggerian 
ecophenomenological ethics still requires support. My main problems with 
Zimmerman include how his system has several important inconsistencies, and has 
little capacity to include a critique of social/economic systems. Buber’s 
ecophenomenology, as I will show, does not disappoint in this regard.
In chapter three I discuss several of Buber’s works. Because there are, to my 
knowledge, no Buberian ecophenomenologists I do not refer to anyone other than 
Buber and some secondary sources, with one exception: Emmanuel Levinas was a 
contemporary of Buber, and also an influential Jewish scholar. It is from Levinas 
that I take my first criticism of Buber.
I begin this chapter by discussing Buber’s early work, Daniel: Dialogues on 
Realization (1913). Here Buber portrays two ways of seeing and interacting with 
the world. Orientation is the tendency to see ‘all happenings in formulas, rules’ (D
72). Orienting man sees the world in terms of instrumental uses and values, and 
seeks to live in a predictable and stable world. Similar to Heidegger’s account of 
the technological mode of revealing, orienting man sees his surroundings in terms 
of use value. Realizing man does not view the world in such a limited way (D 94). 
Rather, he seeks to achieve a ‘totalizing’ view of reality, and this includes 
awareness that life and death are ‘side by side in endless embrace’, rather than 
mere ‘before and after’ (D 131). 
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In I and Thou (1923), Buber portrays a ‘twofold world’: we exist somewhere on the 
spectrum between the ‘It-world’ and the ‘Thou-world’. Sometimes we are closer to 
one end of the spectrum than the other, and, importantly, it is always possible for 
an I-It relation to be transformed by us into an I-Thou relation (Guilherme and 
Morgan, 2009: 567). The It-world is similar to orientation, where we understand 
only the instrumental value of Others (by which Buber means God, people, and 
nature) and seek to exploit this. By relating in this way we are isolated –
encountering only one dimension of the Other, and letting them see only one 
dimension of our self. The I-It relationship is one of alienation. I-Thou 
relationships are not so shallow. We should approach the other with an open and 
inclusive attitude, with compassion and respect for their Thou-ness (their complete, 
unique self). By treating them in such a way, and allowing them to respond 
similarly, we become close to them, overcoming alienation. Approaching the world 
in the I-Thou mode allows us to live beyond mere instrumental meaning. We feel 
deeply valued by moments of I-Thou bonding.
I apply Buber’s existentialist philosophy to our relationship with nature. I argue 
that the It-mode allows us to relate to timber or potential land for cattle grazing, but 
not the tree itself (IT 58). In the I-Thou relationship, we are not simply looking for 
ways to gain benefit from the tree. Buber is not suggesting that trees are conscious 
and can relate back to us like people can. The goal is the same – to relate to the tree 
with inclusiveness, compassion, and respect for its uniqueness (IT 59). Buber’s 
dialogical ecophenomenology shows that our lives can be enriched by a complete 
relationship with nature, rather than an objectifying one.
Buber makes the ethical argument that we are free and powerful, and therefore 
responsible for our choices and actions. We can choose to be authentic, to live 
fully, and so we should do this. In order to be authentic we must relate in the I-
Thou mode. Buber is ethically a dialogical pluralist because for him the dialogue 
(between two unique beings, thereby making every dialogue unique) determines or 
reveals the ethical behaviour. Through I-Thou dialogue we understand what we 
ought to do out of respect for the Other. The relationship is exclusive so only those 
within the relationship can understand the ethics of said relationship. It is entirely 
possible that, out of respect for the Other we may kill them (say in the case of
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consensual active euthanasia). It is possible also that a forest manager will cut 
down several trees to thin a wooded area, for the sake of the forest and not purely 
for his own gain. Clearly Buber is against the exploitation of nature for our 
personal gain. Such exploitation is only possible when we see nature through the I-
It relationship, and so we ought to minimize the chances of encountering the world 
in this way through education and reform of social/communal structures to make 
objectification less commonplace.
Buber is critical of Heidegger, particularly for his account of Being-with, which 
Buber describes as Being-alongside or Being-near, but not Being-with. For Buber, 
Heidegger cannot explain how our isolation from the Other can or should be 
overcome. In Heidegger, the ‘barriers’ of our own Being are never ‘breached’: we 
remain alone (BM 201).
Buber is criticised by Levinas largely for abandoning Jewish law in favour of 
pluralism. Levinas argues that every relationship is a reminder of God’s 
commands, including not to kill, and so the pluralism Buber advocates is against 
God’s teachings. I raise further criticisms of Buber, particularly that his I-Thou 
model requires a response from the Other, but such response cannot come from 
non-conscious nature. While we can still try to empathise with the non-conscious 
Other, we cannot achieve the same unity that we can with a conscious and 
responsive Other. Though this does not undermine the rest of his 
ecophenomenology and ethics, this is possibly an area where Buber does not offer 
anything new or useful.
I conclude this thesis by arguing that, despite its flaws, Buber’s ecophenomenology 
and environmental ethics offers much that is missing from the two main schools of 
ecophenomenology. It is a great shame that his contribution has not received more 
appreciation or attention to date, but I hope to make it clear that his philosophy is 
deserving of very high praise indeed.
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Chapter One:
Husserlian Ecophenomenology
Edmund Husserl
Edmund Husserl is perhaps best known for his Logical Investigations (1900/01), 
Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy 
(Book I, 1913), and Cartesian Meditations (1931). Amongst other subjects, Husserl 
develops ideas of anti-naturalism, intentionality, phenomenological reduction, the 
transcendental ego, and his concepts of noesis and noema. Husserl’s career can be 
understood as having several phases beginning with anti-psychologism (1887), 
then descriptive phenomenology (1901), alignment with transcendental idealism 
(c1907), and transcendental phenomenology (1913 until his death in 1938). Each 
phase offers something new to phenomenology, thus there can be many different, 
and at times conflicting, ‘Husserlian’ positions. In this chapter I will give an 
account of his central themes and terms. After this I will study two Husserlian 
ecophenomenologists, Charles Brown and Erazim Kohák, to show some elements 
of Husserlian ecophenomenology and its shortcomings. Though I am favourably 
inclined towards a number of aspects of Husserlian ecophenomenology, such as 
anti-naturalism, I argue in this chapter that most that this school of 
ecophenomenology has to offer is done better by Buberian ecophenomenology. 
Husserl’s anti-psychologism and anti-naturalism
Part of Husserl’s original contribution to philosophy was the opposition he 
presented to the dominant methods and schools of philosophy in his day. In Logical 
Investigations, he argued against psychologism in his own works On the Concept 
of Number (1886) and Philosophy of Arithmetic (1891), and in those of John Stuart 
Mill and Franz Brentano (LI 112). According to Husserl, psychologism is the belief 
that ‘the essential theoretical foundations of logic lie in [primarily empirical] 
psychology’ (LI 90). Arithmetic and logic can be reduced to or explained by the 
psychological acts wherein mathematical and logical concepts operate. That is, if 
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we understand the psychological processes which occur when we use logic or 
mathematics, we can understand logic and maths themselves (LI 99). In his early 
works Husserl followed the traditional naturalist position that all sciences are 
‘about some domain of objects’ (Philipse, 1996: 243). What, then, is the object of 
logic? Naturalism and psychologism would claim that it must be about mental 
phenomena. Logical and mathematical truths are reduced to mere psychological 
phenomena by psychologism. This, for Husserl, gives logic and mathematics 
subjective and relative grounding rather than the more desirable objective and 
universal grounding (see the first volume of Logical Investigations, ‘Prolegomena’
§34-38). 
Husserl also argues that because it can only support a subjective theory of logic, 
and so it makes no claims about the existence of universal logical facts, 
psychologism is a fundamentally sceptical theory (LI 101). Psychologism cannot 
grasp the essence of an a priori logical truth through its contingent, subjective, and 
belief-based rather than truth-based approach:
The task of psychology is to investigate the laws governing the real 
connections of mental events with one another, as well as with related 
mental dispositions and corresponding events in the bodily organism 
[…]. Such connections are causal. The task of logic is quite different. 
It does not inquire into the causal origins or consequences of 
intellectual activities, but into their truth-content (LI 93-94).
Psychologism thus fails to advance a convincing epistemic basis for logic and must 
be rejected.
From anti-psychologism, Husserl becomes increasingly critical of naturalism. His 
anti-naturalist stance developed alongside his turn towards transcendental idealism, 
and culminated in ‘Philosophy as a Rigorous Science’ (1911). Naturalism is the 
position that every phenomenon is a part of nature and is explained by the laws of 
nature. Everything that is real can be reduced to its physical nature. Even mental 
phenomena are dependent on physical nature and corresponding rigid laws. Husserl 
writes that the naturalist ‘sees only nature, and primarily physical nature… 
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Whatever is belongs to psychophysical nature, which is to say that it is univocally 
determined by rigid [scientific] laws’ (PRS 79). 
Husserl argues that naturalism is the dominant philosophical outlook of his time, 
and as a result philosophy traditionally has treated ‘consciousness as something 
[which is] a completely natural being, a mere part of nature’ (Moran, 2006: 142). 
Furthermore, naturalism is so deeply embedded in our everyday assumptions about 
the world that it is the default cultural outlook. Husserl writes that we ‘do not easily 
overcome the inborn habit of living and thinking according to the naturalistic 
attitude’ (PRS 109). The prominence of naturalism in philosophy and everyday life 
has a serious impact on how we as a society understand consciousness and explain 
mental phenomena. Naturalism is thus highly influential to how we think. As I will 
show, Husserlian ecophenomenologists hope to reorientate our outlook away from 
naturalism and towards phenomenology.
Transcendental idealism is the view that everything that exists, including our minds, 
is ‘nothing but an intentional structure of transcendental consciousness’ (I will 
explain what is meant by ‘intentional’ shortly) (Philipse, 1996: 244). Based on his 
transcendental idealism, Husserl holds that naturalism is based on a number of 
unfounded presuppositions and fails to acknowledge its own limitations, such as its 
necessary inability to grasp human consciousness. Naturalism only grasps one 
aspect of reality and it is simply incapable of accounting for consciousness.
In Ideas, Husserl introduces the concept of the ‘natural attitude’ which is a 
common-sense mental stance through which we engage with the world around us, 
making many presuppositions along the way (ID I 64). The natural sciences tend to 
rely on unfounded presuppositions and lack epistemological modesty (ID I 57). 
However, Husserl does recognise that the sciences can be extremely useful. 
Problems occur when sciences overstep their bounds and try to answer (or reject 
the validity of) questions concerning consciousness and human experience. The 
naturalist tends to answer such questions through either empirical psychological 
findings or, more recently, neuroscience and biochemical research (ID I 35-36). 
Naturalists forget that, in David Cerbone’s words, ‘there are questions that are in 
principle beyond their reach’ (2008: 17). Naturalism can explain mere ‘sensuous, 
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experiential seeing’, but not conscious encounters with the world (ID I 36). 
Consciousness is ‘reified’ by naturalism because naturalism has a narrow field of 
study, i.e. physical objects and natural laws (PRS 85). Naturalism is inappropriate 
for understanding consciousness.
Intentionality
Brentano was a teacher and friend of Husserl’s, and introduced him to the doctrine 
of intentionality, i.e. that conscious acts are about or directed towards something 
(Moran, 2006: 47, 69). Brentano never used the term ‘intentionality’, choosing 
instead to speak of the ‘intentional object’ or ‘intentional relation’:
Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within 
itself… In presentation something is presented, in judgement 
something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire 
desired and so on (1995: 88).
Husserl’s version of intentionality emphasises the importance of the concept of 
intentionality to the project of understanding consciousness (Moran, 2006: 114). 
Husserl writes on intentionality in such a way as to echo, if not flatly plagiarise, 
Brentano: ‘In perception something is perceived, in imagination something is 
imagined, in a statement something stated, in love something loved, in hate hated, 
in desire, desired, etc.’ (LI 554). Husserl explains that ‘all thought and knowledge 
have as their aim objects or states of affairs’ (LI 253). In his Paris Lectures he 
writes that ‘consciousness is always consciousness of something’ (PL 13).
According to Husserl there are many forms of intentional structures, including 
many possible subspecies of each structure (LI 555). The best way to express these 
intentional structures is by using ‘the language of commonsense psychology’ 
(Moran, 2006: 114). Using the example of a building in Berlin, Husserl writes that 
description of the consciousness of the building ‘cannot be otherwise expressed 
than by saying [this building] is perceived, imagined, pictorially represented, 
judged about, delighted in, wished for etc. etc.’ (LI 560). Intentional experiences 
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can be simple, such as seeing an unfamiliar and unremarkable landscape; or 
complex, such as seeing a photograph of a familiar and remarkable landscape, 
about which we have strong feelings (such as a graveyard where a close loved one 
is buried). 
The association between consciousness of an object, and the object itself (i.e. ‘the 
mind-transcendent’ metaphysical object whose existence goes beyond our 
conscious experience of it, as opposed to a mind-dependent object of our 
imagination), reveals an important part of Husserl’s phenomenology. Husserl 
stresses the difference between the object or content of experience, noema, and the 
process of experience, noesis. When I perceive an object, for example a rock, I only 
see it from one side, in a certain light, from a certain distance and so on. Though I 
can walk around it to see a different ‘profile’ (Abschattungen), or visit the rock at a 
different time of day when the light is different, or step back and see it from a 
different distance, I can only ever experience one possibility of each variable at 
once (LI 538). I can not experience the rock in daylight, near pitch black, and 
moonlight all at once. Nor can I experience it from all sides at once. Despite this, I 
understand that each view, each arrangement of the variables of perception (light, 
distance etc.), presents to me the same rock. 
A more sophisticated example is required to understand further dimensions of 
experience, specifically the experience of time. Husserl claims that time-
consciousness is a ‘wonder’, ‘rich in mystery’, and is also one of the most difficult 
and important areas of phenomenology (PCIT 290, 286, 346). To experience a song 
(say Beethoven’s Fifth) rather than a collection or string of notes, it is important 
that the notes are experienced in a specific order. The listener must hear the first 
note at time t1, the second at t2, and so on (PCIT 341). If each note was 
experienced at once, the listener would not hear Beethoven’s Fifth but rather a 
cacophony. Though both experiences (the symphony played out in time, and played 
all at once) contain the same notes, their temporal arrangement means that each 
experience has a different intentional object: each experience is directed towards a 
different thing. Thus the temporal arrangement of notes, in this case, affects the 
experience.
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Assuming that the notes are correctly spaced, we can begin to analyse the 
experience we have of music, which is analogous to far wider content than this 
trivial example suggests. If with each new note heard we remember the previous 
note or notes so that they ‘sound now’, our experience would be cacophonous. If 
we forget each of the previous notes, our experience would not be of a song but of 
a stand-alone note. To experience a song, then, we must not remember or forget
each note. Retention allows for each note to be remembered, not as ‘sounding now’ 
but as having just sounded. We retain them rather than recall (or re-sound) them so 
that our experience of each new note is informed, but not subsumed, by each past 
note. Thus the experience of a song has a retentional structure to it. 
A further aspect of the experience of music (and time) is protention. Our ‘now’ 
experience includes, along with the notes retained and the note being heard now, 
notes we expect to hear. To take the example of the beginning of Beethoven’s 
Fifth, which has three short notes followed by a long note, we would be surprised if 
the fourth note was not struck as expected. Part of the experience of the first three 
notes is the expectation that there will be a fourth, fifth, sixth, and so on2. We 
experience each of the first three notes in such a way as to protain further notes: 
our ‘now’ experience includes the protention of something which we are yet to 
experience. Thus experience of time has a ‘horizonal’ structure: 
As one note in the melody is experienced as currently sounding, the 
just-experienced and the still-to-be-experienced notes are part of the 
horizon of that moment of experience; the current moment of 
experience ‘points to’ those further notes as retained or expected 
(Cerbone, 2008: 27).
What each element of experience allows us to form is what Husserl calls a 
‘synthesis’, providing us with a ‘unity of the flow’ of the experience (PCIT 378).
To summarise, for Husserl, temporal experiences (not just of music) have a 
                                               
2 As I will discuss later, Kohák adapts Husserl’s notion of protention to discuss our moral 
expectations, and how something is deemed good or bad based on how behaviour corresponds to 
our expectations. Betrayal, for example, is especially hurtful partly because it is counter to our 
expectations.
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retentional, protentional, horizonal, and synthetical aspect. If any element is 
missing then the experience will be substantially altered. To apply this to an 
experience of the natural environment, say a walk in a park, we must retain the 
memory of the path we have walked along for the past twenty minutes, we must 
expect to walk further along this path before the experience ends, thereby fulfilling 
the horizonal element of experience, and we must be able to synthesise each aspect 
to have the experience of walking in the park. 
Husserl’s phenomenology can crudely, though sufficient for my current purposes, 
be understood as being intentional, at heart, in that it is the study of the structure of 
the conscious experience of something. From this Husserl argues that to experience 
something is to have a temporal experience of it. As with only hearing one note of 
a song, seeing only one profile of a rock gives us a limited experience of 
something. Though we cannot experience each profile of the rock, or each note of a 
song, all at once, we can synthesise each view – each angle, distance, light state, 
etc. – to form a more complete understanding of the phenomena in question.
Husserl’s first reduction
Though he frequently added to and amended it, Husserl consistently heralds his 
method of reduction as ‘his greatest discovery’ (Moran, 2006: 12). It takes its name 
from the Latin reducere, ‘to lead back’, and is necessary in order to ‘go back to the 
things themselves’ (LI 252). Husserl proposed a series of reductions as the 
appropriate method for understanding conscious phenomena, unlike the natural 
attitude. To grapple with such subjects as consciousness we need ‘an entirely new 
point of departure and an entirely new method’ which is ‘remote from natural 
thinking’ (IP 19; ID I xvii). Only the reduction can provide this.
The method of reduction first appears in the second volume of Logical 
Investigations (1901). The aim here is to allow us to move from everyday, natural 
reflection to phenomenological reflection. Natural reflection is impure, it is laced 
with assumptions and prejudices which make it a poor tool. Husserl writes, 
‘naturalistic prejudice… confuses phenomenological viewing’ (PRS 115). The 
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reduction, by stepping out of prejudices and assumptions, allows for pure 
reflection. The purpose of the reduction is to discard the non-essential elements of 
conscious experience, to lay bare the bones of consciousness. By performing 
reductions we can gain a solid understanding of consciousness, conscious 
phenomena, and the interactions between the content and the process of 
consciousness. 
Husserl elaborates on this in Ideas (1913), and introduces the term ‘epoché’ 
(‘abstention’ or ‘suspension’) which he borrows from the skeptics, especially 
Pyrrho. To perform the epoché we must set aside all assumptions we have about 
the way things are. This does not mean that we reject these assumptions as invalid. 
We suspend all assumptions about ‘all varieties of cultural expression’ including 
arts, sciences, morals, religions, and instead we ‘see’ only ‘what is given in pure 
experience’ (ID I 171, 164). This is a strenuous task, and, as I will show later, some 
existentialists including Heidegger claim it is not possible to step outside of our 
‘cultured’, prejudiced perspective. But, for Husserl, it is necessary if we wish to 
understand the essential features of conscious experience.
Husserl proposes a method for testing the results of the reduction called ‘free 
variation’ (EJ 340). The hope is that everyone who uses their rational mind will 
reach the same conclusion. This method is best explained by example. To 
understand the essence of our experience of a rock we should vary certain 
properties of it. For example, we could vary the shape of the rock from long and 
thin as it first appears, to spherical. We would still intuitively call this a rock, thus a 
particular shape is not an essential property of a rock. But we would struggle to 
imagine it as ‘shapeless’. Such a thing would, at least intuitively, cease to be a 
rock. Thus by varying properties we can see that it is non-essential that a rock is a 
certain shape, but essential that it is a shape of some description. 
The second reduction and the transcendental ego
In the first decade of the twentieth century, Husserl realised that phenomenology, 
while exploring essential structures and intentional objects of conscious 
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experience, must also recognise that all conscious experience is rooted in a 
transcendental realm. This necessitates a second level of reduction. Beyond merely 
suspending assumptions about the world we live in, with its natural laws and our 
cultural prejudices, we must bracket our empirical (‘relative’) self from the 
phenomenological project. We have distinctive characteristics, moods, experiences, 
and so on, which tend to make us approach analyses, including phenomenological 
analyses, in a prejudiced manner. We must bracket this aspect of the ‘self’ to 
expose the ‘self’ which performs the epoché. The latter is the transcendental ego. It 
is the world-constituting ‘absolute source’ of our experiences (CM 65). 
The transcendental ego has several important features. In Ideas Husserl claims that 
it cannot:
[B]e taken for itself and made into an object of inquiry on its own 
account. Apart from its “ways of being related” or “ways of 
behaving”, it is completely empty of essential components, it has no 
content that could be unravelled, it is in and for itself indescribable: 
pure ego and nothing further (ID I 233).
Later, in the Paris Lectures, Husserl wants for there to be a connection between the 
transcendental ego and other ‘levels’ of the self. Having performed the reductions 
necessary to reach the phenomenological attitude, the individual becomes the 
‘disinterested spectator’ of his own ‘natural worldly ego and its life’ (PL 15). The 
transcendental ego, the phenomenological spectator, finds himself ‘detached’ from 
his worldly self and worldly interests (‘which I nonetheless possess’,) and instead 
finds himself looking down on himself from his phenomenological viewpoint (PL
15). We, as good Husserlian phenomenologists, are to be sufficiently detached 
from our worldly prejudices – impurities of thought – so as to achieve truthful 
phenomenological insight, but must never attempt to be entirely detached from our 
worldly self. Indeed, that would be impossible as the transcendental ego is 
intentional – we are always linked to the world and cannot become ‘pure’ 
phenomenological spectators.
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Lifeworld, empathy, and intersubjectivity
Before Husserl introduced the concept of lifeworld (Lebenswelt) in his Vienna 
Lecture (1935) or his Crisis of European Sciences (1936), he talks of a similar idea, 
Umwelt, meaning ‘surrounding world’ or ‘environment’ in the second book of 
Ideas. 
In whatever way we may be conscious of the world as universal 
horizon, as coherent universe of existing objects, we, each ‘I-the-man’ 
and all of us together, belong to the world as living with one another 
in the world; and the world is our world, valid for our consciousness 
as existing precisely through this ‘living together’ (CES 108).
As I noted above, Husserl was aware that consciousness and body were not 
separate. In the Crisis he takes this further. Here he recognizes that consciousness 
is already embedded within, and operating within, a world of meanings which are 
socially and culturally constituted. Any efforts to study ‘pure consciousness’ as 
something which is separate from this social world full of meanings are misguided. 
Instead, Husserl shifts to study ‘world-consciousness’ (CES 254).
Empathy (Einfühlung) plays a key role in Husserl’s conception of the lifeworld and 
intersubjectivity. Empathy involves conscious attribution of intentional acts to 
other subjects. Rather than something simply ‘happening’ (like a branch falling 
from a tree), we can intuit that something has deliberately happened as a result of 
the presence of another psyche (such as a fallen branch being collected for 
firewood). As part of this empathy, we require that the other looks and behaves 
something like ourselves, and exhibits certain traits of consciousness. By acting as 
we would if we were in their shoes, the other allows us to ascribe intentional acts to 
them. Though I do not wish to go into criticism at great depth here, Husserl’s 
account of empathy is rather shallow. Emmanuel Levinas criticises Husserl because 
he lacks an account of genuine intersubjective encounter, and only seems to explain 
the presence of other minds (Bergo, 2011). Buber does go into much more depth on 
this topic, as I will show in chapter three.
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Though each of us carries our own lifeworld, with our own historical-social-
cultural experiences, the lifeworld remains the domain for intersubjective 
consciousness. Indeed, historical-social-cultural meanings are intersubjectively 
accessible and communicable. In Ideas II, Husserl uses the example of coal. He 
remarks that one person can recognize it as a useful substance for burning and 
others notice this, so ‘it acquires an intersubjective use-value and in a social 
context is appreciated and is valuable as serving such and such a purpose, as useful 
to man, etc.’ (ID II 196). 
Husserlian Ecophenomenology
Husserl’s phenomenology demonstrably shifted throughout his life. This allows for 
many different ‘Husserlian’ phenomenologies and ecophenomenologies. Areas for 
Husserl’s contribution to ecophenomenology include: his anti-naturalism; his 
account of experience, interaction, and time; and his notion of lifeworld and the 
creation of meaning through relationships. Importantly though, Husserl never 
considers the essential structures of our experience of nature. Thus some work 
needs done in order to convert Husserl’s work into an ecophenomenology. Each of 
these issues will be explored in this section.
Though Husserl did not direct his phenomenology towards environmental ethics, 
some of his works inspire one major group within the ecophenomenology 
movement. In this section I will expound Husserlian ecophenomenology with 
reference to two of the most important contemporary Husserlian 
ecophenomenologists, Brown and Kohák. The aim here is to demonstrate the 
potential for Husserl’s phenomenology to support a coherent system of 
environmental ethics. Much of the discussion focuses on Husserlian anti-
naturalism, Husserl’s theory of the lifeworld, and the role of experience in the 
creation of meaning and value. Though some aspects of Husserlian 
ecophenomenology are convincing, especially anti-naturalism, I argue here that as 
yet no convincing Husserlian ecophenomenology has been devised, and I am 
unable to sidestep the problems I identify below within a Husserlian framework. I 
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thus reject Husserlian ecophenomenology, but that is not to say that we cannot 
learn from its strengths, or indeed from its weaknesses. 
‘The Real and the Good’:
Charles Brown’s Husserlian Ecophenomenology
Brown adopts Husserl’s emphasis on lived experience and anti-naturalism, and 
directs these towards creating a Husserlian ecophenomenology. Here I will explain 
Brown’s argument and attempt to show that it is largely unsuccessful. There are 
many good aspects to Brown’s work, such as his advocacy of pluralism, his attempt 
to straddle moral relativism and absolutism, and his insistence that nature should be 
worshipped not as a Goddess but as a ‘fellow mortal’ (2003: 16). Despite these 
strengths, Brown’s curiously optimistic view of history as naturally bringing about 
necessary changes in policy and behaviour because of collective ‘moral unease’ 
(such as in the case of slavery) is dubious. Ultimately, as I will show in chapter 
three, Buber offers a more nuanced and robust defence of pluralism and anti-
instrumentalism. 
According to Brown, modern methods of enframing nature give us only a limited 
view of it. Within naturalism we see only causally-bound, extensional properties 
which obey natural laws. A forest functions like clockwork – gravity causes the 
leaves to fall, insects and bacterium cause the leaves to decay, this mulch fertilises 
the ground to allow seeds to grow into trees which shed their leaves and so on. 
Naturalism sees only the mechanics. Or rather, anything beyond the ‘Real’ 
mechanics such as beauty or harmony, which we might call ‘Good’, is dismissed as 
merely subjective3. Any concept of subjectivity, transcendence, meaning, or value, 
is labelled as ‘outside of nature’ (Brown, 2003: 8). As a result of reducing reality to 
only include causality and extensional properties, ‘naturalism separates the Good 
from the Real’ (Brown, 2003: 3). As long as the Good and the Real are 
conceptually separated, ethics and values will seem somehow unReal. The separate 
Real is conceived of by naturalism as having only causal meaning and value. There 
is no basis in naturalism’s account of the Real for intrinsic values and non-
                                               
3 I use capitals for ‘Good’ and ‘Real’ in accordance with Brown’s own writing.
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instrumental ethics. Brown dubs the ecological crisis ‘a crisis of meaning’ (Brown, 
2003: 5). Moral value needs to be reinstated within Reality to overcome the 
nihilism of naturalism. Brown’s task, then, is to ensure that the Good and the Real 
remain united and for this he uses Husserl’s phenomenology.
According to Brown and Husserl, the sciences have a tendency to seek objectivity 
and universality. But the aim to present a monistic ‘true’ picture of reality is flawed 
(Brown, 2003: 8). The ‘notion of objectivity itself is a highly idealized and abstract 
construction’ (Brown, 2003: 8). ‘Objectivity’ typically connotes ‘emotional 
detachment’, ‘empirical reliability’, and ‘procedural correctness’, but above all, a 
sense of ‘absolute truth’. This objective truth claims that there is one single correct 
description of a thing, the object exists in a mind-independent reality, and it has 
‘wholly determinable… fixed properties’ (Brown, 2003: 8). Certainly scientific 
analyses have their uses, but for Brown, our confidence in objectivity in 
appropriate areas should not stray into other fields. Even if science can reveal many 
‘true’ qualities of a quark, rock, or tree, this does not entail that we could possibly 
make objective claims about morality, especially on the basis of naturalistic 
enquiries.
It is in metaethics and normative ethics that the notion of objectivity presents great 
difficulties. When considering what ‘goodness’ is, objective metaethics suggests 
that there can be a constant – something which is always good in every situation. 
When put into normative ethics, an objective system of ethics will then say that 
certain situations always require the same behaviour. For example, it is always 
wrong to kill, because killing is objectively wrong.
Brown argues that almost all modern moral theories (i.e. those emerging from the 
Enlightenment) are underpinned by a belief in objective moral absolutes. They 
share ‘an underlying and unexamined metaphysical view’ in that each theory 
‘assumes that all moral phenomena share a single underlying essence’ (Brown, 
2003: 9). Modern moral theories are independent of subjectivity: even in the case 
of egoism the abstract notion of ‘the ego’ is prioritised above the individual. 
Modern metaethics, like objectivity, presupposes ‘absolute truth’ beyond 
subjectivity.
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When considered in relation to normative ethics we see that modern moral theories 
often present us with fixed obligations which are separate (though they may run 
parallel on occasion) to our situation, desires, and beliefs. Whether it is a 
commitment to duty, happiness, or the ego, there is a universal and absolute moral 
standard which is ‘true’ independently of the subject and her experiences. ‘For 
modern theory, morality becomes effectively decidable as some sort of calculus is 
applied to so-called objective standards of right and wrong’ (Brown, 2003: 9). 
Normative ethics based on objective metaethics presents us with rules that we 
either obey or fail to obey. According to Brown, when ‘morality becomes governed 
by an external calculus, the good [is] secondary to the right’ (2003: 9). The 
problem, Brown argues, is that each moral theory adopts a form of ‘Rule-Based 
Moral Monism’ and in doing so the theories reduce ‘all moral phenomena to a 
single criterion’ (such as duty, contracts, etc.) (2003: 10). Modern moral theories 
present us with criterions of goodness and badness, and quantify how good or bad 
we are. Such theories deny our subjectivity (i.e. the importance of emotions, 
desires, beliefs, and situations). Given that such a moral calculus is so abstract from 
our actual lived experience, moral philosophy and its claims of objectivity ought to 
be discarded. 
The monistic moral theories from the Enlightenment are flawed because they are 
monistic. The alternative, then, is pluralism. And given Brown’s background in 
phenomenology, pluralism is recounted with particular emphasis on experience. He 
argues that moral theory should be based on both ‘an attitude of respect’ for 
experience, and on recognition that objective morality is impossible:
Thus we must be open to a kind of moral pluralism in which, for 
example, a duty to tell the truth may be, in one case, grounded in 
utility and, in another case, grounded in respect for the person with 
whom I am speaking. Or, from another perspective, we may find that 
it is appropriate to have an attitude of moral regard and respect for 
some nonhuman others because they may be able to suffer and for 
others because they are components of the biosphere (2003: 10).
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Brown goes from here to formulate his Husserlian ecophenomenology. He argues 
that moral experiences are irreducible from, and essential to, our experience of the 
world (specifically the lifeworld). ‘We regularly find the world and the things 
within it to be infused with value’ (Brown, 2003: 11). We experience the sun, rain, 
and many other things as good. Our moral assessments of the world are intentional, 
thus Good (our moral assessment) is a property of some thing (the Real). Brown 
writes that ecophenomenology does not seek ‘to break apart the primal unity of the 
act of valuing and thing valued… but rather to simply describe the primal unity’ 
(2003: 11). Brown’s account of Husserl and objectivity show that Husserlian 
ecophenomenology is pluralistic and that ethics are dependent on the encounter.
Our understandings of Good are subject to reassessment based on new experiences. 
This is in much the same way as what we believe to be Real or True is contingent 
on counterevidence. For example, a piece of CCTV footage may reveal a defendant 
to have been lying, and shows that we were wrong to believe his alibi. While we 
can hold quite firmly that something is the case, this position is still open to re-
evaluation. In the case of competing perspectives  – say a logging company which 
views the clearance of many hectares of ancient woodland as good versus a group 
of residents of the forest who oppose the clearance – the matter is more complex 
(Brown, 2003: 11). While the logging firm may see huge swathes of cleared 
forestry as good, other perspectives, including others who use the forest (animals, 
symbiotic plant life, people, and future generations of each), add balance to the 
picture. Those who do not have short term-profit to be made from deforestation see 
that maintaining and preserving woodland is good because it promotes life. It is 
through dialectical consideration that moral decisions should be made. By 
considering the interests of nature and the wider consequences of our actions, it is 
assumed that we would not harm the natural environment. Such a process would 
seriously limit the long-term damage done to the environment in the pursuit of 
short-term profit. Currently the profit attained by a small group of humans tends to 
receive disproportionate weighting over the cost paid by a large group of humans, 
animals, and plants, present and future. Husserlian ecophenomenology offers a 
route through which we can criticise or praise environmental practices. Wherever it 
seems that one voice is given too much weight, we must redress this imbalance by 
studying the implications of our behaviour.
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According to Brown, we experience rain and sun as good because we understand 
them to be good for the biotic web of the Earth (2003: 12). We think these things 
good because we are aware of our own dependency on the planet and the consistent
functioning of the ecosystem. Too much sun or rain is bad because they damage the 
ecosystem. We recognise that life on Earth flourishes when everything is in a 
healthy and sustainable balance: over-population of predators leads to the 
extinction of prey and then of predators. Brown urges that we recognise that the 
Earth is not a mystical being: it is neither a Goddess nor a God-send of infinite 
resources for our benefit. Instead we should understand it and treat it as a ‘fellow 
mortal’ (Brown, 2003: 16).
Entrenched within this discussion is a moral judgement similar to the sanctity of 
life principle that ‘life is to be sought and cherished while death is to be shunned 
and avoided’ (Brown, 2003: 13). Brown, then, seems to be making an objective and 
universal ethical claim. That which sustains life is good, and that which destroys it 
is bad. But rather than being an absolute claim that any and all death is bad, Brown 
may support a more consequentialist system. For example, the Inuit practice of 
sending elderly members out into the snow to die during hard times may seem 
barbaric and yet it sustains the tribe. Rather than feeding an elderly person, 
resources are used on raising the young so that they grow strong and become good 
hunters – ideally good enough to feed themselves and others (including the 
elderly). The practice in fact sustains life. It is not only necessary, but good. 
However, in societies where there are plentiful resources, sending the elderly out to 
die would not sustain life at all. In this case, such a practice would be ethically bad. 
The principle that what sustains life is good remains, though the actions justified 
are completely different. Again distinct from the sanctity of life principle, Brown 
notes that it is not merely a question of life and death which effect moral 
evaluations: ‘Why are we so sure that dishonesty, fraud, rape, and murder are evil? 
Because each, although in different ways, retard and inhibit the intrinsic purposes 
and desires of life’ (Brown, 2003: 14). Brown is claiming that ‘flourishing’ is better 
than suffering. It is quantity and quality of life that must be considered. 
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According to Brown, historically society has demonstrated a number of seismic 
shifts in its ethical stance towards, for example, institutional slavery and racism. 
Brown highlights substantial ‘moral unease’ which ‘remained mute and powerless 
until the Enlightenment rhetoric and the ideologies and discourses of freedom and 
equality were developed’ (2003: 16). Practices of slavery and racism end because 
the ‘interpretation [that such practices are good] cannot be sustained indefinitely’ 
(Brown, 2003: 15). Practices which harm community (it is unclear what scale 
Brown is referring to here) ultimately collapse. We continue to find value in 
friendship, shelter, community, food, and so on because these sustain life and tend 
to make it good. Over time society comes to identify some things as bad and others 
as good. Brown calls this the ‘evolving wisdom of our collective experience’ 
(2003: 15). Through this we avoid moral absolutism as moral truths are always 
open to reassessment, and we avoid relativism because ‘our experiences of the 
Good themselves demand their own confirmation in future experience’ (Brown, 
2003: 15). Brown seems to advocate a sort of ‘evidence based’ system of morality. 
Some situations may reveal something as good, but most reveal it as bad, so on the 
whole this practice or belief is to be considered bad. Though initially we may have 
considered something good, new evidence can change this position, and perhaps 
back again. While during the Enlightenment, Western society believed that the 
world was a massive resource for us to conquer, own, and use, this belief is 
increasingly challenged. People are reassessing the belief that natural resources can 
and should be tirelessly used in the pursuit of material wealth. According to Brown, 
our collective ‘evolving wisdom’ is moving towards the position that these 
practices cannot continue as they are harmful to the biosphere, and thus harmful to 
the quality and quantity of life, beyond anthropocentric interests.
What we are left with is an ecophenomenology which holds that values are rooted 
in, and discovered through, our experience of the environment. Brown writes that 
‘[i]t seems to be a fundamental possibility that humans can experience nature as 
infused with goodness and from within an attitude of concern and empathy’ (2003: 
15). Such an attitude sustains and promotes life. Brown seeks to avoid the 
metaphysical naturalist assumption that what is Real is value-neutral, and what is 
Good is somehow separate from the Real world. To do this, Brown argues that we 
cannot have experience of the Real without experience of the Good. Our 
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relationship with the environment is necessarily value-laden and thus naturalism is 
fatally flawed because it attempts to deny the validity of such experiences of 
meaning and value.
Criticisms of Brown’s ecophenomenology
The principle contradiction in Brown is that he argues against a universal moral 
standard, but then he develops his own – namely that what is good is so because it 
protects or improves life, and what is bad does the opposite. While there are indeed 
no universal normative ethics coming from Brown, there certainly seems to be a 
basic universal belief, albeit in a more sophisticated account of ‘life’ than the 
sanctity of life principle. 
Brown wishes us to base moral assessments on our experience of the world, but our 
experience of a flood is as something ‘bad’. We can only understand the pluralistic 
moral assessment of the flood by stepping out of our experience of it. But beyond 
our experience we have no way of assessing something. A desert, a field covered in 
locusts, or a perfectly balanced and self-sustaining rainforest are all morally neutral 
to us from outside of our perspective as ‘human’. So are we to base moral 
assessments simultaneously on our experiences and from outside of our 
experiences? This seems like a difficult task, and Brown offers no explanation of 
how this is to be done. It seems that he is advocating some form of empathy, but 
Brown does not develop this, and as I have already said, Husserl’s own account of 
empathy is found wanting. Buber, as I will show, does give a nuanced account of 
empathy (or as he terms it, ‘inclusion’). In sum, Brown does offer 
ecophenomenology much, but there are flaws which must be addressed. These 
flaws, it seems, are the result of the basic problems of pure phenomenology. I will 
show in chapter three how a dialogical and existential phenomenology can 
overcome these.
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‘An Understanding Heart’:
Erazim Kohák’s Husserlian Ecophenomenology
Because one of Kohák’s best known works, an introduction to environmental 
philosophy The Green Halo (2000), does not explore his own position (except very 
briefly in the postscript), I focus here on Kohák’s journal article ‘Knowing Good 
and Evil’ (1993) and book chapter ‘An Understanding Heart’ (2003), both of which 
focus on the place, or creation, of meaning in value through our lived experience of 
the world. Many of his current ideas were formed or inspired while Kohák wrote 
his book The Embers and the Stars (1984) in which he depicts his years living 
‘beyond the power lines’ in a forest cabin in New Hampshire. Though interesting 
in its own right, his more mature philosophical position is what I will focus on. 
Like Brown, Kohák argues that reason and ethics have been mistakenly separated 
by Enlightenment philosophers and scientists. Kohák attempts to develop an 
account for the reunification of reason and ethics based on Husserl’s lifeworld and 
transcendental phenomenology. 
Along the lines of Husserlian anti-naturalism, Kohák is highly critical of the 
Enlightenment project to reduce ‘rationality to instrumentality’ (2003: 20). He 
praises Husserl’s ‘persistent quest for an alternative conception of rationality’ 
based in the lifeworld which is ‘a value-laden world structured by meaning’ (2003: 
23). Kohák also notes that at ‘the dawn of modernity, European thought reduced its 
conception of explanatory rationality to mathematical and causal relations only’ 
(2003: 21). Kohák argues that the Enlightenment project was misguided as it 
sought to separate reason and value. Rather than blaming ‘some fatal flaw in our 
collective unconscious’ (such as a persistent tendency to exploit whatever we can, 
e.g. nature), Kohák places the blame for the current environmental crisis on this 
‘wrong turn’ in European thought in the seventeenth century and after (2003: 19). 
We should be committed to reason, but not of the ‘heartless’ form which has been 
dominant for the past few centuries. Kohák believes that many acts of immorality 
have been carried out based on this heartless rationality. In one of his earlier works, 
Kohák recounts of how he used to work as a baggage handler at an airport:
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I used to unload crates of monkeys destined for scientific 
experimentation. They were crammed in flimsy cages, their condition 
horrible. I remember skulls cracked open. They huddled, bewildered, 
to each other, destined for torture and death, and all that in the name 
of ‘science’ (1986: 56-57).
He goes further:
For better or for worse and for whatever reason, science has been the 
most dehumanizing of human endeavours. I am not thinking now of 
its effect on its victims or beneficiaries, but rather on its perpetrators. 
Once clad in a white laboratory coat and equipped with a slide rule, 
humans seem to become monsters, devoid of conscience, devoid of 
all moral scruples (1986: 57).
Heartless rationality, present in Western society’s ‘obsession’ with scientific 
discovery, is similarly present in philosophy. Kohák writes that philosophers from 
the Enlightenment onwards have ‘reduced the reason they charged with so noble a 
task to dealing with mathematical and causal relations, leaving questions of value 
and meaning in a limbo of non-rational’ (2003: 20). Of course, not all post-
Enlightenment philosophy (or science) does this, but certainly this ‘heartless 
reason’ is present in positivism and other influential strands of philosophy.
Kohák intends to present ‘in place of the heartless reason… a more adequate 
conception of reason that would subsume relations of value and meaning as well as 
those of cause and number… that we may discern between good and bad’ (2003: 
20). Kohák defines reason as a ‘way of interacting with the world around us’ 
(2003: 20). This allows Kohák to move reason towards an active ‘confrontation’ 
between subject, experience, and the world. If reason is an integral part of our 
interaction with the world, and we experience the world as value-laden, then it 
would be foolish to separate reason from value and meaning. 
Engrained in modern thought is the apparent division between reliable and rational 
objectivity and unreliable and irrational subjectivity. Kohák recognizes that this is a 
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tempting position: ‘Mathematical and causal relations really do appear as 
“objectively” there in a world independent of the subject’ (2003: 22). While it is 
always a subject who calculates that if a coppice of 30 trees were halved, 15 trees 
would remain, that fact is observable and decipherable by all who can understand 
basic arithmetic. It is a truth beyond human experience: it is objectively true. It is 
feared that such a truth would be diminished if it were based on subjective 
experience. Because judgments of value and meaning depend on experience and 
active engagement with the world, such judgments are commonly given less 
weighting than ‘objective’ or naturalistic states of affair (Kohák, 2003: 22). 
But, Kohák argues, relations of value and meaning ‘are utterly fundamental to 
human decision making’ (2003: 22). The consequences of using immensely 
powerful instrumental rationality with misguided, foolish, and irrational value-
systems could be, and have been, dire: ‘Irrationality of goals empowered by 
rationality of means… is deadly dangerous’ (Kohák, 2003: 29). Having been a 
victim of Nazi airborne ordnance, Kohák highlights that technical reasoning has 
been utilized and directed by meanings and values. In the case of the Luftwaffe, 
mathematical and scientific truths were used to advance fascist ideology which 
found meaning and value in nationalism, racism, and domination. Kohák describes 
such behaviour as like having a supercomputer directed by a Ouija board (2003: 
29). It is dangerous to base questions of good and evil on ‘instinct, intuition, or 
custom’ (Kohák, 2003: 22). Thus Kohák is seeking to supplement our proficiency 
for scientific and instrumental rationality (which can be a force for good), with a 
robust and rational (in his non-heartless sense of the word) value system. Note here 
that Kohák may be leaning towards ‘shallow’ ecology. In contrast to Heidegger, as 
I will show, Kohák’s philosophy might seek to find, say, technological solutions to 
problems of pollution such as carbon-capture on factory chimney stacks rather than 
an all-out rejection of the presence of such factories (as with the position of some 
‘deep’ ecologists4). Indeed, in The Green Halo, one of the solutions to the 
                                               
4 For the purposes of this thesis I do not wish to go into much detail about the distinction between 
‘deep’ and ‘shallow’ ecology. Very briefly, shallow ecology is the ‘fight against pollution and 
resource depletion [with the] central objective [being] the health and affluence of the people in 
developed countries’ (Næss, 1973: 95). Deep ecology asks longer-term questions about our 
relationship with nature and natural resources and encourages biospheric egalitarianism – an 
ontological shift away from the anthropocentrism of shallow ecology. I will discuss deep ecology 
and this ontological shift at some length later when I look at Zimmerman’s ecophenomenology. 
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environmental crisis he advances is ‘more effective technology’ (the other is ‘less 
demanding humanity’ – a route which he puts little hope in) (2000: 159).
How do we discern good from evil in a reasonable way that is based on subjective 
experience but not to be discarded as merely subjective? This is the aim of Kohák’s 
1993 paper ‘Knowing Good and Evil’ which I will unpack here. Kohák makes 
three arguments: firstly, the lifeworld is value-laden in part because life is 
purposive and active; secondly, and in accordance with Husserl again, expectations 
are a part of our experience of good and evil; and thirdly, life is valuable in and of 
itself: whatever is alive wants to remain alive. I will explore each of these in turn.
Life is ‘purposive in its very nature… To live means to strive to accomplish 
something, even if that something is as minimal as staying alive’ (Kohák, 1993: 
34). We exist within a context, the world, which may help or hinder our purposive 
activity, and we attribute these facets of contexts as being positive or negative to 
our purposes. Terms like ‘good’ and ‘bad’ relate to this. As such, purpose is greatly 
important to our definition of ‘good’ and our understanding of the world. Our 
experience of the world is value-laden because the world has an impact, good or 
bad, on our projects, desires and goals. This seems plausible prima facie: a rotten 
apple is bad if we are hungry and crave an apple; a person who hoards all the food 
required by a whole community seems worse than a single rotten apple, and might
be labelled ‘evil’. Our human minds are capable of performing abstractions and 
projections, and empathy, such that even when something seemingly assists us in 
our projects, or does not affect us at all, we can see that it is evil (Kohák, 1993: 35). 
For example, the damming of rivers to create a hydroelectric plant at the cost of 
habitat for rare species can be understood as bad because of how it affects other 
species, rather than how it might affect us.
The second level of moral experience identified by Kohák concerns our 
expectations. Kohák writes that we ‘do not face the world with a blank stare,
prepared for anything and anticipating nothing. We confront it with very definite 
expectations’ (1993: 35). Kohák is clearly following Husserl’s concept of 
protention here. A facet or level of our experience is what we expect to happen 
next, as is the case with the fourth note in Beethoven’s Fifth. Because of this 
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future-facing element of experience we do not simply understand the world as 
helping or hindering our purposive activity, ‘but also as better or worse in terms of 
living up to our expectations’ (Kohák, 1993: 35). To explain this, Kohák cites the 
example of the siege of Troy. Because this does not affect our own purposive 
activity (the first dimension of moral experience discussed above) we cannot label 
behaviour in the story as good or bad on these grounds. We can however assess 
behaviour based on what we expect from a hero, for example, and see if these 
expectations are met. If they are, then we experience the character as good, if not 
(say if they run away from the fight), we experience them as bad.
Kohák is keen to highlight that it is not just humans who experience satisfaction or 
disappointment based on expectations. When a dog expects a reward but does not 
receive it, their behaviour is clearly of disappointment. Likewise swallows appear
saddened if they cannot find their habitual nest (Kohák, 1993: 35). Kohák decides 
to sidestep discussion of whether or not plants experience expectations, saying that 
his concern is phenomenological rather than empirical. The main point, he says, ‘is 
that value judgments have an experiential foundation not only in the experience of 
utility [the first dimension], but also in the experience of relative perfection, of 
coming up to expectation’ (Kohák, 1993: 35). It is a little unclear what Kohák 
would have us base our expectations on, but I suspect it is primarily influenced by 
the lifeworld. For example, different cultures have different expectations of their 
own heroes. Often this relates to how a hero may save or enrich lives, which brings 
me to Kohák’s next point.
The third and final level of moral experience surrounds Kohák’s claim that ‘life is a 
value for itself… whatever is alive, wants to remain alive’ (1993: 35). Anyone who 
performs an exercise in Husserlian reflection can reach this conclusion for 
themselves. That life is valuable for itself is as much the case for people as it is 
with an animal licking its wounds or a tree striving to be tall enough to bask in the 
sunshine. ‘Not as a matter of doctrine, but as a matter of experience, life is a value 
for itself’ (Kohák, 1993: 36). Kohák insists that ‘being is good, to be sought and 
sustained, perishing is bad, to be shunned and avoided’ (1993: 36). The distinction 
between death as bad and life as good ‘expresses a basic, irreducible dimension of 
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lived experience – that life is precious and that some aspects of reality foster it, 
others hinder it’ (Kohák, 1993: 36).
Kohák acknowledges that for some ‘the pain of age or fortune outweighs life’s 
value’ and in these cases people or animals decide it is time to die (1993: 36). He 
also highlights that death is an essential and defining part of life. The implication, 
though Kohák does not spell it out, is that untimely death is bad (what elsewhere he 
calls ‘vain perishing’), but timely death is less bad (2000: 155). This is in 
accordance with our experiences. When a 93 year old dies we feel less of a sense of 
loss than if a young child dies. What makes the death of the young girl tragic and 
sad is that she and the world have been deprived of a potentially full being. Thus 
our experience is of a loss in itself (as with the first dimension of experience) and 
in terms of our expectations being unfulfilled. Kohák’s Husserlian moral theory 
seems to offer a fairly convincing explanation of how we experience some deaths 
as better than others.
The implications of Kohák’s position of life = good and death = bad on a system of 
ethics is fairly crude but intuitive. Social practices are bad if they hinder life itself; 
make our lives less good; or which make them less likely to meet expectations. 
Though based entirely on our experience of the world these judgments do not 
depend on ‘mere’ subjective experience, and as with mathematical or scientific 
truths they can be seen and understood (potentially) by anyone. Genocide, racism, 
rape, and murder, are bad every bit as much as 2 + 2 = 4 is true.
Some social beliefs sustain their people and help them prosper, others 
lead them to perish. Some things works, others just do not. That is not 
a matter of taste, that is not a function of preference. It is just the way 
it is (Kohák, 1993: 38).
Kohák claims that ‘harmony and diversity’ foster and sustain life. He draws the 
analogy between a healthy forest where no one plant or animal dominates too 
much with a rich society which can support a range of lifestyles and beliefs. Again 
Kohák does not spell it out but it is implied that practices of racial and cultural 
tolerance foster and sustain life, that our society and our lives are enriched by 
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multiculturalism every bit as much as an ecosystem is full of life only when there 
is a significant range of types of life. 
In terms of biodiversity, Kohák’s position on human population levels is similar to 
an excess of predators such that the prey become extinct, leading to a cataclysmic 
population collapse in the predators. He makes this point in his postscript to The 
Green Halo (2000: 93). Human population, and population growth, at current 
levels cannot be sustained by the Earth’s resources. Though he is keen to stress the 
intrinsic value of life, he adopts a consequentialist ethic. Though life is good, too 
much of any creature represents an imbalance. When there is this imbalance, life, 
which is good, is threatened. Culling deer, for example, might benefit the herd 
directly (because the weak and elderly will be killed), and while some deer are 
killed, the ultimate value of harmony and balance is privileged. Like any predator 
living off of the success of our prey, we must ‘accept limits to our greed’ (Kohák, 
2000: 93). Kohák urges that we ‘learn to love this Earth and to treat it with 
gratitude and respect’ (2000: 163). Kohák says that we should not seek to ‘save 
Nature’ (a goal he describes as ‘megalomania’) but we should try to ‘save 
humanity from the consequences of its own shortsighted greed’ (2000: 163).
Kohák’s Husserlian ecophenomenology can be summarised as consisting of an 
attempt to reunite rationality and subjective experience. Kohák seeks to ground our 
understanding of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ in experience, not just in terms of our selfish 
interests but also with due consideration given to other organisms. Kohák also 
wants us to respect the value of life, diversity, and harmony. This has social 
implications on small and large scales, as well as implications for environmental
policy.
As an environmental ethic, whilst we should not attempt to engineer or 
manufacture the world in this way (see above concern over megalomania), we can 
understand that a self-sustaining ecosystem (say a healthy and diverse forest in 
South America) is good. This is because it supports and maintains life, it meets our 
expectations of a healthy and flourishing ecosystem, and, owing to the diversity of 
lives within it, it enriches and protects the lives of its inhabitants (some creatures 
may benefit from a wide variety of fruits to be healthy, for example). Some dessert 
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areas are good because they match some of these criteria. However, because it 
sustains less life, and inhabitants have a less rich life, it is less good than the 
rainforest. In terms of our own farming behaviour, if we recognise that a certain 
volume of crops will be grown, we should seek to grow a diverse range. The 
monoculture system which lead to the potato blight in the mid-1800s in Ireland and 
the Scottish Highlands was wrong, not simply because it caused many deaths but 
because harmony and diversity was not protected. Healthy crop rotation is 
supported by Kohák’s theory. 
As was suggested above, Kohák thinks that it is unlikely that behaviour change 
alone can halt an impending environmental crisis. He supports technological 
solutions to a number of problems. Thus, unlike the supercomputer and the Ouija 
board, we should use our immense technological abilities and direct these skills 
using a rational value system. Mankind can continue to exploit the Earth’s 
resources, but only insofar as this is sustainable. As long as shale fracking is 
sustainable and pollutants are negligible or are captured, then there is nothing 
wrong with this practice, in much the same way as catching two or three salmon 
from a river flowing with a million fish is morally acceptable. Like the predators 
discussed above, our concern should be over sustainability and maintaining balance 
of population rather than the ethics of the hunt itself.
Criticisms of Kohák’s ecophenomenology
I have a number of criticisms of Kohák’s position, though his argument certainly 
seems to be an improvement on Brown’s Husserlian ecophenomenology. Firstly, 
for several reasons I am unconvinced that the pre-reflective dimension of 
experience is a reliable source of meaning and value, as Kohák argues. Secondly, 
Kohák offers nothing to deal with the problem of ‘proximity’ – our experience of 
local deforestation is different from distant deforestation: does this mean that local 
deforestation is better or worse than distant deforestation? An account that relies on 
lived (i.e. pre-reflective) experience seems to necessitate this error. My final 
criticism is that Kohák, and indeed Husserlian ecophenomenology generally does 
not consider the problem of alienation. 
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I agree that a great deal of the time we experience the world in a pre-reflective 
manner, as Kohák argues, but I do not agree that this presents a reliable basis for 
any moral philosophy. Husserl, in The Crisis of European Sciences (1936), argued 
that theoretical knowledge should correspond with pre-reflective experience, and 
this includes a moral dimension, so certainly Kohák is representing Husserl fairly. 
My concern is that our pre-reflective experience of the world can easily be 
influenced. Upbringing, culture, education, our moods, our hunger, the company 
we are with, and so on, all influence our pre-reflective experience of the world. As 
Husserl recognised, there are many factors that influence our experiences. For 
example, those who are educated to be deeply concerned about environmental 
issues, trained in a number of Earth sciences and ethics, may tend to encounter the 
natural world differently from someone raised in a logging family to join the family 
business. The latter’s experience of a forest will see resources, the former’s will see 
inherent value and beauty. Ought we to then encourage a shift in education policy 
towards environmental ethics from a young age? Perhaps, but Kohák certainly 
never spells this out. Though our experience of the world is certainly important, 
Kohák relies too heavily on it as a basis for his ethics. There should be space for 
reflection and dialogue; the notion of a pure pre-reflective ethic is unconvincing. 
My second concern is with what Peter Singer calls ‘proximity’ (1972). In response 
to the line that ‘charity begins at home’, Singer argues that a starving Bengali child 
ten thousand miles away is as deserving of our help as the neighbours child ten 
yards away. My concern here with Kohák is that, because meaning and value are 
based on experience, we experience problems near to us far more acutely than if 
they are far away. While many people in the Western world are aware of 
extraordinary deforestation in South America and starvation in developing nations, 
these problems are experienced in a very different way to local or near-local 
problems. I imagine many environmental ethicists would claim that deforestation 
abroad is just as serious a concern as local deforestation, yet this does not match 
our pre-reflective experience. Again Kohák’s reliance on pre-reflective experience 
is misguided. 
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Final remarks
Some Husserlian ecophenomenologists, such as Iain Thomson, support a nurturing 
mentality towards nature, whereby we acknowledge ‘our own unavoidable 
custodial role’ (2003: 394). Others, like Kohák, are against such ‘megalomania’. 
Almost invariably, Husserlian ecophenomenologists have adopted the 
‘experiential’ argument to demonstrate our pre-reflective, value-laden encounters 
with the world. It is perhaps this beginning in life that stunts the growth of 
Husserlian ecophenomenology into something better. As is acknowledged by 
Brown and Toadvine in their introduction to Ecophenomenology, Husserl’s 
phenomenology ‘is a reduction of the world to meaning, and of meaning to 
subjectivity’ (2003: xiv). This emphasis on subjectivity as the progenitor of 
meaning infects any corresponding environmental ethic with anthropocentrism. 
Indeed, Husserl ‘never pulled away from his central theses, that the truth was to be 
found in the self, and that this truth was universal and necessary’ (Solomon, 1988: 
137). This commitment to the centrality of the subject as originator of truth was 
prone to change. At his most extreme, in Cartesian Meditations, Husserl considers 
the possibility of a ‘phenomenological egology’ (CM 30). In Formal and 
Transcendental Logic (1929), he insists that ‘the transcendental ego exists 
“absolutely”, and everything else is relative to it’ (Solomon, 1988: 138). He steps 
back from this in his last book, The Crisis of European Philosophy (1936), where 
he posits only that the ego is ‘correlative’ to the world (Solomon, 1988: 138). Here 
Husserl shifts from his rational individualistic account of the ego to his social 
theory of the lifeworld whereby intersubjectivity plays a large role in the creation 
of truth and meaning. Nonetheless, whether it is an individualistic transcendental 
ego or an intersubjective basis, the claim remains that meaning originates from 
human experience of the world. 
Though the environmental ethic which results from Husserlian phenomenology 
may deplore anthropocentrism and may advance the notion that human 
perspectives are not of ultimate or overriding importance, its basis in human-
centred and generated ‘truth’ seems to engender the same severance between our
truth and the truth of wider environment that we see in naturalism. If truth and 
meaning comes from us and only us then Husserlian ecophenomenology falls 
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down. The implication is that should human beings not exist then the natural 
environment would have no value (as value is based in human experience). 
As has been apparent throughout, I am favourably inclined towards anti-naturalism 
and pluralism, and I support the goal of shunning ‘heartless’ rationality. Beyond 
these gifts, Husserlian ecophenomenology offers us little other than frustration and 
disappointment. 
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Chapter Two:
Heideggerian Ecophenomenology
Martin Heidegger
Martin Heidegger is most famous for Being and Time, first published in 1927. It is 
sometimes understood that his later works lend themselves most directly to 
environmental concerns. However, it should be noted that the difference between 
early and late Heidegger is often overstressed, and that Heidegger refines rather 
than rejects his earlier work (Wrathall, 2011: 136). Indeed, Heidegger notes that 
what some describe as a turn in his philosophy later in life does not actually 
constitute ‘a change of standpoint from Being and Time’ (BW 208). Heidegger’s 
enduring concern is with answering the question: ‘What is the meaning of Being?’ 
(BT 19). Thus while this section will focus largely on Heidegger’s later philosophy, 
his earlier work cannot go unmentioned. A number of areas in Heidegger’s 
philosophy present themselves as relevant to ecophenomenology. They include his
anti-modernism, Dasein, care (Sorge), his account of technology, and his call to 
‘let things be’.
Anti-Modernism
Heidegger’s critical attitude to modernism greatly influences his criticisms of 
philosophy, his criticisms of modern technology, and his methods. Heidegger holds 
the pre-Socratics in high esteem, and charts the decline of philosophy and 
civilization after this period. The triumph of pre-Socratic philosophers was that 
they ‘experienced’ Being in an authentic way, as what Heidegger called physis
(‘the arising of something from out of itself’ (QCT 10)). This definition of Being as 
‘self-blossoming emergence’ is closely related to the Greek word for truth, 
Alētheia, meaning ‘unveiledness’ (IM 14-15). Greeks understood ‘truth as “the 
unconcealedness of beings”: a being is “true” when it emerges as it is, 
unconcealed’ (Cooper, 1996: 59). It is our place to serve as the ‘clearing’, to ‘guard 
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the truth’, meaning that we must allow things to emerge ‘as the beings they are’ 
(BW 210). 
Such understanding of Being, so says Heidegger, has long been suppressed by the 
dominant, erroneous post-Socratic conception of Being. From Socrates onwards, 
philosophy has largely focussed on the things which emerged, namely beings, 
rather than the process of emerging and unconcealing truth, namely Being (Cooper, 
1996: 59). The ‘decisive moment’ in the history of philosophy occurs when 
philosophers cease to study Being, and start to study beings (BQ 120). The 
substantial difference between Being and being is ignored. Being, even when 
highly elevated, is at most understood as ‘the condition necessary for us to perceive 
or otherwise encounter things’, rather than the ‘source of those very conditions’ 
(Cooper, 1996: 60). 
By the time of Aristotle, the decline had also engulfed the meaning of truth. Rather 
than meaning unveiledness, truth comes to refer to ‘the correctness of an assertion’ 
(BQ 98). This explains in part why Heidegger is critical of Aristotle’s notion of the 
rational animal, a conception of Being which has persisted. Rather than focussing 
on the unique way humans (Dasein) serve as clearing, Aristotle focuses on 
humankind’s ability to exercise reason as the defining characteristic of our 
existence. Heidegger’s account of clearing and Dasein, as we shall see, highlights 
much more substantial differences between mankind and other entities. While both 
Heidegger and Aristotle believe in humankind’s ability to uncover truth, both have 
seriously differing notions of truth in mind. 
Before going on, some mention of one of Heidegger’s methods is called for. 
Heidegger’s use of language and his repeated performance of etymological 
analyses are important throughout his life’s work. Language itself, specifically the 
terms we use regularly and unthinkingly, needs to be reassessed and reconfigured. 
Language shapes our unconscious perception of the world, and of our existence. 
Heidegger states that ‘we human beings remain committed to, and within, the being 
of language, and can never step out of it and look at it from somewhere else’ (BT
10). Thus it is by firmly grasping language that we can understand Being. Indeed, it 
is only through language that we understand Being. By writing in his distinctive 
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style, Heidegger hoped to make language seem unfamiliar and strange. Heidegger 
forces us to adopt new understanding of words, or rather to ‘re-awaken’ their old 
meanings (BT 1). Heidegger’s sense that civilization has declined since the pre-
Socratic era is embodied in his conviction that older language was better suited to 
the purpose of uncovering truth. Thus etymological analysis allows us to move 
away from our modern inaccurate use of language, and towards truth. 
Being and Time
Heidegger’s aim is to consider ‘the question of the meaning of Being’ (BT 1). He is 
keen to distance the phenomenological concept of ‘Being’ from the ordinary sense 
of the word, as in the sort of ‘being’ which is accessible through ‘empirical 
intuition’ (BT 54). Heidegger is concerned with the ontological exploration of 
Being, not with the ontical assessment of being. We are ‘Beings’, in that we are 
aware of, and able to consider ontological and other meaningful questions, for 
example, about the meaning of life. This is unlike ‘beings’, say a rock, a hat, a 
river, and so on, which cannot consider such questions. We allow for Being to 
reveal itself (BT 55). Thus Beings perform a disclosive role, but to make sense of 
this I must first unpack Heidegger’s definition of phenomenology.
One of Heidegger’s first etymological analyses in Being and Time comes when he 
assesses the word ‘phenomenology’, which had been familiar since Hegel and 
Husserl. To reach an understanding of the word itself he studies the composite 
words, phenomenon and logos. Heidegger writes that phenomenon ‘signifies that 
which shows itself in itself, the manifest’ (BT 51). Logos is defined by Heidegger as 
‘discourse’ (Rede) which ‘lets things be seen’ (BT 56). By allowing things to be 
seen, it is possible for ‘truth’ (alētheia) to be discovered, or ‘taken out of 
hiddenness’ (BT 57). By synthesizing the meanings of phenomenon and logos, 
Heidegger summarizes that phenomenology means ‘to let that which shows itself 
be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself’ (BT 58). 
Heidegger then goes on to reference Husserl: ‘But here we are expressing nothing 
else than the maxim formulated above: “To the things themselves!”’ (BT 58). 
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Key to Heidegger’s account of phenomenology is that it is not the study of that 
which primarily shows itself (i.e. ‘semblance’, or ‘mere appearance’), but rather is 
the study of what is hidden, namely Being (distinct from a being). ‘This [B]eing 
can be covered up so extensively that it becomes forgotten and no question arises 
about it or about its meaning’ (BT 59). Heidegger himself characterizes philosophy 
as ‘universal phenomenological ontology’ (BT 62). Heidegger’s philosophy is 
ontological in nature, with no emphasis put on values or ethics, quite the opposite. 
In this sense Heidegger is different from Husserl and Husserlian 
ecophenomenologists who devise an axiological philosophy. Whereas Husserlians 
rely on the epoché and reason to devise axioms and normative ethics, Heidegger 
instead focuses on Being-in-the-world to explain why things matter to us, and 
rejects such Husserlian ‘value-thinking’. Husserlians do not focus on Being or on 
Being-in-the-world, and thus Heideggerians take a very different path.
Dasein
According to Heidegger there are different modes of Being. The mode particular to 
humans is Dasein, or rather, in Heideggerian terms, humans ‘have the character of 
Dasein’ (BT 32). Literally translated, Dasein means ‘there-being’ (normally written 
as ‘Being-there’). This ‘there-ness’ conveys the sense that for Dasein, Being has 
‘presentness’ in that it is aware of itself as Being. This sets human consciousness
apart from all other forms. For example, a dog or a rock does not have the same 
awareness or thoughtfulness about its Being. Indeed, such an entity’s Being is a 
‘matter of indifference’, ‘or more precisely, they “are” such that their Being can be 
neither a matter of indifference to them, nor the opposite’ (BT 68). Thus Dasein, 
unlike any other Being yet encountered, is uniquely aware of its own Being. Thus, 
for Heidegger, Dasein is uniquely able to access questions of the meaning of Being 
which is Heidegger’s overarching project (BT 35). 
Because of this self-awareness, Dasein will be able to perform phenomenological 
analyses, to allow things to be unconcealed, to let things be, unlike any other 
Being. In Heidegger’s words, ‘Dasein exists as an entity for which, in its Being, 
that Being itself is an issue’ (BT 458). Dasein is ‘the being to whom and for whom 
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entities appear as they are’ (Mulhall, 2005: 74). Understanding the ‘essential 
structures’ of Dasein’s Being, then, is the most apparent starting point for 
understanding Being (BT 38). To understand ‘not just accidental structures, but 
essential ones’, we must look at the ‘average everydayness’ of Dasein’s Being (BT
38). This lays the ground for further analysis, but does not answer the question of 
the meaning of Being itself.
‘Temporality’ is what gives Being meaning, or rather, ‘Dasein’s Being finds its 
meaning in temporality’ (BT 41). Time binds Being and is an essential structure of 
Dasein. Our own birth and death are of great significance to our Being, and for 
such things to be the case, temporality is vital. From the very first page of Being 
and Time, Heidegger claims that time is the best ‘possible horizon for any 
understanding whatsoever of Being’ (BT 1). Again, this time on the last page of the 
book, Heidegger asserts the pivotal role of Dasein’s temporality: ‘The existential-
ontological constitution of Dasein’s totality is grounded in temporality’ (BT 488). 
It is Dasein’s temporality which opens up the ‘clearing’ (Ger. Lichtung, derived 
from licht meaning ‘light’) where beings can show themselves (BT 177). 
Moving on from temporality I must now discuss two essential structures of our 
average everydayness, namely ready-to-hand (Zuhanden) and present-at-hand 
(Vorhanden). Each relates to the way in which we interact with the world in a 
practical way. Ready-to-hand is when you act through something unconsciously 
(BT 98). When I move the mouse on my computer, I am only aware that I am 
moving through menus, web pages, and so on. The act feels unmediated, as though 
I am directly interacting with the menus etc. 
Present-at-hand is when an entity becomes an object of study. Instead of being 
something we unthinkingly utilize, an entity present-at-hand is something we study 
and theorize about. Things reveal themselves as presence-at-hand (Vorhandenheit) 
particularly when they break, or fail to perform in some way, as with Simon James’ 
account of a broken pen nib, or Heidegger’s broken hammer example (James, 
2009: 23, BT 98). In terms of my own example, when my computer mouse ceases 
to work it has presence-at-hand so I might pick it up and study it for any damage or 
loose wires. I become very aware of the practical use the thing has, not when I am 
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using it casually, but when I can no longer use it casually. Present-at-hand can 
apply to the mode of existence held by things such as ‘a table, house or tree’ (BT
67). In observing something as present-at-hand, we are only observing the entity’s 
fixed properties. We engage with such things as a scientist or theorist, assessing 
what has happened.
Heidegger makes it clear that Dasein’s Being is not present-at-hand. Dasein’s 
Being is ‘never to be taken ontologically as an instance or special case of some 
genus of entities as things that are present-at-hand’ (BT 67-68). Moreover, Dasein’s 
Being is distinct from present-at-hand entities in the sense that Dasein’s Being-in-
the-world is unlike the way a chair or a plant pot or any simple present-at-hand 
entity can be said to be ‘in-the-world’ (Mulhall, 2005: 62). Present-at-hand entities 
are in-the-world in the sense that they occupy Euclidean space – they have 
‘properties’; a certain mass, volume, size, colour, and so on (BT 84). But Dasein’s 
Being-in-the-world does not refer to such properties. 
It is important to note that the -in-the-world part of Dasein’s Being is not ‘an 
optional extra, something tacked on to Being… it is an ontological fact’: without -
in-the-world, there can be no Being (Mulhall, 2005: 62). Heidegger writes that 
‘Dasein is never “proximally” an entity which is, so to speak, free from Being-in, 
but which sometimes has the inclination to take up a “relationship” towards the 
world’ (BT 84). This Being-in-the-world is an essential ontological component of 
Dasein, and moreover, it reveals to Heidegger a further essential feature of 
Dasein’s Being, namely ‘care’.
Care
The final relevant element of Being and Time to Heideggerian ecophenomenology 
is the notion of care (Sorge). To explain this, it is worth returning to the meaning of 
the term ‘Dasein’ (‘Being-there’). ‘There’ in this case signifies ‘Being-delivered-
over to the “there”’, where here Being-delivered is what Heidegger calls 
‘thrownness’ (Geworfenheit) (BT 174). Dasein’s having-been-thrown into the 
world is an ontological given. ‘Disposedness’ (Befindlichkeit), another given, is 
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Dasein’s receptiveness to the world. Traditionally, and according to Stephen 
Mulhall, misleadingly, translated as ‘state-of-mind’, disposedness refers to 
Dasein’s ‘capacity to be affected by the world, to find that the entities and 
situations it faces matter to it’ (2005: 75). Disposedness occurs in Dasein’s average 
everydayness as ‘mood’ (Stimmung). According to Heidegger, we are always in 
some mood and we can only leave one mood by replacing it with another. 
Importantly, Heidegger’s account of moods does not imply that they are mere 
subjective ‘colourings laid over an ontologically given world’ but rather they ‘are 
aspects of what it means to be in a world at all’ (Wheeler, 2011). This anti-
subjectivist stance is familiar – we talk of being in a mood, not of a mood being in 
us. Heidegger goes so far as to claim that ‘we [Dasein] are never free of moods’ 
(BT 175). Thus Dasein is always already in the world, as an ontological 
requirement. But more than this Being-in component, Dasein is affected by, and 
responding to, the world. Dasein is always ‘occupied’ with the entities it 
encounters. This does not mean that:
Dasein is always caring and concerned… It is, rather, that, as 
Being-in-the-world, Dasein must deal with that world. The world 
and everything in it is something that cannot fail to matter to it 
[Dasein] (Mulhall, 2005: 112).
Heidegger recounts a fable about human creation, which Mulhall argues is in part 
an attempt to show that his account of Dasein is not unprecedented (BT 242, 2005: 
112). Heidegger tells us that Care (Cura) shaped us from clay which was donated 
by Earth, and Jupiter donated spirit. Saturn decides that Jupiter shall have our spirit 
when we die, the Earth our bodies, and since Care gave us our living (temporal) 
bodies, she shall possess us while we live. Saturn also decides that because we are 
made of Earth we shall be called homo- (derived from humus meaning soil) (BT
242)5. This fable highlights Heidegger’s position that central to our Being-in-the-
world is care. Not only is it an ontological given, but Cura’s shaping of Dasein
‘signifies not only that care is the basis of its Being, but that this is something to 
which Dasein is subject – something into which it is thrown, and so something by 
                                               
5 The etymological link between ‘human’ and ‘earth’ is not confined to this fable. For example, 
Adam, the first man, gets his name from Adamah, the Hebrew word for ‘earth’ (Boff, 2007: 33).
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which it is determined’ (Mulhall, 2005: 113). Heidegger’s telling of the fable 
alludes to the direction he goes in the second part of Being and Time. Recall that 
Saturn, god of Time, is the authority to whom all submit, including the creator of 
Dasein. This signifies that at its core, Dasein’s Being is not Care as such but ‘that 
which somehow conditions or determines care – time’ (Mulhall, 2005: 114). 
Fundamentally then, time is ‘the basic condition for the human way of [B]eing’, 
but this reveals itself in our everydayness as care or moods (Mulhall, 2005: 114). 
Because Being is Being-in-the-world, other beings and Beings always matter to 
Dasein. Mulhall also highlights that the fact that humankind’s name is derived 
from soil means that ‘the distinctly human way of [B]eing arises from its worldly 
embodiment’ (2005: 113). 
We can conclude then that Heidegger places great importance in care as an
existential-ontological structure of Dasein’s Being. Dasein is embodied in the 
world, and he cannot help but be concerned with the entities with which it shares 
the world. Heidegger does not make any ethical claims – such as that we ought to 
take care of fellow beings and Beings. Rather, Heidegger claims that authentic 
Dasein cannot do anything but care. 
Dwelling
Heidegger’s 1951 essay ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’ is something of a beacon for 
Heideggerian ecophenomenologists. Here Heidegger argues that Being consists in 
dwelling, a concept which he unpacks throughout his essay largely by use of 
etymological analysis, and attempts to show that Being is unfolded by dwelling, 
that ‘dwelling is the manner in which mortals are on the earth’, and thus we should 
seek to dwell (PLT 147). To do this we must build.
Heidegger highlights that the old word bauen means not only to build but to dwell. 
He goes on to draw an etymological connection with bauen and various verbs such 
as (ich) bin and (du) bist, and in doing so claims a link between dwelling and 
Being. Bauen also means ‘to cherish and protect, to preserve and care for, 
specifically to till the soil, to cultivate the vine’ (PLT 147). Heidegger digs deeper:
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The Old Saxon wuon, the Gothic wunian like the old word bauen, 
mean to remain, to stay in a place… Wunian means: to be at peace, to 
be brought to peace, to remain in peace. The word for peace, Friede, 
means the free, das Frye, and fry means: preserved from harm and 
danger, preserved from something… To free really means to spare…
The fundamental character of dwelling is this sparing and preserving
(PLT 146-147).
Central to Heidegger’s account of dwelling is his notion of the ‘fourfold’, referring 
to earth and sky, gods and mortals. ‘Earth’ and ‘sky’ refer to the natural world 
when considered not in naturalistic terms but rather in terms of the ‘events and 
processes as they impinge upon ordinary human concern – the ripening corn, the 
changing seasons, the rising of the sun’ (Cooper, 1996: 83-84). ‘Mortals’, places 
emphasis on our finitude while referring to our personal and social lives (this is in-
keeping with Heidegger’s earlier account of Being-towards-death and Being-in-
the-world). ‘Gods’ represent ‘higher things’ – within which Heidegger would 
include art and philosophy along with religion – which facilitate our reflection on 
the meaning of our lives. The fourfold, then, ‘is Heidegger’s stab at grouping 
whatever matters to human beings, in terms of how it concerns them, under a few 
striking labels’ (Cooper, 1996: 84). 
Heidegger claims that the fourfold each ‘mirror’ one another. The earth only 
signifies something by its relation to the sky ‘whose rain nourishes it and to the 
mortals whom it in turn nourishes’ (Cooper, 1996: 84). Heidegger writes:
‘On the earth’ already means ‘under the sky’. Both of these also mean 
‘remaining before the divinities’ and include a ‘belonging to men’s 
being with one another’. By a primal oneness the four - earth and sky, 
divinities and mortals - belong together in one (PLT 149).
The unity of the fourfold constitutes the ‘world’, where ‘world’ refers to the 
cultural-historical dimension. Implicitly, given the nature of ‘world’, it is 
only through cultural-historical things (a concept I will explore in more depth 
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later) through which the fourfold can occur. For example, a bridge is ‘never 
first of all a mere bridge’, but instead is first of all a thing6 (PLT 153). 
‘Thing’ here is used with a special meaning. Heidegger highlights that the old 
German for thing connotes ‘assembly or gathering’ (Cooper, 1996: 82). A 
thing is not ‘first of all’ equipment, nor is it an object, such as in the case of 
the bridge, or in Heidegger’s example of the jug (PLT 166). Everything is a 
thing when understood correctly, but typically we ‘annihilate’ a thing’s thing-
ness by focussing on its scientistic or perceptual properties, or by what it is 
made of. Instead a thing has integrity, it is ‘self-supporting’, and unique, 
meaning that it cannot be understood or categorised by reference to its mere 
properties7. Because of the capacity of things such as the bridge to ‘gather’, 
things can ‘admit… and install the fourfold’ (PLT 158). Thus for a bridge to 
gather the fourfold means that it makes space for, gathers, and assembles 
earth and sky, gods and mortals. Indeed, a bridge connects ‘the banks that are 
already there… The banks emerge as banks only as the bridge crosses the 
stream’ (PLT 152). The banks, because they now relate to each other, now 
take on new significance. 
Authentic being can only occur when we stop living in a way which partitions the 
fourfold structure of our Being. Modern life makes it hard to remember the 
fourfold structure and this leads to inauthentic Being. The success or failure of 
authentic Being comes down to our ability to dwell, to live in a way which unites 
the fourfold. In order to succeed we must safeguard the fourfold ‘in its essential 
being, its presencing’ (PLT 150). This presencing or unfolding requires explanation 
which is best done by following Heidegger’s bridge example. The bridge is a 
location which creates a space. By bringing together two sides of a river the bridge
creates the banks of the river: ‘the bridge designedly causes them to lie across from 
each other’ (PLT 151). Thus it creates an area of heightened relationships between 
components, the bridge brings ‘stream and bank and land into each other’s 
neighbourhood’ and it still allows the river to run its course (PLT 151). Thus the 
                                               
6 Note the shift away from Heidegger’s assertion in Being and Time that entities are ‘primordially’ 
experienced as ready-to-hand: by this old account, a bridge would first of all be ‘a mere bridge’, but 
this is no longer Heidegger’s position.
7 At first glance there are similarities between this and Buber’s notion of the ‘irreducible’ construct 
of the ‘Thou’. I shall elaborate on this in the next chapter.
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bridge creates a gathering space, beyond mere geographical significance, which is 
also caring and preserving (PLT 161). By creating the bridge we are performing an 
act of safeguarding. By this Heidegger means that each of the fourfold is taken as it 
is. We ‘save the earth, receive the sky as sky, await the divinities as divinities’ and 
accept our mortality (Wheeler, 2011). 
Technology
Understanding the failure by modern Western humans to achieve dwelling helps to 
clarify the concepts presented here. In his 1953 essay The Question Concerning 
Technology, Heidegger differentiates between different forms of technology. One 
form, which is dominant in modern society, results in a mechanical mode of sense-
making. This modern understanding of technology understands it to be merely a 
‘means to an end’, but, says Heidegger, this belief that technology is neutral is the 
‘worst possible’ understanding (QCT 4). Instead, we should understand that 
‘technology is a human activity’, and that activity can produce or destroy dwelling 
(QCT 4). Heidegger has four substantial criticisms to make of modern technology. 
First, it ‘challenges’ nature. It reveals nature as nothing more than a useful 
instrument or raw material. In so doing, it reveals everything, including man, as 
standing-reserve. Second, technology has come to dominate us and our lives. Third, 
technology leaves us ‘homeless’ through the destruction and commodification of 
culture and location. Finally, technology suppresses other forms of revealing.
Heidegger conducts a long etymological survey of the meaning of technology. He 
considers the Greek words Technikon, Epistēme, and alētheia, as well as the 
Roman Veritas to show a link between technology and truth. Following this he 
argues that technology is poietic (from Poiēsis, meaning ‘to make’). Heidegger 
concludes that technology means ‘revealing’ of truth: ‘Technology is therefore no 
mere means. Technology is a way of revealing’ (QCT 12). Technology can allow 
us to be ‘entirely at home in something, to understand… such knowing provides an 
opening up [i.e. revealing]’ (QCT 13). This leads Heidegger to claim that the 
essence (Wesen) of technology is not its ability to manipulate or make things, but 
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rather what is decisive about technology is its revealing: ‘It is as revealing, and not 
as manufacturing, that technē is a bringing-forth’ (QCT 13). 
Artisanal crafts reveal the ‘distinctive features’ of materials, such as the grain of 
wood (Cooper, 1996: 71). But with modern industrial production, such 
distinctiveness is undesirable, hence the trend for using MDF, chipboard, and other 
artificial materials with no such character. Modern technology has no interest in the 
materials themselves, except in terms of their manipulable and exploitable 
qualities. Each type of technology constitutes a different mode of revealing. 
Modern technology’s particular form is characterised by ‘challenging’ in that it 
‘puts to nature… unreasonable demand[s]’ (QCT 14). For example the coal 
industry, or hydroelectric power plants, expect nature to provide power as and 
when it is needed – at the touch of a button. This ‘challenging’ mode of revealing is 
in contrast with ‘bringing-forth’ which makes no such demands of what is
encountered but instead simply allows and invites its essence to present itself. 
Heidegger highlights that primitive technology which brings-forth, such as a 
windmill, unlike modern hydroelectric systems which challenge, do not seek to 
store energy for when we want it – to be unleashed at the touch of a button. 
Heidegger gives another example: a field once farmed by a peasant has been found 
to have coal underneath it. Whereas before the peasant lived off the land in an 
‘unchallenging’ way, now that the field is mined for coal and thus the power of 
nature is ‘unlocked and exposed’ (QCT 15). This is done solely for the creation of 
‘the maximum yield at the minimum expense’ (QCT 15). The power of nature, for 
example in the case of coal, is stockpiled so that we may exploit it when it suits our 
human wants, in this case to create steam ‘whose pressure turns the wheels that 
keep a factory running’ (QCT 15). The division here is simple: in primitive 
technology we use nature to provide for us, such as wind power to drive sawmills 
or land to provide us with crops; but in modern technology we abuse nature to 
provide for us. In modern technology we challenge nature and demand from it that 
it surrender its power to us. 
To concretise his argument, Heidegger gives us the example of the hydroelectric 
plant on the Rhine. Because of the damming and the control exerted on the flow of 
the water ‘even the Rhine itself appears as something at our command’ (QCT 16). 
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Such abuse takes place in the name of providing greater security in our material 
world, what we might call self-assertion. Having electrical power, surpluses, and 
material wealth, creates an illusion of control over our Being-towards-death. 
Technology inspires such inauthentic fleeing from our temporality, and distracts us 
with promises of ever greater security that it is ultimately unable to produce. 
Whereas an old bridge joins together the banks of a river, the power plant 
transforms the river into a mere water-power-production-facility. The water behind 
the dam is stored so that we may release the potential energy at our chosen moment 
to transform it into electrical energy. Not only is nature altered drastically, but it is 
challenged, exploited, and controlled. Moreover, the modern mode of interacting 
with the natural environment means that a river, or what remains of it following 
damming, is typically met ‘as an object on call for inspection by a tour group 
ordered there by the vacation industry’ (QCT 16). The natural environment has 
been adapted for the production of profit, and through this challenging of nature we 
behave destructively.
This brings Heidegger to the wider issue of what he describes as ‘the standing-
reserve [Bestand]’ and the ‘oblivion of Being’ (QCT 17, 27). The standing-reserve, 
like the dammed water, is something which has potential use value: ‘Everywhere 
everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand’ (QCT 17). Even 
people are ‘taken as standing-reserve’ (QCT 27). In Contributions to Philosophy 
(From Enowning) (1936-38) Heidegger argues that the technological attitude 
reduces beings to manipulable and measurable tools such that we become not-
beings (C 6). The technological system of sense-making reduces everything to be 
understood in terms of instrumental value, driving out any sense of secular ‘awe’ or 
‘wonder in the presence of being’ (Wheeler, 2011). Heidegger explains how this is 
revealed clearly in the modern society: ‘Current talk about human resources, about 
the supply of patients for a clinic, gives evidence of this’ (QCT 18). 
Another term Heidegger deploys here is ‘enframing [Ge-stell]’ (QCT 19). As a 
mode of revealing, enframing, through modern technology, ‘reveals the real as 
standing-reserve’ (QCT 21). Heidegger is clearly against this mode of interacting 
with the world i.e. as a standing-reserve. He says that the ‘essence of modern 
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technology starts man upon the way of revealing through which the real 
everywhere, more or less distinctly, becomes standing-reserve’ (QCT 24). One 
such case is the modern trend for ‘networking’, where relationships are reduced 
from a great cause of wellbeing to a tool for personal gain, and others are treated as 
instruments for our own purposes (Dreyfus, 2006: 358). Though it is all too easy 
and tempting to order or enframe the world into standing-reserves, we must resist 
this ordering. This is because enframing ‘not only conceals a former way of 
revealing, bringing-forth, but it conceals revealing itself’ (QCT 27). I will return to 
this later when I discuss the way in which technology suppresses other modes of 
revealing.
The second criticism of modern technology is how it has come to dominate our 
lives. Our desire for security means that technology has expanded beyond reliable 
methods of farming and building shelter. When considered as intertwined with 
modern capitalism, technology finds and makes new ways to profit from our desire 
for security. Indeed, while we think of technology as providing what we need, in 
fact we provide what it needs (Cooper, 1996: 65). We contribute to the 
technological process (QCT 27). It is ironic that capitalism, liberalism, and 
modernity – as methods and institutions for assuring our dominance over nature 
and of providing security from tyranny – have come to dominate us so thoroughly. 
The attack by technology ‘upon the… nature of man’ is, according to Heidegger, 
deeply troubling (DT 52).
A third criticism of technology is that it leaves us ‘homeless’ and ‘aimless’ 
(Cooper, 1996: 65). Though technology certainly has aims such as achieving 
greater efficiency, maximizing yields, and so on, ‘nothing guides our sense of what 
should be wielded and why’ (Cooper, 1996: 65). And because we are aimless in 
our lives, we are also homeless. Moreover we are homeless because modern 
technology destroys our culture and significant locations. Sometimes this is 
literally the case, such as when dams replace bridges (such as in the case of the 
Rhine), which not only can destroy homes, but also destroy things which create 
places of dwelling. But also the significance of culture and heritage is reduced. 
When framed in terms of profitability and productivity, such things as monuments, 
temples, and bridges, are valuable only in terms of the tourist trade they can 
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command. Cultural locations which do not profit or break even are neglected until 
they are ruins. Any emphasis on dwelling is forgotten.
The final criticism of technology is that it suppresses other forms of revealing. The 
technological epoch is unusual in that, unlike past eras, technology ‘drives out 
every other possibility of revealing’ (QCT 27). It imposes itself as ‘the presumed 
unique mode of disclosure’ (Haar, 1987: 86). Every alternative form of revealing is 
adopted and perverted by technology. David Cooper gives the example of art and 
how it has become technologized:
…not because we have no interest in paintings except for their 
market value, but because they too are on ‘standing-reserve’, as 
things to produce a ‘yield’ in the form of exciting sensations or 
relaxation from the pressures of the workplace (1996: 66).
Perhaps the secret to the longevity and tenacity of technology as the only way of 
revealing is explained by the way in which it appears not to be a way of revealing 
at all. Indeed, Heidegger’s account of truth and technology is derived from the pre-
Socratic era. Since then, we have forgotten that technology is not value neutral. 
The call to ‘let things be’ is nonsensical from within the technological mode. Thus 
not only is everything revealed as one-dimensional, but we lose sense of what it 
might be to perceive things differently. The ‘supreme danger’ of technology is that 
we are unaware of any other mode of revealing, and are unaware of how to step 
outside of the technological mode (QCT 26). 
Clearly unimpressed with the way in which the modern technological attitude 
influences our experiences and interactions with the world, Heidegger hints that it 
was not always like this:
There was a time when it was not technology alone that bore the 
name technē. Once that revealing that brings forth truth into the 
splendour of radiant appearing was also called technē (QCT 34).
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Heidegger’s solution to the ‘supreme danger’ of technology and its dominance as 
mode of revealing is ‘releasement’ (Gelassenheit). Releasement means that we can 
‘use technical devices as they ought to be used’ without discarding them as ‘the 
work of the devil’, all the while leaving ‘them alone as something which does not 
affect our inner… core’ (DT 53f). The hope, then, is that we can use technology 
without necessarily adopting a technological mentality, thereby finding ourselves 
in a ‘free relationship’ with technology (BW 330). In this sense, technology will be 
unable to dominate our lives. Cooper writes that releasement involves a ‘“step 
back” not just from enslavement to technology’ (1996: 86). Cooper continues: ‘the 
released person refrains from imposing upon things categories and uses that do not 
belong integrally to them’ (1996: 86). Instead, the released person ‘lets things be’ 
thereby allowing each thing to ‘fit into its own being’ (PLT 180). Importantly, this 
allows for dwelling, even from within a technological society. By ‘letting things 
be’ we can sidestep the dominance and apparent omnipresence of technology as a
mode of revealing.
Heidegger on value-thinking
There are two points to make about Heidegger’s account of value-thinking. Firstly, 
it shows that Heidegger can explain why things matter to us, but not that they have 
value. This has implications for anyone trying to base an environmental ethic on 
his work and I will return to this point in my section on criticisms of Heidegger. 
Secondly, it highlights the rift between Heideggerian ecophenomenology and 
Husserlian axiological ecophenomenology.
Heidegger’s account of value-thinking is linked to his anti-modernism, and his 
account of the decline within philosophy of questions of Being. According to 
James’ interpretation of Heidegger, questions of Being have been gradually 
‘withdrawn’ until now, in its modern representation as ‘Idea or Substance’, its 
conception is ‘in some way inadequate’ (2009: 77). To accommodate for this, 
metaphysical thinkers (neither James nor Heidegger name names) construct the 
distinction between the ‘ought’ and the ‘is’ (IM 197). From Plato’s idea of the 
Good onwards, metaphysics has upheld ‘subjectivity as the domain of values in 
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opposition to the valueless sphere of inanimate things’ (Schalow, 2001: 250). The 
ought is something that ‘[B]eing never is yet always ought to be’ (BT 133). The 
grounds of the ought are not in Being, but instead it has ‘grounds in itself’ meaning 
that it has ‘intrinsic value’ (IM 198). Thus metaphysicians present an ‘insipid 
conception of Being (materialism, perhaps) with certain values, as it were, stuck 
on’ (James, 2009: 77). The very fact that such conceptions of Being required 
something to be stuck on revealed a basic flaw. 
Heidegger’s account of care, and of moods, certainly entails that the world matters
to us. But ‘mattering’ and ‘valuing’ are not the same. Not everything that we 
experience through care, disposedness, and mood, ‘will show up for us as valuable’ 
(James, 2009: 68). Heidegger writes that ‘thinking in values is the greatest 
blasphemy imaginable against Being’, and moreover that ‘through the 
characterization of something as “a value” what is so valued is robbed of its worth’ 
(BW 251). To attribute values to something is, like technological revealing, to fail 
to simply let it be. Value-thinking amounts to a one-dimensional understanding of 
something. 
For Heidegger, then, to think in terms of values is to be blind to the 
various ways in which the natural world matters to us. And so… 
references to environmental values reflect and foster an exploitative, 
instrumentalist stance towards the natural world (James, 2009: 79)
James continues, ‘[o]f course Heidegger might be wrong about all this’, perhaps 
owing to his ‘extremely bold account of technology’ (2009: 79). Heidegger is 
particularly referring to the way in which technology ‘values’ things, namely as 
raw materials. I will return to this arguably narrow account of ‘value’ when I come 
to criticise Heidegger. For now it is worth mentioning that Buber is also critical of 
placing purely instrumental values on things, but this does not rule out the gamut of 
value-thinking.
The second point on Heidegger and value-thinking is that it reveals a critical 
difference between Husserlian ecophenomenology and Heideggerian 
ecophenomenology. Recall that Charles Brown wrote that ‘[i]t seems to be a 
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fundamental possibility that humans can experience nature as infused with 
goodness and from within an attitude of concern and empathy’ (2003: 15). Brown 
et al hold that values are rooted in, and discovered through, our experience of the 
environment. Heidegger stops short of this, and argues only that our experience can 
show that things matter to us, but not that they are valuable. Whereas Husserlians 
support their ethical model based on nature’s value, Heidegger neither makes or 
hints at an ethical model, and certainly is critical of the very notion of value.
Summary
Heidegger’s position can be summarized as follows: firstly, technology is not a 
neutral means to an end as we tend to believe, but instead is something through 
which we understand the world. Secondly, modern technology makes us 
understand the world in a skewed and one-dimensional way. We see the world, the 
natural environment, and the people in it, as standing-reserve, as a resource which 
we can control and exploit. Technology leaves us homeless, and is extremely 
dominant and pernicious. Finally, Heidegger wishes to show that humans can have 
some of the benefits that technology brings without living with the modern 
technological attitude. Only when we stop seeking to control, abuse, exploit, and 
commodify nature can we interact with it in such a way as to ‘let things be’. 
Heidegger is clearly against the one-dimensional mode of unveiling which justifies 
the modern plundering of natural resources. We need to drastically alter the way in 
which we interact with the world, starting with allowing things to reveal 
themselves completely, and not merely in a one-dimensional way. Certainly we can 
live off of our environment – as the peasant uses the land and the sawmill uses the 
wind – but when we start exploiting nature for profit, when we start to demand 
something from it, we can no longer be said to ‘let things be’. Heidegger’s position 
is summarised well in his ‘Letter on Humanism’: ‘man is not the lord of beings. 
Man is the shepherd of Being’ (BW 221). Thus we should treat the natural 
environment respectfully, without challenging it, not because it is inherently 
valuable, but because that is our ontological role – to act as clearing, to let things 
be.
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Michael E. Zimmerman
Michael Zimmerman is an established and respected figure both for his knowledge 
of ecological philosophy (see his wide-ranging 1994 book Contesting Earth’s 
Future), and for his grasp of Heidegger, demonstrated in several papers and books. 
Zimmerman frequently combines his two areas of expertise and attempts to portray 
Heidegger as a possible ‘forerunner of deep ecology’, which he is openly inclined 
towards, though with certain caveats (1993: 200). Zimmerman admits to being 
embarrassed when Heidegger’s affinity for National Socialism was revealed, and 
backtracked somewhat initially8. Zimmerman is appropriately critical of Heidegger 
(rarely more so than in Heidegger’s Confrontation with Modernity (1990)), and 
recognises that one major perceived problem with deep ecology, namely the charge 
of ecofascism9, is not helped by the association he himself had drawn between 
Heidegger and deep ecology (1993: 196). Though he adopts Heidegger’s critique 
of technology, he does not support Heidegger’s all-encompassing rejection of 
modernity, and Zimmerman places substantial emphasis on the importance of 
political emancipation. Zimmerman is knowingly unfaithful to some of 
Heidegger’s ideas, such as his anti-Aristotelian assertion that man is not one animal 
among other animals. Some of Heidegger’s philosophy has no place in a strong, 
consistent, Heideggerian environmental ethic, and Zimmerman’s 
ecophenomenology is just one of several possible Heideggerian 
ecophenomenologies. However, it is perhaps one of the best. I will discuss where 
Zimmerman disagrees with Heidegger, and why he is right to do so.
Despite Zimmerman and Heidegger’s valuable contributions to 
ecophenomenology, they are let down by some basic problems. Heidegger’s 
excessive anti-modernism is countered well by Zimmerman’s account of progress, 
but Zimmerman’s work is also flawed. Zimmerman tends to ignore the impact or 
                                               
8 ‘Recent disclosures regarding the relationship between Heidegger’s thought and his own version 
of National Socialism have led me to rethink my earlier efforts to portray Heidegger as a forerunner 
of deep ecology’ (Zimmerman, 1993: 195).
9 ‘Ecofascism’ is often used as a pejorative to dismiss certain ecological positions. However some, 
such as Pentti Linkola, are happy to use the term, and advocate controversial policies including 
restrictions on the number of children we can have, and other highly invasive, dictatorial policies. 
Linkola stresses that the human population is too big and that democracy is incapable of bringing 
about the necessary radical changes needed to curb the environmental damage done by modern 
society (for more, see www.penttilinkola.com). Murray Bookchin likens such policies to the ‘eco-
brutalism’ of Hitler’s ‘Blood and Soil’ (1987).
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importance of capitalist economics and social/political institutions on modes of 
revealing especially in his paper on Free-Market Environmentalism (2000). 
Moreover, Zimmerman and Heidegger fail to explain how Heidegger’s 
phenomenology can support any system of (environmental) ethics. James argues 
that the problem here is that Heidegger’s phenomenology is missing a vital aspect. 
James turns to Merleau-Ponty to provide the move which is missing in Heidegger
so as to create an environmental ethics based on ecophenomenology10. Thus, while 
Heidegger and Zimmerman certainly have a lot to offer, their work alone does not 
satisfy my main goal of finding an ecophenomenology that successfully defends 
and supports a system of environmental ethics.
Zimmerman’s work deftly shows how ecophenomenology at times runs parallel, 
and occasionally perpendicular, to deep ecology, one of the best known and most 
influential schools of environmental philosophy. In doing so, Zimmerman raises 
the profile of ecophenomenology. Because it is relatively unknown, 
ecophenomenology certainly benefits from being associated with the relatively
well-known deep ecology. It is through comparison to deep ecology that 
Zimmerman unpacks his version of Heideggerian ecophenomenology.
Deep Ecology
Zimmerman bases his account of deep ecology on the work of Bill Devall, Alan 
Drengson, Warwick Fox, Arne Næss, and George Sessions, all of whom, he says, 
are united by their emphasis on ‘promoting self-realization for all beings’ as 
‘crucial for solving the ecological crisis’ (1993: 196)11. These deep ecologists seek 
an ontological shift ‘from an anthropocentric, dualistic, and utilitarian 
understanding of nature’ to one which ‘discloses things other than merely as raw 
material for human ends’ (Zimmerman, 1993: 196). The presumption made by 
deep ecologists is that this shift will lead people to adopt more caring and 
                                               
10 Unfortunately I do not have the space in this thesis to go into more depth on Merleau-Ponty’s 
contributions to ecophenomenology.
11 Note that here I am generally only discussing Zimmerman’s account of the theory (and theorists) 
of deep ecology, and I am ignoring questions of deep ecology in practice. As it happens, 
Zimmerman is generally dismissive of activists claiming to be deep ecologists such as Christopher 
Manes (Zimmerman, 1993: 209).
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respectful practices and attitudes towards non-human nature, and this will result in 
deeper self-realization.
Deep ecology is highly critical of modernity, particularly the philosophical shift 
towards scientism from the beginning of the scientific and industrial revolution. 
This shift allowed people to interpret nature ‘as a lifeless machine’, and provided 
the tools to exploit it (Zimmerman, 1993: 197). Whereas mining was once 
considered ‘as the “rape” of Mother Earth’, no such emotive or compassionate 
roadblocks now stood in the way (Zimmerman, 1993: 198fn). As noted by the 
Husserlians discussed in the previous chapter, within the scientific and industrial 
mind-set there simply is no ethical reason not to exploit the Earth’s resources. 
Central to this philosophical position is what Zimmerman calls ‘anthropocentric 
humanism’ which ‘provided the ideology necessary to… justify the project of 
dominating Nature’ (1983: 19). As a result of placing human material interests 
above all, including above other human interests such as well-being, this 
anthropocentrism has demoted everything so that it only possesses instrumental 
value.
The alternative to anthropocentric humanism offered by deep ecologists is 
ecocentric egalitarianism (Zimmerman, 1993: 215). Deep ecologists recognise that 
creatures on this earth are interconnected – organisms are like knots in the 
biospherical net – and, following on from this relationalism, what is good for one 
part of the web is good for all (Zimmerman, 1993: 198). All members of the 
ecosystem are dependent on the balance of the ecosystem remaining stable. Thus if 
one member of the ecosystem is annihilated, or swells significantly in population, 
this will have ramifications for other species.12 Deep ecologists recognise the stake 
we have in maintaining the delicate balance within our ecosystem. Thus, rather 
than selfishly and destructively exploiting nature, we ought to conserve our 
ecosystem.
In accordance with Heidegger, deep ecologists argue that we must recognise that 
our being is integrally entwined with the natural world. When we resist pacification 
                                               
12 There are ‘key members’ of most ecosystems.  The presence, or removal, of these members will 
have a larger impact than that of other members.
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or modern technological interactions with nature and instead adopt ecocentric 
egalitarianism, an ontological shift takes place. This results in changes in our 
behaviour; we begin to ‘treat nonhuman beings with compassion and care... instead 
of treating everything as interchangeable raw material’ (Zimmerman, 1993: 197). 
Heidegger and Deep Ecology
The key parallel Zimmerman draws between Heidegger and deep ecology is that of 
the mutual emphasis on an ontological shift towards a ‘“higher humanism”’ (1993: 
200). Both deep ecology and Heidegger argue consistently against the 
anthropocentric dualism which is central to scientism. Zimmerman argues that 
Heidegger’s philosophy is consistent with deep ecology’s ecocentric 
egalitarianism. 
First of all, I must unpack Zimmerman’s account of Heidegger’s ontology. 
Heidegger’s philosophy centres on the ontological difference between Beings and 
beings, as discussed above (Zimmerman, 1993: 200). As Heidegger notes, the 
problem which Western society faces is that this ‘ontological difference’ has been 
forgotten over time, and so we can no longer differentiate between ‘being’ and 
‘Being’. The result is that ‘everything now manifests itself as interchangeable raw 
material’13 (Zimmerman, 1993: 200). 
The development of how the ontological difference has been forgotten can be seen 
in many Enlightenment philosophies where being human was understood to mean 
being a rational subject. Scientism hereafter ‘compelled entities to show themselves 
in accord with the expectations of the rational subject, which defined itself as a 
“clever animal,” struggling to survive by dominating everything else’ 
(Zimmerman, 1993: 201). Now the modern technological age reveals everything, 
people included, as raw materials for this domination. This ‘productionist 
metaphysics’ has made us blind to the fact that ‘there is an ontologically disclosive 
dimension that is prior to the causal-material dimension’ (Zimmerman, 1993: 201). 
                                               
13 For step-by-step explanation of this, see above for my explanation of Heidegger’s account of 
Being/being and the standing reserve.
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There are further similarities between Heidegger and deep ecology. Both ‘call on 
humanity to “let things be”’, a phrase with several meanings (Zimmerman, 1993: 
203). For Heidegger, it means ‘to open up to the ontological clearing in which 
things can disclose themselves’ (Zimmerman, 1993: 203). For both Heidegger and 
deep ecology it entails a duty of care (i.e. no undue human interference) within this 
disclosure. But more than ‘no undue interference’, for Heidegger more than deep 
ecology, ‘letting things be’ also requires respectful, creative, and nurturing 
interaction. ‘“Letting things be” is not to be understood merely passively, as a 
disinterested “bearing witness” to things, but also actively, as working with things 
to bring forth new possibilities’ (Zimmerman, 1993: 203). ‘Letting things be’, then, 
does not entail simply leaving them alone. Rather, there is a nurturing role played 
by us, what Heidegger called ‘shepherding’. While deep ecology and Heidegger 
place different emphasis on each of these meanings, they are all compatible, and 
moreover each supports critical interpretations of productionist metaphysics. 
‘Technological production forces entities to reveal themselves inappropriately, e.g., 
animals as mere machines’ (Zimmerman, 1993: 203). Rather than letting things be, 
technological production constrains the being of all entities to the realm of 
instrumental and mechanical existence.
Conflicts between Heidegger and Deep Ecology
Heidegger and deep ecology conflict in at least two ways. Firstly, Heidegger’s 
apparent anthropocentrism is at odds with ecocentric egalitarianism; and secondly, 
Heidegger’s anti-naturalistic view of human existence seems to hold, unlike deep 
ecology, that humans are not animals or a part of nature. Zimmerman attempts to 
deal with these conflicts, with varying degrees of success. 
On the charge of anthropocentrism, Zimmerman writes that ‘human existence has 
immeasurable significance’ when ‘conceived as the clearing through which the 
cosmos in all its beauty and worth can manifest itself’ (1993: 202). It is Dasein
alone that can provide the ‘disclosive dimension’ prior to the naturalistic or 
scientistic dimension. As such, human existence is unique, ontologically different 
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to that of other life forms. This appears to be at odds with deep ecology’s claim that 
human’s are not ‘separate from and superior to all else, but rather [are] a small part 
of the entire cosmos’ (Zimmerman, 2005: 1)14. It also seems contradictory to the 
view that ‘the worth of things holds independently of whether they happen to be 
apprehended by humans’ (Zimmerman, 1993: 202). While this seems quite distinct 
from the deep ecology position, Zimmerman argues that even Arne Næss agrees in 
some ways that ‘human existence allows things to manifest themselves, at least in a 
way not otherwise possible’ (1993: 202). Næss cites T. L. S. Sprigge as explaining 
consciousness as that which:
supplies a home in which objects can enter into actuality, so that we 
as consciousness are to be thought of as existing for the sake of the 
objects which need us in order to exist rather than its being the 
objects which exist for our sake (Zimmerman, 1993: 202).15
Zimmerman’s hope here is that the significant role of Dasein need not be 
considered incompatible with ecocentric egalitarianism. Non-human nature can 
exist meaningfully without human consciousness (i.e. in a non-
anthropocentric/anthropogenic manner), but human consciousness can offer 
something further, by way of Dasein’s disclosive capability. The distinction 
Heidegger draws is between ‘earth’ and ‘world’. The former refers to the 
‘transhistorical, self-concealing dimension of entities’, whereas the latter refers to 
the cultural-historical dimension (Zimmerman, 1993: 203). Nature as ‘earth’ has 
one type of significance, and nature as ‘world’ has another form through Dasein’s 
role. Thus Heideggerian ecophenomenology can recognise that nature matters as 
something which does not require human consciousness of it and at the same time 
recognise the ways in which nature matters in terms of human culture and 
language. Zimmerman hopes that this sidesteps claims of damning 
anthropocentrism. 
                                               
14 Page numbers for Zimmerman (2005) refer to the online edition (i.e. pp. 1-11), rather than the 
printed edition (i.e. pp. 456-460).
15 Original quotations can be found in:
Sprigge T. L. S., ‘Nonhuman Rights: An Idealist Perspective’ in Inquiry, 20, 1984, 455.
Næss, A., ‘The World of Concrete Contents’ in Inquiry, 28, 1985, 426.
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Drawing on Heidegger’s rejection of the ‘animality’ of humankind found in his 
‘Letter on Humanism’, Zimmerman reveals a seemingly unbridgeable gap between 
deep ecology and Heidegger: ‘Heidegger, like many other anti-Darwinian 
conservatives, held that humans are not animals’ (1993: 213). Because of this his 
former student Karl Löwith accused Heidegger of anthropocentrism, and of 
committing the same mistakes of humanistic dualism which Heidegger himself 
rejected. However, it is naturalism which Heidegger is critical of, including 
naturalistic accounts of Dasein. Naturalistic explanations of the world, including 
human beings, are only possible ‘because natural entities are first disclosed through 
human existence’ and ‘this capacity for disclosure cannot be explained by a science 
made possible by that capacity’ (Zimmerman, 1993: 214). Only phenomenology 
can explain how it is that naturalistic enquiries can be made. Thus a worthy account 
of Being cannot be reached through naturalism (Zimmerman, 1993: 214). Attempts 
to give naturalistic accounts of Being are misguided at best. Heidegger’s account of 
authentic humanity as that which ‘lets things be’, as discussed above, does not 
entail anthropocentric dualism or any antagonism, quite the opposite.
Political problems for Heidegger and Deep Ecology
Though a great deal has been said elsewhere about Heidegger’s links to the 
National Socialists, it is relevant for my purposes, and for Zimmerman’s, to go 
over some of them again. Zimmerman’s main point is to show that Heidegger’s 
affiliation with the National Socialists is consistent with some of his philosophy, 
and so these parts of Heidegger’s philosophy should be discarded. It is this position 
which helps explain why some elements of Zimmerman’s Heideggerian 
ecophenomenology are not completely true to the main source material, and why 
Zimmerman and I believe this to be a good thing.
There are two main similarities between Heidegger and National Socialism: anti-
modernity, and anti-anthropocentrism. According to Zimmerman, Heidegger 
believed that the Nazi movement’s ‘“inner truth and greatness”’ was in line with 
his view of modernity (1993: 204). Heidegger believed that democracy, socialism, 
capitalism, and scientism, rather than being marks of historical progress in fact 
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signified Europe’s decline into a ‘degenerate’ and ‘nihilistic’ era (Zimmerman, 
1993: 204). While many philosophers squabbled over the false dichotomy of 
capitalism versus communism, Heidegger sought a different way altogether. 
Zimmerman notes that ‘capitalism and communism alike pollute air and water, 
annihilate farmland and forests, destroy the habitats necessary for the preservation 
of species diversity, and exterminate native peoples’ (Zimmerman et al, 2004: 
392). National Socialism, Heidegger believed, embodied the anti-modern 
philosophy that Europe needed to overcome its decline and its political crisis. In 
accordance with Heidegger’s position, some National Socialist ideologues, though 
Zimmerman does not say who or where, reject anthropocentrism ‘for it ignorantly 
assumed that nature was made for humanity’ (Zimmerman, 1993: 206). This fits 
Heidegger’s own position which is explicitly hostile towards ‘“ego-centred 
thinking”’ particularly when embodied into political frameworks which set man up 
as ‘the centre and measure of the universe’ (Cooper, 1996: 53). 
In his defence, and in the defence of his ideas, sharing ideas with National 
Socialism does not necessarily mean they are wrong, and Heidegger also seemed to 
be aware by the late 1930s that the Nazis in their particular historical form adopted 
‘crude naturalistic, biological, and racist views,’ and was actually ‘another 
expression of technological modernity’ (Zimmerman, 1993: 206). Zimmerman’s 
solution is to abandon the parts of Heidegger’s work which lend themselves to 
fascism. He hopes to use anti-modernist arguments whilst recognising the 
importance of emancipation and political freedom.
The main connection between ecofascism and deep ecology, and through that to 
Heidegger, is only present in the minds and actions of activists and bad theorists. 
Deep ecology and Heideggerian ecophenomenology can, Zimmerman argues, 
support pluralism and respect (1993: 210). Zimmerman cites several good sources 
to support this position and says that given their ‘insistence on the intrinsic worth 
of individual members… their emphasis on pluralism and diversity, and their 
endorsement of Gandhi’s non-violent approach to social change, deep ecology 
theorists can hardly be mistaken for ecofascists’ (1993: 210). Zimmerman, then, is 
dismissive of charges of ecofascism made against deep ecology just as much as he 
is dismissive of the tenets of fascism which mar Heidegger’s reputation and work.
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Zimmerman on anti-modernism
Zimmerman, like Heidegger, is critical of the Enlightenment project. However, he
advances a seemingly anti-Heideggerian account of progress. Zimmerman’s aim is 
to redefine ‘progress’ from the definition used by ‘many Enlightenment lumières’ 
which focuses on: 
Ending material scarcity; freeing thought from the constraints of 
political interference and religious dogma; emancipating people from 
authoritarian social structures; and using scientific knowledge to 
pacify human relations and to gain mastery over nature (2000: 4). 16
It is the final part of this definition of progress which Zimmerman is uncomfortable 
with. He hopes to retain the ‘noble goals of modernity’ while rejecting the notion 
that nature can or even ought to be ‘dominated’ by mankind (2000: 5). Because 
‘progress’ has been synonymous for so long with domination over nature, 
environmentalists are prejudiced against progress. It is a case of death by 
association, but, argues Zimmerman, domination of nature is not the necessary 
accomplice of bringing an end to material scarcity, or of political and intellectual 
freedom. 
In Contesting Earth’s Future, Zimmerman argues that ‘deep ecology’s norm of 
self-realization may be read as broadly consistent with a “progressive” view of 
history’ (1994: 106). People are moving beyond scientistic dualism (‘human vs. 
nature’) ‘toward a more inclusive way of relating to each other and to the natural 
world’ (Zimmerman, 2000: 2). Zimmerman claims that the increase in awareness 
that ‘humanity is dependent on the well-being of the living environment’ has 
resulted in a shift in consciousness away from domination over nature, and towards 
symbiosis or nurture of it (2000: 5). Because we are ever more aware that harm to 
the natural world harms us too, we are becoming disillusioned with anthropocentric 
dualism which justifies exploitation of natural resources. This shift against the 
fourth tenet of modernism (human mastery over nature) has been made possible by 
                                               
16 Page numbers for Zimmerman (2000) refer to the online edition (i.e. pp. 1-36), rather than the 
original edition (i.e. pp. 89-110).
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the first three tenets of modernism: ending material scarcity, dogma, and 
authoritarian social structures. Thus modernity and progress, rather than being anti-
environmental, has proved to be meaningfully self-improving. Zimmerman’s telos, 
the goal his progressive account of history is directed towards, will take the form of 
a society (possibly global) where there is no material scarcity, no political or 
religious dogma, no authoritarian social structures, and anthropocentric dualism 
(human vs. nature) is replaced by a form of ecocentric egalitarianism. 
The conflict with Heidegger is apparent. While he and Zimmerman oppose the 
‘mastery’ of nature, Heidegger focuses instead on the problems of technology and 
the goal of dwelling. Political freedom, education, and unprecedented rates of 
production are not Heidegger’s primary concern. Indeed the latter, particularly in 
terms of modern productive methods, is an example of challenging. Heidegger 
would say that modernity has taken us further from letting things be, and instead 
has resulted in one-dimensional thinking and the wanton destruction of nature. 
Zimmerman sees modernity instead as providing the route, through education and 
science, towards a better relationship with nature. Anthropocentric dualism cannot 
last forever, and Zimmerman is optimistic that soon it will have ‘burnt out’ leaving 
ecocentric egalitarianism – widespread knowledge of the interconnectedness of life 
on earth. Heidegger does not share this optimism. The implications of the 
difference here is that Zimmerman can account for and justify political freedom 
and emancipation (which occurs in part through education) within his philosophy; 
Heidegger cannot. 
Summary of Zimmerman
As I said above, Heidegger directly leaves us with a system which acknowledges 
the non-neutral nature of technology, the one-dimensional way modern technology 
reveals the world to us, and he attempts to show that a good existence, and 
authentic behaviour, can only happen when we step away from the modern 
technological disclosure of the world and start to dwell.
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Zimmerman picks up on Heidegger’s anti-modernism, and shows the importance of 
an ontological shift away from anthropocentric dualism towards the deep 
ecologist’s position of ecocentric egalitarianism. Zimmerman correctly rejects 
some elements of Heidegger’s thought. Rather than adopting a sweeping anti-
modernism, he hopes to redefine progress to include emancipation and political 
freedom, whilst being critical of the goal of dominating nature. Influenced by deep 
ecologists, Zimmerman also supports pluralism and diversity, as well as non-
violent methods of social change. 
Criticisms of Heidegger
Some criticisms of Heidegger are dealt with by Zimmerman, including the 
elements of Heidegger’s philosophy which lend themselves to an abhorrent 
political stance. The substantive criticisms I will highlight here are that 
Heidegger’s work does not support a system of ethics. Furthermore, Heidegger’s 
rejection of value-thinking is based on a very narrow understanding of values, that 
is, as inherently technological. This need not be the case, and this is an example of 
where Buber’s theory stands above Heidegger’s. So, while Heidegger’s 
ecophenomenology offers us much food for thought, it has a serious central 
weakness that is not dealt with by Zimmerman.
As I stated in my introductory chapter, the aim of this thesis is to find an 
ecophenomenology which can support a system of environmental ethics. While 
Heidegger’s phenomenology can explain why things matter to us, why these affect 
our moods, this does not support any normative claims. It seems, then, that 
Heidegger’s phenomenology cannot be what I am looking for in this thesis. The 
problem comes down to Heidegger’s rejection of value-thinking. In his 
introduction to ecological ethics, Patrick Curry posits that ‘there can be no ethics 
without value’ (2006: 40). Assuming that Curry is correct, it is required of me to 
show that value-thinking should not be rejected.
Heidegger claims that ‘through the characterization of something as “a value” what 
is so valued is robbed of its worth’ (BW 251). This may indeed be the case if, say a 
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forest, a mountain, or a river, was valued only in instrumental or financial terms. 
But if valued in terms of its indefinable, irreducible, non-repeatable qualities, then 
valuing something need not rob it of its worth. If in the act of valuing we attempt to 
quantify or categorise then it will only be a limited account of a thing’s correct 
value. But if we value something completely as it is then we take nothing from it. 
This seems compatible with letting things be, and certainly allows us to understand 
the ways in which things matter to us. James words my positional well:
Just as the Heidegger of Being and Time was wrong to suppose that 
all value-thinking presupposes the notion that the world is at root an 
objective realm standing over against us subjects, so the Heidegger of 
‘Letter on Humanism’ was wrong to suggest that all value-thinking
was inherently technological (2009: 80).
Because Heidegger refuses to discuss value in anything other than the 
technological sense, he unnecessarily fails to move his phenomenology into ethics. 
Buber, on the other hand, makes this move, and in this sense is more easily applied 
to creating an environmental ethic. Heidegger’s philosophy, as it stands, is not 
sufficient as a basis for environmental ethics.
Criticisms of Zimmerman
Zimmerman’s reworking of Heidegger’s anti-modernism to allow for progressive 
politics is certainly praiseworthy. I am also favourably inclined towards 
Zimmerman’s apparent support for pluralism and diversity which Zimmerman 
borrows from deep ecology. At times, Zimmerman’s work is so far removed from 
Heidegger’s own that it seems only mildly Heideggerian, and only loosely 
phenomenological. Where Zimmerman falls short is by failing to advance anything 
new. He successfully draws parallels between Heidegger and deep ecology, but his 
efforts have been spent defending old positions rather than on developing new 
ones. But what reasons have we to reject these old positions? 
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Firstly, widespread knowledge of the interconnected web that makes up the 
biosphere does not necessarily result in an ontological shift towards ecocentric 
egalitarianism. Though we would be more aware of the often surprising and 
significant connections between entities, this could easily be understood from 
within an anthropocentric and scientistic position. The ‘interconnected web’ view 
of nature sees instrumental connections, but does not necessitate or facilitate any 
other mode of viewing. 
Second, Zimmerman’s position on pluralism and monism is unclear. It seems that a 
diverse range of positions are worthy of Zimmerman’s consideration, but this does 
not fit with his conviction that there is strictly one telos, an end-point to which we 
all should strive, and to which education will guide current and future generations. 
Moreover, the single ontology prioritised by Zimmerman and Heidegger appears at 
odds with pluralism. 
This problem is compounded by the fact that this single ontology, and 
Zimmerman’s emphasis on personal interpretation taken from deep ecology, can be 
used to support multiple conflicting positions. Val Plumwood’s criticism of deep 
ecology is that it is an easy target to be hijacked by oppressive political groups, and 
this criticism is similarly true of Zimmerman’s philosophy (cited in Aaltola, 2010: 
171). Zimmerman, despite his monistic telos, repeatedly fails to commit himself to 
political theory. He ignores economic factors which have contributed to ecological 
crises. It is this lack of ethical and political guidance which leaves Zimmerman’s 
grand plan adrift. Zimmerman himself acknowledges his lack of commitment to 
any political stance, upon being labelled ‘right-wing’ by Plumwood (Zimmerman, 
2000: 2). Either Zimmerman should commit to pluralism, dialogue, and being a 
dynamic green movement, or he should construct a political stance in accordance 
with his telos. Because he fails to do either, all we are left with is a call to move 
towards an ontological shift, with an undeveloped ‘progressive’ political theory in 
tow, which may in fact be deeply conservative.
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Final remarks
Heidegger’s account of technology and modernism is certainly interesting, and I 
am sympathetic to his conviction that modern modes of production are harmful in 
many senses. Our desire for security as a mark of inauthentic fleeing from our 
impending death almost certainly plays a part in our desire to have control over the 
world. Like Heidegger, I believe that any mode of revealing which shows only one-
dimension plainly misrepresents reality. All of these points, as I will show, are 
made by Buber. But with Buber there are not the same problems, such as a 
wholesale rejection of ethics and value. 
By bringing the discussion of ecophenomenology into the mainstream area of deep 
ecology, Zimmerman may have raised the profile of this relatively obscure niche in 
environmental philosophy. Determined to avoid the darker side of Heidegger’s 
philosophy, Zimmerman has indeed remedied much of Heidegger’s work to 
account for progress, freedom, education, and so on. But there are a number of 
weaknesses in Zimmerman’s theory, such as the clash between pluralism and his 
monistic telos, and the lack of potential his theory has for analysing or criticising
economic and social structures. In his defence though, Zimmerman’s telos is not an 
essential or necessary feature of his Heideggerian ecophenomenology. 
Nevertheless, as I will show in the next chapter, Buber does not present us with
these problems and thus offers something unique to ecophenomenology.
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Chapter Three:
Buberian Ecophenomenology
Martin Buber
The best known of Martin Buber’s works is I and Thou (Ich und Du) (1923). This 
will be the main text I refer to, but I will also unpack points made in Daniel: 
Dialogues on Realization (1913) and Between Man and Man (1947). 
Overwhelmingly, Buber’s philosophy focuses on how dialogue determines Being. 
For Buber, we exist in a fundamental duality with Others17 (by which Buber means 
people, nature, and God). The manner in which we relate to Others determines our 
mode of Being. There are many similarities between Buber and Heidegger, but 
Buber’s accounts of ethics, social critique, and dialogue, makes his contribution to 
existential phenomenology quite distinct. It is my aim in this chapter to 
demonstrate the ways in which Buber’s work might be used to support a system of 
environmental ethics. Secondary to this goal, I will show the aspects of Buber’s 
philosophy that make his contribution to ecophenomenology and ethics superior to 
both Husserl and Heidegger’s.
Like Heidegger, Buber uses words carefully. Before continuing, I must make note 
of three words: ‘unity’, ‘inclusiveness’, and ‘Thou’. For Buber we exist in a 
fundamental duality with Others. We desire unity, the transcendence of the 
separateness of our Being, and this can only be achieved within certain forms of 
relationships. When Buber talks of unity he does not mean the concept of ‘total 
union’ which escapes the ontological duality of existence. Buber writes that ‘the I 
is indispensable for any relationship, including the highest [i.e. with God], which 
always presupposes an I and You’ (IT 126). Here Buber is inspired by the Hasidic 
notion of devekut. Israel Koren explains that ‘in devekut a person leaves his 
existential aloneness by clinging to God, or to elements connected to Him, without 
nullifying himself’ (2002: 191). Martina Urban explains that devekut refers to a 
form of ‘communion with God’ which ‘preserves the ontological distance between 
                                               
17 I use the capital ‘O’ on ‘Others’ in a similar way to Heidegger and the being/Being distinction. 
When I say ‘Others’ I mean ‘other Beings’ rather than mere things.
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God and man’ (2008: 209). Buber expands this concept of unity-with-God to cover 
all Others, implying that we can achieve unity-with-nature. Retention of the self is 
critical to Buberian dialogue: the subject should not be lost in the relation. 
Unlike Husserlian’s, Buber emphatically rejects the use of the ‘familiar but not 
very significant term “empathy”’ in place of the term ‘inclusion’ (BM 114). 
Its elements are, first, a relation of no matter what kind, between 
two persons, second, an event experienced by them in common, in 
which at least one of them actively participates, and, third, the fact 
that this one person, without forfeiting anything of the felt reality of 
his activity, at the same time lives through the common event from 
the standpoint of the other (BM 115).
Buber does not suggest that we should reject or attempt to suppress our perspective 
so as to see only that of the Other. Instead inclusion means understanding of the 
viewpoint of the Other, whilst not forgetting our own perspective (BM 124). 
Dialogical psychotherapist18 John Wheway writes that when practicing inclusion 
the subject experiences ‘the living perspective of the Other while remaining 
connected with his own perspective’ (1999: 112). Though it may appear similar to 
standard accounts of empathy, Buberian inclusion is quite distinct. Certainly it is a 
more clearly defined concept than the empathy which Husserlians refer to.
An important nuance within Buber is how he insists upon the possibility of ‘various 
levels, shades and hues of inclusion’ (Guilherme and Morgan, 2009: 569).
Inclusion can even be one-sided, requiring no symmetrical response from the 
Other. This facet is particularly clear in Buber’s discussions on education where the 
relationship between teacher and pupil is not symmetrical. ‘The Thou that I say to 
my lover is much more intense than the Thou I say to a friend, and the Thou that I 
say to a close relation is more inclusive than the Thou I say to a pupil’ (Guilherme 
and Morgan, 2009: 569). Understanding that there are different levels of I-Thou 
relations is of great importance to grasping Buberian relations with nature.
                                               
18 Dialogical psychotherapy focuses on the therapeutic capabilities of subject-to-subject dialogue 
and the importance of the mode of relationship between patient and doctor.
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In his introduction to I and Thou Walter Kaufmann is critical of the use by previous 
translators of ‘Thou’ instead of ‘You’. ‘Thou’, Kaufmann argues, suggests a much 
less mutual, intimate, and equal relationship than that which Buber intends. From 
the German Du, it is more accurately translated as ‘You’ (Kaufmann, 1970: 14). 
Kaufmann states that ‘Thou immediately brings to mind God; Du does not’ (1970: 
14). Part of the problem, according to Alex Guilherme and John Morgan, is that the 
English language itself ‘has lost the distinction between formal and informal 
pronouns’ (2009: 579n). However, Kaufmann’s interpretation is debated and given 
that most commentators use ‘Thou’ over ‘You’, I will do so too (Kramer and 
Gawlick, 2003: 18). Nevertheless, note that ‘Thou’ hereafter is not meant in a 
formal or hierarchical sense. We can accept that both ‘You’ and ‘Thou’ are 
imperfect, and must be conscious of this when approaching Buber in English.
Daniel
The five dialogues of Daniel focus on overcoming duality. Buber proposes two 
ways in which we relate to the world. ‘Orienting man’ sees the corporeal and 
mechanical part of the world; and ‘realizing man’ sees everything including the 
spiritual, meaningful part. We exist somewhere on the spectrum between the two
(D 72). Buber explains: ‘Orientation installs all happenings in formulas, rules, 
connections which are useful in its province but remain cut off from a freer 
existence and unfruitful; realization relates each event to nothing other than its own 
content’ (D 94). Orienting man experiences the world as an object; measurable and 
rule-bound, a string of cause and effect with no inherent value (D 70; Friedman, 
1955: 38). He lives the life of an object relating to other objects in a calculable 
manner.  Maurice Friedman describes the orienting man as wanting ‘security once 
and for all: he wants to know his way about, and he wants a solid general truth that 
will not overturn him’ (1955: 37). As a result of this striving for security and 
stability we remain fixed in our duality, afraid to attempt to achieve unity with 
Others. Orienting man sees only the instrumental dimension of Others, and thus he 
fails to acknowledge their complete value. His actions and interactions are 
functional. Even his relationship with God is instrumental and meaningless as he 
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relates to God, the thing, rather than God the Being. Orienting man eats, sleeps, 
breathes, and feels emotions in a meaningless and shallow way, as an object.
Unlike orienting man, realizing man lives in a meaningful, purposeful manner. 
Even a simple act like breathing can be conducted in a realizing way, with the 
whole of one’s Being, so that the act is imbued with meaning beyond its basic 
functionality. For example, noticing the cold air on a winter’s morning, and, 
breathing in deeply, feeling connected with the world around us, the frosty lawn, 
enjoying the crunch as we walk across it. Realizing man can feel invigorated by 
such simple (inter)actions. He does not reduce experiences to purely naturalistic
explanations. Though this is part of reality it does not tell the whole story of 
realizing experiences. Friedman captures such moments well: realizing man 
understands ‘all being in its reality’ and ‘does not posses the world, yet stands in its 
love’ (1955: 38). Realizing man exists in a heightened reality because for him it is 
more than merely corporeal and functional. His existence cannot be calculated or 
quantified. Instead realization is a qualitatively superior manner of existing. 
Buber says that ‘the creative man is the realizing one’ (D 70). Language, 
knowledge, and experiences must be ‘renewed’, created, and taken beyond 
orientation. Buber offers the example of a poet who heightens the meaning of tired 
old words through poetry (D 67-68). Creativity, an expression of our uniqueness 
and unique perspective, is valued highly by Buber. It allows us to see beyond the 
orienting realm. The similarities here between Buber and Heidegger’s project of 
reinvigorating language are apparent.
In the first dialogue of Daniel Buber gives the example of a pine tree (D 54). 
Orienting man understands the tree in terms of its species, the quality of timber, 
and its effectiveness in purifying the air, its chemical composition, and so on. But 
this mode of encounter fails to grasp a great deal. Orienting man thus experiences 
‘nothing of the truth of this [B]eing’ (D 54). Orienting man, much like Heidegger’s 
technological mode of revealing, sees only instrumental value. Orientation, in 
Heidegger’s terminology, sees only being, not Being.
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Part of the solution to this is for us to direct ourselves towards the Other, in their 
entirety, completely as they are. Realizing man is not limited to encountering a 
tree’s instrumental value. The purpose of this genuine relationship (i.e. an 
encounter between two Beings) is ‘not understanding, but meeting, encounter’ 
(Wheway, 1999: 108). Orienting man reduces the Other for his personal 
convenience; realizing man, by directing himself at the complete and irreducible 
Other, instead seeks a meaningful encounter with the whole of the Other. 
Realization brings us into ‘real contact with God, with other men, and with nature’ 
in a meaningful and non-functional way (Friedman, 1955: 34). 
The fifth dialogue, ‘On Unity: Dialogue by the Sea’, presents an early version of 
Buber’s dialogical principle. Lukas speaks to Daniel about the death of his 
acquaintance Elias. The dialogue leads Lukas to understand that life and death lie 
‘side by side in endless embrace’, rather than death being separate from life as a 
mere ‘before and after’ (D 131). Lukas remarks on a peculiar wind that blows back 
towards him from his own future/death which makes him realize that ‘it was 
foolish to wish to limit death’ (D 128, 131). Realizing man understands that the 
essential counterpart to life is death. When we recognise that the part and 
counterpart cannot be separated the tension between life and death is resolved. This 
is what Buber means when he says we must ‘live the tension’ (D 143). This 
presents a significant challenge, indeed Buber describes it as ‘highest test of our 
being’ (D 143). The example of life and death helps frame Buber’s dialogical 
philosophy, and reveals the presence of devekut within his theory. Particularly in 
modern, liberal society where individualism is prevalent, we have come to believe 
firmly that the Self and the Other are separate, and implicitly that they can be 
separated. For Buber, though, there can be no Self without the Other. Seemingly 
separate things are dependent on the other for their very Being. Realizing man 
understands this, but orienting man does not. Unity does not mean oneness – death 
is not actually life – instead unity means togetherness. Orienting man is only 
‘together’ with one dimension of Others. Realizing man is together with Others in 
their completeness.
The characters in Daniel reach their conclusions by experiences of angst. It is 
apparent that realizing man must experience a crisis in order to resolve the sort of 
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tension discussed earlier. The crisis prompts him to have an experience of 
totalizing and complete perspective, and of overcoming crises through creation. 
The subject is compelled to live with direction, commitment, and creativity. 
Suggestive of the influence of Kierkegaard on him, Buber calls such crisis 
‘provocative despair’ and says that it is ‘the highest of God’s messengers; it trains 
us to be spirits that can create and decide’ (BM 241; D 133-134). This ability to 
choose and commit is a part of Buber’s authentic character.
We live somewhere between the poles of orienting and realizing existences. Buber 
is clear that we should strive to be realizing wherever and whenever possible. 
Realizing man does not invent or project meaning and intrinsic value onto the 
world, rather he is able to see beyond the narrow reality seen by orienting eyes. The 
dominance of objectifying orientation, much like Heidegger’s technology, is what 
the early Buber saw as the cause of society’s ills. We deny or flee unity for the 
safe, secure, and unsatisfying isolation of orientation (Mendes-Flohr, 2006: 229). 
I and Thou
In I and Thou Buber describes the world as twofold and this is in accordance with 
man’s twofold attitude (IT 53). This is not to be confused with the sort of 
mind/body dualism of Descartes. There is only one world, but it is twofold. The 
two aspects which I will explain in turn are the ‘Thou-realm’ and the ‘It-realm’. 
Buber’s dialogical principle claims that the mode of dialogue determines our mode 
of existence (IT 53). Thus if we relate to the world in the I-It mode, we live in the 
It-realm. Dialogue is what ‘establish[es] a mode of existence’ (IT 53). With 
Biblical tone Buber writes: ‘In the beginning is the relation’ (IT 78). As he points 
out, ‘the I of the basic word I-You is different from that in the basic word I-It’ (IT
53). Buber is summarised well by Terry Brink and Connie Janakes: ‘The 
relationship makes the subjects who participate in it. […] I occurs only within the 
context of a relationship. Therefore, the I that enters into the I-Thou is different 
from that of the I-It’ (1979: 287).
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It would be wrong to think of Buber as suggesting that we exist purely in one realm 
or the other. Guilherme and Morgan explain that ‘Buber rejects any sharp dualism 
between the I-Thou and I-It relation; that is, for Buber, there is always an 
interplay… rather than an either/or relation’ (2009: 567). We oscillate between 
Thou and It attitudes. Buber’s claim is that although we may slip into the It-
attitude, there is always the potential for this to become the Thou-attitude 
(Guilherme and Morgan, 2009: 567). Significantly, while we must tend to our It-
realm needs (such as food, maintaining physical health and so on), this can always 
be done in the Thou-attitude. Indeed, the existentially transformative power of the 
Thou-mode means that following moments of I-Thou bonding, our outlook is 
changed and our experience of tending to It-needs is enriched. The I-Thou mode 
does not simply deal with ‘spiritual’ well-being but affects our ‘physical’ existence
also. Hilary Putnam captures this well: ‘the idea is that if one achieves that mode of 
being in the world, however briefly… then ideally, that mode of being… will 
transform one’s life even when one is back in the “It world”’ (2008: 67).
I-It Relationships
The It-realm is similar to Heidegger’s standing-reserve and the I-It attitude is
clearly the lesser mode of relating to Others. In the I-It relationship we perceive the 
Other merely as an object with value derived by their instrumental use to us. The I-
It person ‘only knows the feverish world out there and his feverish desire to use 
it… When he says You, he means: You, my ability to use!’ (IT 109). An I-It 
relationship is thus potentially exploitative and destructive. The I-It person might 
see mountain ranges merely as potential tourist hot-spots, and rivers as good for 
fishing. 
We are partly tempted towards the It-realm by the security it seems to offer. We 
need only present one aspect of ourselves – our instrumental, corporeal, ‘use’-ful 
self (IT 75). We present very little of our complete self, and thus what is hidden 
cannot be judged, criticised, or hated. Conversely though, it cannot be loved or 
simply seen and accepted completely as it is, and so by holding back so much of us
we are isolated from Others (IT 60-61). It-realm existence is a basic, mechanical 
82
existence which leaves us ultimately unsatisfied. Psychologist Keith Oatley 
captures the feeling of this: ‘When the self is a kind of thing, it will feel dead’ 
(1984: 15). 
Buber’s position on I-It relationships reveals his anti-individualistic political 
stance. People in the It-realm are ‘essentially “detached”’ from the Other 
(Solomon, 2005: 318). Rather than moving towards unity, It-realm existence 
upholds our sense of isolation. A society of people in the It-realm is a ‘collection of 
human units’ rather than a community of subjects existing with intrinsic meaning 
(Cooper, 2000: 34). 
The isolation resulting from the subject-to-object nature of I-It relationships is 
partly caused by the hierarchical structure of the relationship. The subject’s 
interests are privileged and there is no reason why the damage done to the Other 
should matter, the Other seeming to be merely an object (Garrett, 2010: 76). In 
terms of ecology, the I-It relationship does not present the trees, the forest, or the 
ecosystem as capable of having ‘interests’. Such things are only capable of 
satisfying our interests. In the It-realm every object is treated as mere instrument or 
obstacle to our desires (IT 63). 
Of course it is possible that we can realize the instrumental importance of having 
many trees and forests, and see that we must conserve at least some key species to 
maintain a habitable planet. There is no reason why there cannot be an It-realm 
justification for conservation. However, Buber would be critical of this too, 
because such conservation is exploitative as it keeps us within instrumental 
appreciation of nature.
As suggested above, we cannot exist in the Thou-realm without also existing in the 
It-realm. While God, what Buber calls the ‘Eternal Thou’, is capable of this, we are 
not: ‘without It a human being cannot live. But whoever lives only with that is not 
human’ (IT 85). If we ignore causation, physiology, laws of physics, etc, we will 
die in both realms. However, Thou-realm existence does not exclude our It-realm 
self. Indeed, the nature of Thou-realm existence is that it is all-inclusive.  Existence 
as an object is a fundamental component to any and all human existence and Buber 
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does not claim otherwise (Brink and Janakes, 1979: 298). Rather, he argues that by 
only living in the It-realm, our existence is basic, like that of a cog in a machine, 
and is also isolated. ‘With It alone people do not live up to their human potential’ 
(Brink and Janakes, 1979: 287). 
I-Thou Relationships
Buber’s I-Thou model applies to our relationships with anything: ‘In fact, anything 
– a tree, for example, or the eyes of a cat – can belong in the ‘Thou’, just as anyone
can be an ‘It’ for us’ (Cooper, 2000: 34). And unlike I-It relations, the I-Thou mode 
allows for meaningful relations to occur. Essential to such relationships is the 
recognition of the Other as a subject rather than a mere object. By this I mean we 
recognise the Other as having qualities which are irreducible, incalculable, 
unquantifiable, and so on. We see the Other as a Thou by seeing them in their 
completeness, entirely as they are. In doing this we affirm to the Other their 
intrinsic value, and their significance beyond instrumentality. Because the 
relationship determines our existence, if we enter I-Thou relationships we exist as 
irreducible, inherently valuable, unique beings.  
I-Thou bonding requires us to approach the Other openly and empathetically 
understand the validity and value of their perspective and interests (IT 62). I-Thou 
relationships can ‘only be entered with one’s whole being’, meaning that we ‘may 
not hold back part of [our]self’ (IT 60, 62). Kenneth Kramer and Mechthild 
Gawlick describe I-Thou encounters as ‘direct and open moments of mutual 
presence between persons... necessary for becoming whole human beings’ (2003: 
18). Our Thou-ness is affirmed by the relationship and it continues after the 
moment ends. Our Being is nourished by moments of unity. However, this 
nourishment fades and so we must attempt to return to unity so as to sustain the 
sense of complete and meaningful Being-with-Others. 
The essential openness of the I-Thou relationship makes us vulnerable. Due to the 
intense and intimate mutuality there is ‘no safe defensive position to which one can 
withdraw’ (Brink and Janakes, 1979: 288). Our complete Thou-ness is exposed –
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not just to physical damage, but to personal criticism and rejection. This risk tempts 
us ‘to flee from the unreliable, unsolid, unlasting, unpredictable, dangerous world 
of relation into the having of things’ (IT 126). In the Thou-realm our Being is fluid, 
unstable, and contingent. We feel insecure as our Thou keeps changing because we 
have no fixed essence and are ontologically linked to our relationships. Such a way 
of Being causes anxiety so we flee to the secure It-realm. But, though it certainly 
does not make things easy, the anxiety involved in I-Thou relationships reveals 
their value. Facing up to the completeness of our Being, realizing we are at once
entities distinct from the world but created by our relationship with it, constitutes, 
for Buber, an enormous shift in our thinking. Little wonder that it comes with 
anxiety. Overcoming this requires commitment and direction. Fleeing from our 
narrow It-self is very difficult but also very valuable and rewarding. Certainly, the 
tone throughout I and Thou reflects the excitement and ecstasy that Buber felt after 
overcoming the anxiety (indeed, Kaufmann was critical of how Buber was too 
‘swept up’ in his own excitement to be philosophically rigorous (Scott, 2010)).
The counterpoint of the anxiety of the Thou-realm is the lack of genuine and 
meaningful satisfaction provided by the It-realm. Indeed we are driven out of our 
secure It-realm by the ‘innateness of the longing for [an I-Thou] relation’ (IT 77). 
The It-realm cannot satisfy our longing for meaningful existence. Thus we are 
compelled by dissatisfaction to flee the It-realm, and by anxiety to flee or avoid the 
Thou-realm. Such a tension certainly makes authentic Being difficult, and quite 
rightly so. The anxiety of the Thou-realm is similar to the ‘provocative despair’ 
which forces us to choose and commit to our path (BM 241). 
An important distinction already hinted at between I-It and I-Thou relations is that 
we may gain from the latter, but do not enter into it for the primary purpose of 
personal gain. As such in the I-Thou mode we do not approach the Other 
instrumentally, in terms of what use they are to us: ‘No purpose intervenes between 
I and You, no greed and no anticipation… Every means is an obstacle. Only where 
all means have disintegrated encounters occur’ (IT 62-63). Whereas in I-It 
relationships the purpose is personal gain, the ‘purpose of the [I-Thou] relation is 
the relation itself’ (IT 112).
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I-Thou relationships occur between two unique and complex Beings. Because of 
this it is impossible to be precise about how the relationship should be. Openness 
and inclusion are certainly important, but these terms are flexible and do not 
prescribe behaviour. Every relationship is between two unique individuals, and 
correspondingly every relationship is unique. Thus how I behave and feel in my 
relationship with a tree, a person, or God must be different to anyone else’s 
behaviour and feelings. Words cannot describe, beyond openness and inclusion, 
quite what form relationships must take. ‘Every actual relationship in the world is 
exclusive’ meaning that only those within the relationship can understand that 
relationship (IT 148). Buber is right not to attempt to describe anyone else’s 
relationship, or to prescribe behaviour beyond openness and inclusion. Though it is 
not entirely satisfying, and though we may feel that it is missing something by 
lacking prescriptions, Buber is consistent with his belief that we and our 
relationships are unique and complex. 
One of the challenges presented by the I-Thou relationship is that it ‘cannot be 
found by seeking’ (IT 62). If we search for an I-Thou bond then it becomes an
object that we seek. The fact that we seek something from the relationship – a cure 
for loneliness, say – means we are hoping to exploit the relationship. There 
emerges a purpose of the relationship for our own benefit and thus the relationship 
becomes I-It in form. So how can we achieve I-Thou relationships without 
attempting to do so, knowing that such an attempt makes the relation unattainable? 
Like realization and orientation, Buber holds I-It and I-Thou relationships as two 
ends of the same spectrum. We exist as some degree of both (IT 85, 114). In his 
introduction to I and Thou, Kaufmann writes that instead of Buber’s twofold 
world, ‘Man’s world is manifold, and his attitudes are manifold’ (Kaufmann, 1970: 
9). Open and empathetic relationships are at one end of the spectrum, and 
exploitative and isolating relationships are at the other. 
A tendency to be empathetic and compassionate could increase the likelihood of 
encountering the Other in an I-Thou manner. The open and empathetic attitude 
encourages us to direct ourselves towards the Other in our entirety (IT 60). 
Through being well practiced in the skills of I-Thou bonding, it is hoped, that we 
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will happen upon moments of I-Thou connection. If we do not practice these skills 
then we will never be exposed or open to the possibility of such a relationship. 
Wheway notes that ‘I-Thou moments cannot be purposively achieved, but they can 
be prepared for – much as a gardener prepares the soil and cares for the plant so 
that it can grow to its full potential’ (Wheway, 1999: 114). A society (by which I 
include prevailing social norms, economic structure, and dominant political 
ideologies) which promotes self-centredness does not teach the skills necessary for 
I-Thou bonding. The aim, then, is to make I-Thou moments more likely. This 
preparedness for I-Thou moments includes not just person-to-person relations but 
person-to-nature relations also (and, for Buber, person-to-God).
Some limitations of I-Thou 
Attempts to create or sustain I-Thou relationships are faced with several 
difficulties. Firstly, I-Thou relationships decay and degrade over time. For Buber it 
is the ‘sublime melancholy of our lot, that every Thou must become an It’ (IT 68). 
He goes on: ‘Every Thou in the world is doomed by its nature to become a thing or 
at least to enter into thinghood again and again’ (IT 69). Because I-Thou 
relationships are intense, they require a great amount of effort to sustain. As such, 
‘a genuine encounter can be quite exhausting, even when it is exhilarating’ 
(Kaufmann, 1970: 17). 
Another problem is that our ability to recognise the uniqueness of each Being in a 
meaningful way is not always apparent, and this is clear when we consider an 
example from nature. When faced with row upon row of cultivated and ordered 
conifers which appear uniform it is harder to appreciate each tree, and its 
uniqueness, as mattering much at all. It is far easier, say, to notice the distinct and 
characterful uniqueness of an ancient oak tree which stands alone at the top of a 
hillock. Likewise, one bee does not seem to have anything particularly meaningful 
about its uniqueness, whereas a very old elephant seems to have a great deal of 
character, and a sense of wisdom and uniqueness. 
87
Buber on Nature
Buber’s stance on nature is captured primarily by two succinct pages in I and Thou, 
quoted in full in the appendix. Here Buber discusses an encounter with a tree. He 
can appreciate the tree’s physical presence and function: ‘I can assign it to a species 
and observe it as an instance, with an eye to its construction’ (IT 57). By focussing 
on this It-realm aspect of it ‘[I] can overcome its uniqueness and form so rigorously 
that I recognize it only as an expression’ of the physical laws and forces (57-58). In 
this It-realm encounter ‘the tree remains my object’ (IT 58). If instead we approach 
the tree in an I-Thou manner, we see that there is more to it than this naturalistic 
account offers. That said, we must remember that the complete Thou-realm 
encounter includes seeing the naturalistic aspect of the tree: ‘There is nothing that I 
must not see in order to see, and there is no knowledge that I must forget. Rather is 
everything, picture and movement, species and instance, law and number included’ 
(IT 58). Buber continues: ‘Whatever belongs to the tree is included: its form and its 
mechanics, its colour and its chemistry, its conversation with the elements and its 
conversation with the stars – all this in its entirety’ (IT 58). 
Buber tells us that ‘relation is reciprocity… Does the tree then have consciousness, 
similar to our own? I have no experience of that’ (IT 58). Consciousness is not 
what Buber is encountering. Instead ‘what I encounter is neither the soul of a tree 
nor a dryad, but the tree itself’ (IT 59). Buber’s I-Thou model seems to be a
phenomenology, by which I mean it is a system for encountering the complete 
phenomena of the Other, whereas his I-It model is very similar to naturalistic 
encountering. Indeed, as Cooper puts it, the I-It model is symptomatic of the 
alienating and objectifying ‘tendency aided and abetted by dualistic metaphysics’ 
(2000: 34). Like Husserl and Heidegger, Buber is highly critical of naturalism as 
offering anything like a complete view of reality, and this is apparent throughout 
his discussion of the I-It attitude.
Environmental theories are often disregarded if they appear anthropocentric, but, I 
argue, any anthropocentrism in Buberian ecophenomenology is appropriate and 
harmless. Buber takes a human-centred perspective to encounters and is talking 
about how humans ought to approach Others. Buber’s theory is anthropocentric, for 
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sure, in the sense that it discusses human behaviour first and foremost. But this 
‘anthropocentrism’ is far from the ghoul that haunts environmentalists (for an 
account of various forms of anthropocentrism and a response to them see James, 
2009: 117-145). Indeed, Buber’s entire point is that human beings should not be 
privileged. Everything has meaning and value beyond how it can serve our 
instrumental needs and wants. Because he does not commit ‘the anthropocentric 
fallacy of privileging human beings over other beings’, there is no actual problem 
raised by Buber’s focus on human conduct (Garrett, 2010: 77). 
Buber adjusts his position on nature in his 1957 afterword to I and Thou. In I and 
Thou, Buber describes the sphere of our relation with nature: ‘Here the relation 
vibrates in the dark and remains below language. The creatures stir across from us, 
but they are unable to come to us, and the [Thou] we say to them sticks to the 
threshold of language’ (IT 56-57). Recall that It and Thou refer to the ‘basic words’ 
and I-It and I-Thou to the basic word pairs. Presumably, then, if nature is ‘below 
language’ (there is no pejorative meant by ‘below’) then the basic word pairs do 
not apply within nature. Buber considers the implications of this in his afterword: 
Animals are not twofold, like man: the twofoldness of the basic words 
I-You and I-It is alien to them although they can both turn toward 
another [B]eing and contemplate objects. We may say that in them 
twofoldness is latent. In our perspective of our You-saying to animals, 
we may call this sphere the threshold of mutuality (IT 172-173).
Buber is seeking to draw distinctions between our relationships with people and 
our relationships with nature, to assess what it is ‘that constitutes the essential 
difference between the former and the latter’ and for this he introduces the notion 
of threshold (Schwelle) (IT 172). For Buber, plants and minerals are at the ‘pre-
threshold’ of mutuality, animals at the threshold, and humans at the ‘over-
threshold’ (Atterton, 2004: 263-264). Complete mutuality is only possible between 
humans, but nonetheless some mutuality between us and any other Being is 
possible. Buber writes that it is ‘part of our concept of the plant that it cannot react 
to our actions upon it, that it cannot “reply.” Yet this does not mean that we meet 
with no reciprocity at all in this sphere’ (IT 173). Between human and rock or tree 
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there is ‘reciprocity of [B]eing itself’ (IT 173). So even though complete mutuality 
is impossible, the presence of two Beings allows for some reciprocity and 
mutuality. But for this, our attitude is still important. 
The living wholeness and unity of a tree that denies itself to the eye, 
no matter how keen, of anyone who merely investigates [i.e. that is 
not accessible by empirical or naturalistic study], while it is manifest 
to those who say You, is present when they are present (IT 173). 
By approaching the tree in the I-Thou manner we ‘grant the tree the opportunity to 
manifest’ its ‘living wholeness’ (IT 173). The indivisible completeness of the tree 
‘flashes toward us’ when we ‘do justice with an open mind to the actuality that 
opens up before us’ (IT 173). Note here that Buber clearly adopts moral language 
(‘ought’, ‘should’) when discussing our relationship with nature. We should
attempt to meet with the ‘indivisible wholeness’ of natural Beings; it is wrong to 
see them merely in naturalistic terms (IT 175). While Buber certainly 
acknowledges the differences between the human-to-human and human-to-animal 
capacity for mutuality, both relationships still involve mutuality and there is still 
reason to focus on our behaviour and manner of approaching the relationship. This 
explains why ‘Buber felt he could simply revise the twofold ontology of I and 
Thou [in his afterword] rather than abandon it’ (Atterton, 2004: 264). 
If anything, Buber’s amendment helps to explain the ethical dimension of 
relationships. Frank Garrett explains: ‘We human beings may indeed be separate 
from animals, and animals may indeed be mute and unable to respond to 
language’s call. But despite this, we nevertheless are responsible for animals’ and 
nature broadly conceived (2010: 81). Garrett even uses the same phrase as 
Heidegger to explain our role: ‘Human beings are the shepherds of [B]eing’ and, 
like shepherds, humans gather ‘together that which disperses itself, namely, 
[B]eing’ (2010: 81). But unlike Heidegger, there is ethical content to Buberian 
‘shepherding’.
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Buber’s Ethics
For Buber, ethical behaviour is closely linked to whether or not we operate in the I-
Thou mode. Buber’s ideal ethical behaviour is derived from his ‘emphasis on 
wholeness, decision, presentness, and uniqueness’ (Friedman, 2002: 233). There is 
also a second basis to Buberian ethics, namely human ‘potentiality’ (EG 95). Buber 
places great emphasis on personal responsibility. In his article ‘What is Man?’ 
(1938) he argues that we are neither determined by our desires or by God or any 
other external forces, but instead the authentic individual is self-directing (BM
190). One year later in ‘The Question to Single One’ (1939), Buber defines 
potentiality as our ability to choose one path from another, and authenticity means 
taking responsibility for this choice (BM 104). Given that ethical direction is not 
heaven-sent or socially constructed, but instead guided by ‘inner awareness’, it 
seems that we have something like a subjectivist account moral autonomy 
(Friedman, 2002: 233). The truth is more complex: Buber is certainly not talking 
about ‘moral autonomy’ or ‘moral heteronomy’ (EG 98). The former is simply 
‘“freedom from” without any “freedom for”’ whilst the latter is a ‘“responsibility” 
that is simply imposed moral duty’ which shows no sign of ‘genuine freedom or 
spontaneity’ (Friedman, 2002: 234). Moral heteronomy imposes rules upon the 
individual and the relationship but Buber rejects this position. Consistent with this, 
Buber rejected Jewish laws as he feared that ‘“internal slavery” to religious laws 
stunts spiritual growth’ (Scott, 2010). Unsurprisingly this stance was heavily 
criticised by many prominent Jewish figures including Gershom Scholem, Chaim 
Potok, and Emmanuel Levinas. 
For Buber, though, moral autonomy was also problematic, largely due to the 
account of values based thereon. If we are morally autonomous then we may 
decide on what characterises moral behaviour (i.e. we autonomously define what is 
good, bad, and valuable). But meanings and values which are simply created by the 
autonomous individual, whether in the moment or after careful consideration, are 
insubstantial. 
One can believe in and accept a meaning or value . . . if one has 
discovered it, not if one has invented it. It can be for me an 
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illuminating meaning, a direction-giving value, only if it has been 
revealed to me in my meeting with [a B]eing, not if I have freely 
chosen it for myself from among the existing possibilities and 
perhaps have in addition decided with a few fellow creatures: This 
shall be valid from now on (EG 70).
Imposed moral duty (moral heteronomy) lacks meaningful freedom. Invented 
ethical practices (moral autonomy), though expressing freedom from imposed 
duties, are somehow distant from reality. Friedman explains: ‘The narrow ridge 
between the two is a freedom that means freedom to respond, and a responsibility 
that means both address from without and free response from within’ (2002: 234). 
Buber is looking for an ethical code based on encounters with Others and on 
authentic Being. Morality must have an intersubjective core – so it is not weighed 
down by external imposition (heteronomy), nor is it worthlessly artificial 
(autonomy). Buber, then, is an intersubjective pluralist: the authentic relationship 
determines what behaviour is ethical within that situation.
There is a prima facie similarity between Kant’s second formulation of the 
categorical imperative and Buber’s ethics: ‘Never treat one’s fellow as a means 
only but always also as an end of value in himself’ (Friedman, 2002: 235). 
However, there is a difference at the base of this claim. For Kant the ‘ought’ is 
based on his notion of human dignity (based on each person’s rationality) but for 
Buber the basis is ontological. A Buberian’s aim is to ‘shepherd’ the Being of the 
Other: to invite them to present themselves but without hoping or trying to ‘impose 
his own’ Being onto him (Friedman, 2002: 100). We do not wish to impose our 
Self on the Other in a ‘colonial’ sort of fashion where the Self expands over the 
Other. Rather, we are concerned for the Other as an end in himself as a result of our 
direct relation to them and our recognition of the value of their perspective and 
uniqueness. If we see the Other in their completeness, and see their value, then we 
would not exploit them or treat them as mere means. 
This brings me to a significant distinction between Buber, Husserl, and Heidegger. 
Heidegger focuses strictly on ontology, on what Being ‘is’, and rejected discussion 
of ‘ought’. Husserl (and Husserlians) focus instead on ontology and values, and on 
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what one ‘ought’ to do, but even Kohák, the best Husserlian ecophenomenologist, 
is not an ethicist. Though he discusses values, there is no priority given to the 
ethics of relationships. For Husserlian’s, the ‘truth’ of the Other Being is accessible 
through reason and reductions, rather than through an ethical relationship. But 
Buber considers ethics, ontology, and relationship modes. For Buber ontology is 
axiological: ‘In Buber “is” and “ought” join’ (Friedman, 2002: 236). So, for Buber, 
ethics are not received from external forces (i.e. absolutism), nor are they invented 
(subjectivism). What matters is the between, and it is through dialogue we know 
not to mistreat the Other, or rather, we know what constitutes mistreatment within 
the context of the relationship. We are responsible for the form of dialogue, and we 
have the capacity to make it I-Thou, so it would be ethically wrong to do otherwise. 
This is what makes Buber’s contribution to existential ecophenomenology and 
environmental ethics unique and original.
Rather than starting from an external, objective, absolutist basis for morality 
‘which man is bound to apply as best as possible to each new situation’, or from a 
subjective, internal basis, Buber ‘starts with the situation itself’ (Friedman, 2002: 
240). Buber talks of an ‘ought’ as a feature ‘of lived life’ rather than as an 
abstraction or imposition (BM 18). He goes on to link the existential theme of
responsibility (for choices and our life-direction) with responsiveness to the world 
which we are in constant relation with. We ought to respond to the Thou of the 
Other. If we only respond to their It (say, if they want to use us for sexual 
gratification because this is their dysfunctional understanding of love) then we are 
relating to their inauthentic self. We ought to encourage the Other to flourish, to 
nurture their Being, and to respond to their authentic needs and wants. So, for 
example, rather than making an absolute claim that killing is wrong, moral 
decisions must respond to the situation. Our choices must be based on the situation, 
what the relationship with the Thou of the Other tells us, rather than on some all-
knowing ethical code which we carry with us (Friedman, 2002: 240). It would 
certainly be extremely unusual for an I to show his responsibility to a Thou by 
killing him, but the decision should be made based on the situation. As discussed 
earlier, owing to each subject’s uniqueness, it is impossible to prescribe the shape a 
relationship should take. In some relationships it might be appropriate to kill the 
Other, but as long as this decision is based on an I-Thou bond and is responsive to 
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the situation, there is nothing necessarily wrong with killing (this may be the basis 
for a Buberian defence of euthanasia, but this is not the place to pursue the 
possibility). In Buberian ethics, traditional ethical norms do not bind us to a course 
of action (BM 135). Thus Buber is a dialogical pluralist (there being infinite unique 
relationships), but is not subjectivist or objectivist. 
There are some similarities between Buber and virtue ethics, such as (generally 
speaking) a denial of absolute moral claims (thou shalt not kill, for example), as 
well as emphasis on exhibiting certain traits (openness, inclusion, compassion). 
Thomas E. Hill, for example, writes that: 
The question is, “What sort of person would destroy the natural 
environment—or even see its value solely in cost/benefit terms?”  
The answer I suggest is that willingness to do so may well reveal 
the absence of traits which are a natural basis for a proper humility, 
self acceptance, gratitude, and appreciation of the good in others 
(1983: 211).
Though the crossover between Buber and environmental virtue ethics presents an 
interesting area for original research, this is not the place to take the matter further.
Buberian environmental ethics
Buber’s pluralism comes from the exclusivity of relationships and the uniqueness 
of subjects (including animals and plants). As such, it is impossible to determine a 
set of ethical norms and rules which we ought to adhere to. Buber simply does not 
tell us what to do in our relationships – or rather, what behaviour the situation (i.e. 
the relationship) can justify. Despite this lack of prescriptive normative content, 
there is certainly a right approach to take to any relationship (i.e. empathetic, 
compassionate, non-objectifying). If we relate purely in the I-It mode then we are 
inauthentically fleeing the wholeness of our Being, and the wholeness of the 
Other’s Being. If we relate in the I-Thou mode (which includes our It-self) then we 
act authentically, with compassion and inclusion, and through dialogue with the 
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Other we can agree upon or discover the correct ethical behaviour which we should 
follow. The dialogue does not ‘create’ what is right, rather it points to what is right 
now, in the situation. 
If the dialogue is narrow, in the It-realm, it will point to the behaviour which suits 
us best in terms of use-value. Some examples of possible It-realm behaviour 
include deforestation for timber, or to clear land for cattle grazing because such 
behaviour may be simply for profit or material benefit, and may exhibit no 
inclusion or compassion. It-realm behaviour could also include substantial
replantation efforts to maintain a habitable environment or to meet the growing 
wants of the global population. Also included is the small-scale planting of trees to 
increase local (often urban) house prices19. A popular system for measuring the 
value of trees in the UK is the Helliwell calculus which ‘does not consider 
environmental, social or cultural benefits’ and ‘expresses [the tree’s value] in 
pounds sterling’ (Forestry Commission, 2010: 23). Attempts have been made, such 
as that by Kathleen Wolf in the USA, to ‘estimate [economic] values for the many 
indirect, intangible services and functions that urban nature provides, such as 
beauty, ecosystem services and psychological benefits’ (2008: 120). One approach 
is to use a market-based hedonic pricing system – by which I mean, how much 
someone is willing to pay for the pleasure of having natural amenities near to 
where they live. Wolf found that house prices increase by 2% with one or more 
trees near the house, by 6-9% if the neighbourhood has ‘good tree cover’ and by as 
much as 37% if the plot borders onto large amounts of wooded land (2008: 122). 
While even making reference to the ‘intangible’ and inherent value of trees and 
woodland, there are many who make it their business to calculate the tangible and 
instrumental value of this. Even when focussing on Thou-realm factors, trees are 
valued by important conservationist organisations such as the Forestry Commission 
purely in terms of their It-realm significance. This is an example of the Thou of 
nature being appreciated strictly in terms of its It-value. I am not suggesting that 
trees and woodland do not have It-realm significance, quite the opposite, but what 
                                               
19 There are a number of methods for calculating the benefit of trees to communities. The Forestry 
Commission’s ‘The Case for Trees’ explains a number of these, whilst almost exclusively focussing 
on instrumental goals, or at least focussing on instrumental justifications for seemingly inherently 
good things like sense of community, education, etc. (2010: 23).
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is clear is that approaching trees solely or mainly in terms of what they ‘have to 
offer’ (primarily in economic terms) misses a great deal of their complete value. 
There is some ambiguity in Buber as to what scale he might be referring to. Are we 
to relate to each individual tree as Thou, or each forest, or each continent’s 
ecosystem, or the global ecosystem? My suspicion, though Buber does not spell 
this out, is that it is all of the above. A complete Thou-view of the tree recognises 
that the tree is joined to the larger system, but also that it is unique and valuable in 
its own way (IT 148). We cannot have a Thou-view of the tree without at least 
acknowledging the Thou-ness of the forest it is in, or the world the forest is in.
To put this into concrete terms, a forest manager working for a large corporation 
seeking to make profit from a forest will clear some trees if there is overcrowding, 
but ultimately aim to grow as much timber per acre in as short a time as possible. 
The It-realm manager is using the forest as a means to an end. ‘Management’ in the 
It-sense means control, but recall that in ‘controlling or using a thing we separate it 
from ourselves’ (Martin, 2009: 200). But ‘management’ in the Thou-sense signifies 
the ‘shepherding of Being’. Thou-realm management is not about wielding control 
for our sakes, but rather involves recognising our potentiality and power to act in 
certain ways. The difference between an It-realm timber plantation and a Thou-
realm managed forest is significant. The It-view manages the timber, the Thou-
view manages the trees and the forest. 
Important for a healthy and thriving forest is biodiversity, so a range of trees, 
animals, and insects will be encouraged by the Thou-realm manager. For the sake 
of the complete forest this may involve artificially creating clearings (popular with 
species of deer to gather). How do we reconcile the chopping of a tree with a Thou-
realm compassion and inclusion? Surely it seems to be against the interests of the 
tree to be felled. On a basic level, yes, it seems wrong to cut down the tree – an act 
of destruction against its Thou-ness. Among its own interests, a tree is concerned 
with the continuation of the forest (mostly for its species’ sake), and the 
continuation of its genetic heritage. Inclusion and compassion may compel us to 
plant or scatter the acorn or seeds of a tree. This means that some of the individual 
tree’s interests – its commitment to the forest and to reproducing – are respected 
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and cared for. Moreover, the timber wielded could be used and appreciated in a 
realizing sense. Not simply because it has made strong, warm walls or furniture, 
but because we are aware that it has been sacrificed for the sake of the forest and 
that it has been respected. 
Given our responsibility as shepherds of Being, and given our capacity for 
recognising the non-instrumental importance of biodiversity and of understanding 
woodland management, it would be wrong to focus on one small part of the forest 
(i.e. several trees) rather than the totality and completeness of the forest. The Thou 
of the forest may require such maintenance and active destruction as forming the 
clearing. However, the Thou of the trees felled must also be respected, as laid out 
above. While we may cut down trees and use their timber, we can do this in a 
heightened, realizing manner, which mitigates the harm done. Forest management 
to encourage diversity and sustainability is certainly ethically justifiable (in some 
circumstances) within Buber’s framework. Recall that It ‘is the word of separation’ 
(IT 75). In the case of the Thou-realm forest management we are not alienated from 
the forest, or from the tree, but are engaged with it, in its completeness, and in a 
close and respectful union. Suggesting the importance of being actively engaged, 
Buber writes that ‘true unity cannot be found, it can only be done’ (IT 146fn). The 
It-realm shows a forest as timber and our ability to profit from it, the Thou-realm 
shows a forest as a forest, and our ability to be in unity with it and our 
responsibility to nurture it. It is important to note that this is simply a sketch of one 
possible relationship to highlight the potential difference between I-It and I-Thou 
relationships with nature. Given the plurality, exclusivity, and uniqueness of 
relationships, I am not suggesting that every I-Thou forest manager must carry out 
deforestation to make a clearing. It is for the situation to reveal what actions ought 
to be taken. We respond to the Other’s Thou, and to our own, and treat both with 
due respect and compassion.
A further situation which explains Buber’s theory is the growing of apples. Here I 
will lay out one possible I-Thou approach, an I-It approach, and show that for 
Buber unlike Heidegger the technology is not necessarily the problem. An I-Thou 
manager does not tend to an orchard purely for personal gain, though there is no 
reason why she cannot enjoy the harvest (that apple trees produce fruit which is to 
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be eaten is, after all, one aspect of their completeness). The gardener will attempt to 
keep the trees healthy, by feeding the soil and pruning where appropriate. The point 
though is not to feed the apple tree simply to increase the yield, but to keep the tree 
healthy. The relationship will be symbiotic rather than exploitative, meaning that 
we approach the tree in terms of how we can have a mutual relationship with it 
while respecting its dignity and distinctiveness. Understanding the tree in its 
completeness includes understanding its natural counterparts. Fostering insects and 
other wildlife is important, not simply because of the functions they perform, but 
because they are part of what we might call the tree’s community. Thus while an 
orchard itself is artificial, we can still treat the trees in it respectfully, nurturing and 
witnessing their distinctiveness. This goes for the fruit also. As with Buber’s 
realizing man, we can enjoy the fruit of a tree for its distinctive character. We need 
not simply eat an apple for sustenance, but instead can eat the apple in a way which 
connects us to the uniqueness of the tree and to the environment in which it 
formed. This environment includes the weather and the seasons: the sweetness of 
the apple reflects the weather and the timing reflects the season. By eating the 
apple in the I-Thou mode we are connected to the tree, to the seasons, and to the 
weather and climate. The simple act of eating an apple can connect us with the 
natural world in a meaningful and authentic way. If we never see an orchard and 
always buy fruit from the supermarket then the chances are high that we are 
missing out on I-Thou moments. But also we are not exercising the skills required 
for these moments. The modern disconnect from methods of production which 
appreciate the tree beyond its yield capacity carries with it this wider implication: 
that another opportunity to bond, and to learn to bond, is lost.
The I-It orchard keeper might have an identical orchard. However, the It-realm sees 
the insects and the varieties of trees simply in terms of their functionality: what 
they offer to the process of producing apples. The trees are not valued for their 
uniqueness and distinctiveness, and are mere slave-trees. Some varieties produce 
higher yields than others, hence why of the 7000 plus varieties of apple, there are 
usually around ten varieties available in supermarkets (Elzebroek, 2008: 27). Thus 
modern apple-growing for profit’s sake is attentive merely to the properties of the 
variety in terms of commercial viability such as crop yield, shelf life, ease of 
transport, and uniformity. The grower is alienated from the apple and the tree, 
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seeing only exchange value. It is not just the tree that is asked to give more than it 
naturally would for our own sake, but the orchard as well becomes cramped. The 
process of dwarfing rootstocks allows trees to be placed unnaturally close together 
allowing for three times as many trees in some orchards (Wilbert, 1993: 65). 
Wherever the dominant aim is to produce fruit for our own benefits, there will be 
isolation from the tree. Because it need not be so, Buber would describe this as 
unethical.
Unlike Heidegger, there is no reason in Buber why one system of technology must
be bad. Take for example the process of grafting whereby one variety of apple (or 
pear) tree is grafted onto the rootstock of another variety (often a quince rootstock). 
This is usually done because one variety produces excellent roots but poor fruit and 
the other variety produces excellent fruit but poor roots. If done to primarily 
maximise yield for our benefit, then this seems unethical. But if it is done to save a 
species from extinction, to rescue it so that its distinctiveness and irreducible 
uniqueness may live on, then we are being respectful of its Being. For Buber, 
emphasis should be on the relationship as mode of revealing, and not merely on the 
technology used. 
Earlier I explained how if we directly seek to achieve an I-Thou bond then we 
objectify the Other and only relate to the part of them that can, say, relieve our 
loneliness. What we should do instead is to practice the skills that increase the 
likelihood of an I-Thou bond. Consider the example of a gardener. An avid and 
careful gardener tends to be ‘in tune’ with the seasons, aware of birth and 
(sometimes premature) death of plants, and is fully aware of her power and 
responsibility ‘over’ nature. Gardening can also allow us to train our eyes to be 
attentive to the beauty and value of all aspects which contribute to the garden. A 
gardener may be able to value each individual bee as contributing to the health of 
the garden. In short, gardening might help us to find value in the very small, might 
encourage our nurturing mentality towards nature, might help us to be more in tune 
with the natural rhythms of the world, and might help us to recognize the beautiful 
and manifold connections between organisms. Gardening, therefore, may hone our 
‘totalizing’ view of nature, and may allow us closer access to the Thou-ness of the 
natural world. While many begin gardening as a hobby, it may take us closer to 
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nature in a meaningful way. Of course, it is possible to garden in an I-It fashion, 
and gardening itself is neither necessary nor sufficient for moving closer towards 
an I-Thou bond with nature. Nevertheless gardening can be an exercise in Buberian 
environmental ethics because any relation has the potential to be an I-Thou 
relation.
Buber on Heidegger
Buber’s criticisms of Heidegger come from lectures given in 1938 to the Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem, and during his 1951 tour of America. This will further 
demonstrate the differences between the two philosophers, thereby highlighting 
what Buber has to offer to ecophenomenology. Buber makes several criticisms of 
Heidegger, some of which will be unpacked later. The first of the two central aims 
of Buber’s critique is to show that, despite claims to the opposite, Heidegger does 
deal with anthropological questions, including interpersonal relationships, but his 
phenomenology is incapable of grasping this aspect of human experience, in its 
‘everydayness’ or not. Secondly, the reason for this inadequacy is Heidegger’s 
fundamentally misguided ontology. This derives from Heidegger’s ‘solipsistic’ 
method which affects his account of Being-with (Mitsein) and solicitude. 
Heidegger explains that we ‘live alongside’ the Other, but according to Buber he 
never explains fully how, or in what sense, our Self can be made accessible to the 
Other. Ultimately, Heidegger’s ‘monological’ method leads him to forget the 
importance of direct, whole relations between man and the Other (BM 203).
Buber notes that Heidegger hopes to root his philosophy ‘not in philosophical 
anthropology but “fundamental ontology”, that is, the doctrine of existence as such’ 
(BM 193). For Heidegger a person’s existence is something which we each have a 
relation to and are capable of understanding. Heidegger’s philosophy, then, seeks 
to find basis in the findings from our own understanding of our Being. ‘But 
fundamental ontology does not have to do with man in his actual manifold 
complexity but solely with [Being] in itself, which manifests itself through man’ 
(BM 194). The problem Buber is raising is that Heidegger’s fundamental ontology 
only exposes one dimension, a ‘curious partial sphere of life’, of that which it seeks 
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to explain (BM 195). Buber explains Heidegger’s mistake in focussing on a 
subject’s understanding of his own Being: ‘One can stretch out one’s hands to 
one’s image or reflection in a mirror, but not to one’s real self’ (BM 198). 
Buber then notes that we must ‘test the genuineness and correctness’ of Heidegger 
in terms of philosophical anthropology since he ‘draws upon concrete human life, 
which is the subject of philosophical anthropology’ (BM 194). Buber notes that 
Heidegger’s notion of Being (which Buber refers to as ‘existence’) is extracted 
‘from real human life’ (BM 194). Despite Heidegger’s interest in the everyday, his 
account of Being is somehow detached from the ‘real facts of its subjects’ (BM
194). ‘Real existence, that is, real man in his relation to his [B]eing, is 
comprehensible only in connexion with the nature of the [B]eing to which he 
stands in relation’ (BM 194). Buber continues: ‘Heidegger abstracts from the 
reality of human life the categories which originate and are valid in the relation of 
the individual [to the Other], and applies them to “existence” in the narrower sense, 
that is, to the relation of the individual to his own [B]eing’ (BM 195). By 
neglecting to study relationships, and by abstracting from that which we know 
about Being-in-relation and applying this to Being, Heidegger’s phenomenology 
reveals only one aspect of Being, and this itself is done through a poor procedure. 
For Buber, we can only understand Being by looking at Being-with. Heidegger 
attempts to do otherwise by providing a ‘fundamental ontology’, and thus he 
provides a warped and one dimensional account of Being. Being can only be 
understood in its totality, and for this we must look at relationship forms.
Of course, Heidegger did consider Being-with (Mitsein), that characteristic of 
Dasein that allows relationships to occur: ‘Being-with lets the Dasein of Others be 
encountered’ (BT 157). Buber’s problem is that Heidegger fails to explain how 
Beings could actually ‘touch’. Heidegger only explains that we live ‘alongside’ but 
not how we come to have a ‘direct relation with the life of another’ (BM 201). 
Heidegger claims that Being-with is an essential part of our Being but Buber shows 
that Heidegger fails to explain how relationships could affect our essence at all 
(BM 201). For Heidegger, concern (solicitude) comes from Being-with but for 
Buber ‘solicitude does not come from mere co-existence with [O]thers, as 
Heidegger thinks, but from essential, direct, whole relations’ (BM 201). Simply 
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existing alongside something does not explain how our essences are affected by 
this relationship. For Buber of course, relationships are determinative of our Being, 
and his problem with Heidegger is that his phenomenology is incapable of 
explaining that relationships are essential. Buber explains: ‘In mere solicitude man 
remains essentially with himself, even if he is moved with extreme pity; in actions 
and help he inclined towards the [O]ther, but the barriers of his own [B]eing are not 
thereby breached’ (BM 201). Much like Buber’s I-It relationship, with solicitude 
there is no unity, no contact of Being-on-Being. In the case of someone helping 
another, the former ‘makes his assistance, not his self, accessible to the other; nor 
does he expect any real mutuality’ (BM 201). Even when we are kind, if we are not 
open then we remain alienated. Such a person ‘may clothe the naked and feed the 
hungry all day and it will remain difficult for him to say a true Thou’ (PMB 723).  
Heidegger can show that we might treat the Other well, in a non-exploitative 
manner. But for Buber this is not sufficient. Within Heidegger’s theory, Beings are 
still isolated from each other. Despite Heidegger’s attempts to be non-
individualistic, he offers no explanation of how a subject might meaningfully 
‘meet’ the Other. 
Heidegger explains our Being by focussing on Dasein’s relationship with himself 
which misses a great deal, and almost certainly gives an inaccurate account of that 
which it does portray. But even when Heidegger comes to discuss relationships it is
far from Buber’s model. Heidegger never explains how Beings might experience 
‘the mystery of the [O]ther’ (BM 202). Heidegger understands his subjects on their 
own, and his phenomenology as such fails to explain how this isolation can be 
overcome, or how to mitigate alienation if isolation cannot be overcome. 
Heidegger’s ‘solitary man’ therefore lives ‘the life of monologue’ (BM 23). 
Buber’s emphasis on dialogue and unity make his contribution to 
ecophenomenology extremely valuable, and his critique of Heidegger shows some 
of the shortcomings of a Heideggerian account.
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Summary of Buber’s position
There are several important aspects of Buber’s theory, and to attempt to reduce it to 
a one-paragraph summary seem rather anti-Buberian. Then again, understanding 
Buber’s work in its completeness is a herculean task20. The pivotal points of 
Buber’s philosophy for the purposes of this thesis certainly can be highlighted.
The world is full of value and meaning, but we need to exercise our perception in 
order to see it this way, and this largely comes down to performing inclusion and 
compassion. It is a myth that we live in an irreconcilable duality with Others. It can 
seem tempting and secure to reinforce this duality, to keep our Being-ness distant 
from Other’s Being-ness, by treating them (and ourselves) as objects and thereby 
only engaging with one dimension of our respective Beings. The alternative to 
living in this duality is to strive towards Buber’s devekut-inspired account of unity. 
In union with Others we maintain our ontological distinctiveness – and in fact 
assert and confirm it – but we also assert and confirm the uniqueness of the Other 
back to them, we value the Other and have ourselves valued. Thus in moments of 
union we are more completely ourselves than before. Our existence is at its most 
heightened and complete when we relate to Others in a compassionate and 
empathetic manner, seeking nothing from them.
An authentic Buberian person will approach Others with openness, compassion, 
inclusion, and will see and nurture them in their complete Thou-ness, entirely as 
they are. It is not the actions we take or the benefits which we reap that determine 
the rightness of our behaviour, it is our approach to the Other that makes something 
ethical or not.
It should be noted that it is the authentic aspects of the Other which we must aim to 
encounter, and treat compassionately. We should be infinitely caring and generous 
to all. In cases where we encounter Nazis or free-riders, say, respecting their Thou-
ness involves consideration of why they hold their positions. If they are 
inauthentic, perhaps they seek control to counter the sense of powerless they feel 
                                               
20 There is still no complete collection of Buber’s work, and the first collection, printed in German 
in the 1960s, was 3500 pages, and was itself incomplete even at this length (Smith, 1966: 9). 
103
over their Being-towards-death, then we should attempt to encourage them towards 
an authentic understanding of death. In some cases we must admit that there is 
nothing we can do for the Other, and we cannot truly encounter their authentic self 
as it is shrouded in entrenched selfishness or dogma. Wherever it is possible to 
encounter an authentic Thou, and to nurture their Being, we ought to do so. But 
there is no requirement for us to allow ourselves to be exploited or dominated by an 
inauthentic Other.
Criticisms of Buber
Because Buber’s work covers so many fields – education, religion, cultural studies, 
politics – there are many criticisms of his work, but many of these would be off 
topic. For the sake of this thesis I will seriously consider three criticisms. I will 
look at the limits of mutuality and reciprocity in the context of our relationships 
with nature. Next I will consider the apparent extremism of Buber’s dialogical 
position. Finally I will consider how much Buber relies on faith, specifically in his 
account of unity. Before this, I must consider Emmanuel Levinas’s criticism of 
Buber’s ethics. 
Levinas argues that Buber’s account of ethics is wrong, and that this reveals that 
Buber is wrong to put such emphasis on reciprocity and mutuality (Atterton et al, 
2004: 325). I argue that Levinas’s reasons for complaint are not strong, but that the 
complaint itself might have some merit. Both Levinas and Buber were important 
Jewish scholars, the latter following the Hasidic tradition and the former following
the Talmudic tradition. Buber believed that God could be found in everything, 
especially relationships, daily habits, and community activity. Levinas believed 
that Buber brought God down by presenting relationships as mutual and 
symmetrical. 
In Totality and Infinity, Levinas posits that ethics are derived from confrontation 
with the Other. This Other represents an opening into the abstract realm of 
Otherness. Our concrete relations to the Other expose to us this infinite and 
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spiritual world, but only when we are open to the complete Otherness of the Other. 
As Levinas writes:
To approach the Other in conversation is to welcome his expression, 
in which at each instant he overflows the idea a thought would carry 
from it. It is therefore to receive from the Other beyond the capacity 
of the I, which means exactly: to have the idea of infinity (1991: 51).
For Levinas, the ethical relation is not mutual and symmetrical as it is with Buber, 
but is asymetrical. The appearance of the Other demands something from us: ‘the 
face of the [O]ther in its precariousness and defenselessness, is for me at once the 
temptation to kill and the call to peace, the “You shall not kill”’ (Levinas, 1996: 
167). This sort of demand is prior to any reaction by us. This demand comes from 
the Otherness of the Other, or rather the Otherness contains God within. The face 
of the Other reminds us of God’s commands.
Recall that for Buber our freedom, combined with our power, means that we ought 
to choose to do the right thing, that is, what the situation/relationship tells us is 
right. But for Levinas, such freedom is irreligious. Earlier I discussed Buber in 
relation to euthanasia, and argued that the relationship could make killing right. For 
Levinas, every relationship reveals God’s commands, especially that we must not 
kill. Levinasian ethics do not allow the freedom to choose to do the right thing, or 
to decide the right thing, rather we ought always to carry out God’s commands 
(Bergo, 2011). Levinas, therefore, is arguing against Buber’s existential-dialogical-
pluralist ethics.
Implicit within this is Levinas’s belief, similar to Buber’s position, that God can be 
found in every relation. For Levinas, this means that the Other is ‘the manifestation 
of the height in which God is revealed’ (1991: 79). This means that any relation 
between the I and the Other is between I and God. As such it should be considered 
asymmetrical. In the face-to-face relation we are addressed by the Other and by 
God. This is not a mutual or symmetrical encounter and to suggest otherwise would 
be to elevate the subject or reduce God. The I-Thou relation is intimate and equal. 
Kaufmann’s decision to translate Du as You, not Thou was a deliberate move away 
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from the asymmetrical position in which we stand with God. The difference 
between Levinas and Buber, in terms of ethics and religious behaviour, is clear.
Levinas’s direct criticism, that Buber’s account of our encounter-with-God is 
wrong, need not impact upon my account of Buberian ecophenomenological ethics. 
My interest is not in the religious aspect of Buber’s thought, but simply how his 
phenomenology might support a strong system of environmental ethics. If Buber 
does not pay the proper respect to God’s position at the top of a hierarchy, this does 
not make his ecophenomenology wrong. Moreover, Buber’s pluralist ethics are 
much more nuanced and considered than Levinas’s basic adherence to religious 
commands. Levinas’s criticisms of Buber do not concern me here. What Levinas 
touches on, namely Buber’s insistence on the mutuality and reciprocity of 
relationships, does need some consideration. 
The problem of mutuality and reciprocity must be dealt with in two stages. Firstly, 
mutuality with animals, specifically animals that can ‘reply’ to our actions. And 
secondly, mutuality with ‘things’ – trees, rocks, and so on – that are not capable of 
cognition or conscious reaction to us. 
Buber describes several encounters with animals. He recalls that when he was 11 
he first became aware of the ‘immense otherness of the Other’ when, at his 
grandparents’ estate, he cared for a horse (BM 26).
When I stroked the mighty mane, sometimes marvellously smooth-
combed, at other times just astonishingly wild, and felt the life 
beneath my hand, it was as though the element of vitality itself 
bordered on my skin, something that was not I, was certainly not akin 
to me, palpably the other, not just another, really the Other itself; and 
yet it let me approach, confided itself to me, placed elementally in the 
relation of Thou and Thou with me. The horse, even when I had not 
begun pouring oats for him into the manger, very gently raised his 
massive head, ears flicking, then snorted quietly, as a conspirator 
gives a signal meant to be recognizable only by his fellow-
conspirator; and I was approved  (BM 27).
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Buber remarks that this relationship was distinct from that with a ram or ox who 
maintained their distance. The horse, by allowing Buber to touch it, allowed Buber 
to become close to its Being. 
For Buber, animals offer us curious access to a realm somewhere between 
‘plantlike security and spiritual risk’ (IT 144). When talking about an encounter 
with a domesticated cat he talks of how his and its eyes met. Neither looked at the 
other to command or request, no language was used (such as the request that the cat 
perform tricks, or that the owner pour milk), but the participants simply looked at 
each other. For ‘the length of one glance’, Buber and his cat were in an I-Thou 
relation. They requested nothing from the Other, and simply encountered the Other. 
Of course the moment of connection did not last. Indeed the alienation between 
Buber and cat was increased because Buber remembered the event and the cat did 
not (IT 146). Both the horse and the cat were open to Buber’s I-Thou advances. In 
the case of the horse it was his touch, and for the cat it was his glance. Animals that 
can respond to us seem to fit with the mutuality and reciprocity that I-Thou 
relations seem to require.
For Buber though, it was an encounter with a fragment of mica (retold in Daniel), 
that was ‘the occasion for his discovery of the Between, the region of relation 
irreducible to subjective response’ (Wood, 1999: 84). Whilst walking ‘on a gloomy 
morning’, he spotted a fragment of mica and picked it up (D 140-141). It was this 
interaction which made him aware of his ‘I’, that he was one part of the polarity, 
and the mica, or things-in-the-world, was the Other. He describes a similar moment 
in his preface to Daniel, when he placed the tip of his walking stick on the bark of a 
tree while he rested. Early on in Buber’s writing, then, he felt that relations with 
simple things could allow us to understand our Being and our Being-in-the-world. 
But ‘an encounter cannot come about from one side alone but must be reciprocal. 
An encounter is an experience of both choosing and being chosen, of action and 
being acted upon’ (Bergman, 1991: 233). In Daniel, Buber does not explain how a 
tree or a rock could possibly reciprocate, or open itself up to us. The worry is that 
without this reciprocal openness we can never have unity. Certainly, any I-Thou 
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relationship with non-conscious nature will be different from those with conscious 
nature (animals), and with people. Whereas the horse could actively be welcoming 
to Buber, the rock has no choice. Remember that Buber tells us that while ‘relation 
is reciprocity’ this does not require that the tree is conscious in the same way we 
are (IT 58). Relationships with non-conscious nature can still reveal to us their 
Thou-ness, we can understand the tree entirely as it is. The relationship is between 
person and tree, not consciousness and consciousness. As with person and rock, 
hill, tree, any Other, there is an encounter. But while we can acknowledge the 
Thou-ness of the non-conscious Other, this does not entail unity can be achieved. 
Unity does require response from the Other. Perhaps then, beyond making the 
ethical demand that we do not see the Other as mere It-ness, in the context of 
relations with non-conscious nature, Buber’s account may not offer more than ‘to 
the things themselves!’. My understanding of Buberian unity is that the Other must 
be capable of responding in a meaningful way. While certainly true of some 
animals, this is not the case for a large number of species and parts of nature. We 
ought to still practice inclusion and compassion, but I am unconvinced that there is 
opportunity for unity with non-conscious nature.
Despite this, Buber’s realizing mode is just as available to us through non-
conscious nature as conscious nature. Moments of connection to non-conscious 
nature can feel genuinely meaningful. While full unity is not achieved, we can 
spend time with nature and feel that we are part of something bigger than 
ourselves, and that each part of nature is a beautiful part of a wondrous whole. 
Thus the above criticism demonstrates a limit to unity, not an actual flaw in 
Buber’s ecophenomenology.
A further criticism of Buber is that his position is too extreme and too simple. 
Buber’s ontological claim that ‘in the beginning is the relation’ is a very strong 
claim (IT 78). For Buber, our Being is determined by our relationships. Our Being
is fluid so our essence changes with each relationship. Effectively then, we are 
nothing other than relationships. This is both an extreme claim, and a simple one. I 
certainly agree that our approach to the Other affects the degrees of alienation we 
feel (this is perhaps the most valuable contribution Buber makes). But if I am 
determined by the relationship, what am I that can chose to approach the Other as 
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an It or Thou? If Buber claimed that my self was largely, or predominantly, 
dialogical then it would be fairly convincing. But his claim is that we exist purely 
in dialogue with the Other. This does not explain the ontology required in order to 
relate. Certainly we are capable of relationships, and we can more or less choose 
our approach to the Other, but Buber goes too far. Kaufmann picks up on this, and 
suggests that Buber makes his system simple for rhetorical reasons: ‘Not all 
simplicity is wise. But a wealth of possibilities breeds dread. Hence those who 
speak of many possibilities speak to few and are of help to even fewer’ (1970: 9). 
Whether Buber’s simple and extreme claim is designed to make his theory more 
persuasive or have a higher impact, or whether he really means it is unclear. The 
position I hold is that some attention needs paid to the ontology of the Being that is 
capable of relating, so that we can better understand how it is that we come to 
choose the It or Thou approach. This might involve some reference to 
developmental and social psychology, and to analysis of social structures.
Finally, Buber’s philosophy may rely too heavily on his conviction that unity is 
possible. He believes this as a result of his faith, but offers little explanation or 
assurance that we can find unity. That I do not share his faith is not necessarily a 
problem. After all, it seems that Buber’s account of unity is an existentialist 
concept that is inspired by religion. Buber’s aim, consistent with his 
dialogical/dualistic account of the self, is to preserve our existential distinctiveness 
and ontological distance. As a result, Buber was accused by Gershom Scholem of 
cherry-picking elements of Hasidism to confirm his philosophy, rather than to 
spread the teachings of Hasidism (see Friedman, 1988). Whether or not this 
criticism stands, and regardless of whether or not unity is actually achievable with 
any Other, Buber’s ethical claims still stand, and his conviction that we ought to 
approach the Other in the Thou-mode is not fatally undermined. The Thou-mode is 
at the extreme end of a sliding scale. Even if unity is impossible, we still ought to 
approach the Other with respect and inclusion, and this will overcome as much 
alienation as can be achieved.
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Final remarks
It is hard to be fully convinced by Buber’s position – perhaps unity is not actually 
possible, and at best we experience the appearance of devekut. Buber’s I-Thou 
model does not offer much when considering non-conscious Beings. His 
philosophy is often extreme, and his excitement may be the cause of a lack of 
rigour, and so some of his position is to be rejected. But even a half-strength 
version of Buber offers a strong contribution to ecophenomenology and ethics. 
Relationships are a significant part of our Being, and we have responsibility for the 
way we choose to approach Others. What Buber does, then, is give us an ethical 
reason why we should treat the Other compassionately, but also without absolute 
self-sacrifice. He tells us, like Heidegger, of the dangers of technology, but for 
Buber it is dangerous only when it encourages It-thinking. Despite the similarities 
between Buber and Heidegger, the former is critical of the later. He highlights what 
Heidegger’s ontology is missing, and in so doing he demonstrates the original 
contribution he makes to ecophenomenology. Moreover, the differences between 
Levinas and Buber show the latter’s original contribution to dialogical 
ecophenomenology. Buber is evidently distinct from every other 
ecophenomenologist. For Buber we ought to always attempt to be open to the 
world around us. By doing this, by recognising the dignity and irreducibility of the 
Other, we live meaningfully, and we invite the Other to do the same.
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Conclusion
As I stated in the introduction, my aim in this thesis has been to argue in favour of 
Martin Buber’s ecophenomenology and environmental ethics. I also intended to 
demonstrate some of the shortcomings of ecophenomenology to date to highlight 
why further research into a wider range of philosophers was required. Buber’s 
emphasis on the ontological and ethical significance of our mode of relating marks 
him out against Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, and shows the main way 
in which ecophenomenologists so far have fallen short. 
My research has faced several challenges, not least that this small and new area of 
philosophy has received little attention within academic and publishing circles. 
That there are, to my knowledge, no books or articles which have explicitly 
attempted to formulate a Buberian ecophenomenology has meant that much of my 
reading has only been partially on-topic. Despite this, there has been enough 
written about and by Buber to allow me to write this thesis. My argument required 
three chapters, the first two looking at Husserl and Heidegger, and their modern 
representatives, and the third discussing Buber. 
I began with Husserl because as the founder of phenomenology all that followed 
was in someway a response or rejection of his work. Charles Brown and Erazim 
Kohák both pick up on Husserl’s anti-naturalism and concept of the lifeworld. 
Brown focuses on lived experience and anti-naturalism. His account of Husserlian 
phenomenology advocates a pluralist ethical system as a rejection of monistic 
moral theories. To behave ethically we must consider all perspectives, none 
(especially short-term profit-seeking perspectives) should receive disproportionate 
weighting. Because ethics are discerned by an ongoing assessment of perspectives, 
our judgements are to be reassessed (Brown, 2003: 15). At the core of Brown’s 
theory is his conviction that what sustains and enriches life is good, and that which 
harms or extinguishes life is bad. Because of this, combined with ongoing 
reassessment, society has been able to progress from slavery and racism, and, 
Brown hopes, will continue to do so until we cease to exploit the natural 
environment. 
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Like Husserl and Brown, Kohák is highly critical of naturalism, and of the 
destructive capacity of science. Kohák argues that we interact with the world 
through reason and by experience (including experience of values). To separate 
reason from values would be foolish because they are both a part of our interaction 
with the world. Despite this, industry and science has removed concern for values 
which has resulted in the dominance of ‘heartless’, functional, exploitative 
rationality. 
Kohák argues that we make value judgements based on how things promote or 
inhibit our purposes, and, separately, how things live up to our expectations. The 
third element of moral experience is that life is valuable, and that quality of life is 
important too. Thus a thriving ecosystem is good because it promotes our purposes 
(such as our desire for endangered species to survive), and it allows for quantity 
and quality of life (diversity provides a balanced diet, among other positives). On 
the other hand, a politician in charge of environmental issues (whom we entrust to 
protect the environment) who presides over massive deforestation, culls, and
devastating pesticide treatment schemes, is bad because they do not meet our 
expectations (among other reasons).
Kohák’s position on human population size and his ‘hands off’ mentality to 
conservation are controversial. More worrying is that he makes no mention of how 
we ought to relate to nature or how we can overcome alienation from it. While I 
argue that his contribution has more to offer than Brown’s, and I am favourably 
inclined towards his Husserlian account of expectations, I maintain that a vital 
component for a strong ecophenomenology is a substantial account of our 
relationship with nature. Because the Husserlian school of pure phenomenology 
pays little or no attention to this we must look for better elsewhere.
As I discussed in chapter two, Heidegger’s existential phenomenology offers a 
radical critique of modernity and technology. His account of authentic Being as 
dwelling, derived from etymological analyses, focuses on caring for nature, and 
suggests an active role rather than a laissez-faire, minimal-interference position. 
Heidegger’s fourfold presents us with a mode of existence whereby we are aware 
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of our finitude and our Being-in-the-world, plus our duty of care to the world. 
Heidegger’s Dasein who dwells seems to live a full existence.
Heidegger’s account of modern technology as something which reveals the world 
to us in a one-dimensional way is interesting. Modern technology is a pervasive 
and tenacious mode of revealing which shows the world to contain only objects. 
Everything is revealed as ‘standing reserve’, there for us to use. We see trees as 
timber, rivers as great sources of power, and mountain ranges as full of minerals or 
potential tourist spots. Modern technology reveals only one dimension to us, and 
so, far from letting things be completely as they are, we see only one aspect. 
Because technology challenges nature, dominates our lives, and suppresses other 
modes of revealing, Heidegger is justified in his stance against it. I agree with 
Heidegger here, but largely because it fits within Buber’s analysis of I-It rather 
than the strength of Heidegger’s etymological method.
Where I disagree strongly with Heidegger is in his stance against all value-
thinking. He argues that ethics is inherently technological, and that while things 
certainly can and do matter to us, Heidegger is unwilling to say that the Other has 
some non-instrumental value. He writes that ‘thinking in values is the greatest 
blasphemy imaginable against Being’, and moreover that ‘through the 
characterization of something as “a value” what is so valued is robbed of its worth’ 
(BW 251). Dasein’s role is to let things be, not to encounter the Other’s distinct, 
unique, irreducible value. For Buber, recognising such value in the Other is 
necessary for us to overcome our isolation from them. Only when we do this can 
we let things be.
Michael Zimmerman’s Heideggerian ecophenomenology begins by drawing links 
between Heidegger and deep ecology, which Zimmerman does with some success. 
Both are interested in an ontological shift away from anthropocentric dualism 
towards ecocentric egalitarianism where we learn to ‘treat nonhuman beings with 
compassion and care... instead of treating everything as interchangeable raw 
material’ (Zimmerman, 1993: 200, 197). Heidegger and deep ecology agree that 
modern Western society’s focus on human concerns is largely due to naturalism 
and productionist metaphysics which encourage technological revealing. If we 
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believe that nature is nothing more than a resource, then we will not strive to let it 
be anything more than a resource (Zimmerman, 1993: 197). Thus we must shift 
from the belief that nature is there for our pleasure and use. Again, I support this 
position, but primarily because ecocentric egalitarianism seems to have similarities 
with the inclusion and compassion of an I-Thou stance, and the reasons for 
criticising anthropocentric dualism are similar to Buber’s criticisms of I-It.
Zimmerman is critical of the potentially fascist aspects of Heidegger’s philosophy. 
Heidegger’s anti-modernism goes too far, and Zimmerman is keen to put emphasis 
on progress towards a world with less poverty, more political freedom, and better 
education. Indeed, Zimmerman believes that wealth, freedom, and education will 
all make us more environmentally conscious and less likely to cause harm. Unlike 
the science of the Enlightenment ideal, our aim is to learn more so as to help nature 
flourish rather than ‘gain mastery over it’ (Zimmerman, 2000: 4).  
Zimmerman’s stance on value-thinking is rather ambiguous. He does not openly 
reject Heidegger, but he does seem to value some things for their non-instrumental 
benefits, such as political freedom. Aside from this ambiguity, I am critical of 
Zimmerman for refusing to criticise capitalism. Capitalism seems fundamentally 
technological, and Zimmerman’s lack of criticism of it seems to bring into doubt 
his commitment to Heidegger’s account of technology. 
While there is much that is good about Heideggerian ecophenomenology, such as 
the critique of technology and emphasis on an ontological shift, there are some 
problems which Buber raises, and I discussed these in chapter three.
Unlike my chapters on Husserl and Heidegger, there were no obvious supporting 
Buberian ecophenomenologists to consider, and so it was left to me to construct 
and explain Buberian ecophenomenology and ethics. I began by discussing Buber’s 
distinctive use of some words before going on to unpack several of the themes in 
Daniel, beginning with the division between orientation and realization.
Orientation is the way of encountering the world in an instrumental fashion. Much 
like Heidegger’s technological mode of revealing, orientation sees only the 
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formulaic, naturalist, functional dimension. Orienting man is inauthentically fleeing 
from the insecurity of our existence (including that we must die) by seeking the 
security that material goods can offer, and that people can provide. Orienting man 
exploits so that he can feel secure. Realizing man does not seek such security, but 
instead embraces his own insecurity, and recognises that life and death are always 
‘side by side in endless embrace’ (D 131). Realizing man does not try to limit 
reality to mere instrumentality, but instead hopes to encounter the world in its 
complexity and splendour. 
Buber presents a twofold world in I and Thou. Our existence is somewhere 
between the It-realm and the Thou-realm. The It-realm, or I-It approach, is similar 
to orientation, in that we see only the instrumental value the Other has for our 
purposes. The I-It relationship is one of isolation whereby we only meet one 
dimension of the Other. I-Thou relationships involve us meeting the complete 
Other with our complete self. To allow for such a meeting we must approach the 
Other with compassion and inclusion, not purely seeking anything from them, as 
that would objectify them as a provider of something for our interests. I-Thou 
relationships allow us to overcome our alienation from the Other and they nourish 
our Being as well. Our lives feel much more important because we feel a part of 
something bigger than ourselves. 
After this I apply Buber’s philosophy to our relationship with the environment. The 
It-mode, much like anthropocentric dualism and naturalism, shows us only the use-
value of nature (for example that a tree is only for timber or to provide clean air) 
and so we see nothing wrong with exploiting nature. Buber believes that we ought 
to approach nature in the I-Thou mode. A relationship which recognises the 
uniqueness and dignity of each part of nature makes us less likely to feel we may 
exploit it. Instead we will respect it as it is.
Buber’s system of ethics centres on the claim that because we are free and 
powerful enough to chose to relate to the Other in the I-Thou mode, and because 
this is how to live authentically, then we ought to do this. It would be inauthentic to 
pretend we are unable to be authentic, and being authentic requires relating in the I-
Thou mode. Buberian ethics is unable to provide a prescriptive, normative model 
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beyond saying that we ought to approach the Other in the I-Thou mode. This is 
because each individual is unique and irreducibly complex, and as such every 
relationship is unique. Respectful dialogue with the Other’s Thou-ness tells us what 
we must do to treat them ethically. Our relationship with a forest may tell us that it 
needs thinned in places, and that it would be healthier if there were occasional 
clearings to encourage a range of wildlife to live there. So in that case, and acting 
out of respect and compassion, ethical behaviour may involve some deforestation. 
But obviously each forest is different and each relationship justifies different 
behaviour, hence why I label Buber a dialogical pluralist. Nevertheless, ethical 
behaviour begins with compassion, respect, and inclusion.
Buber’s criticisms of Heidegger focus on the latter’s account of Being-with, which 
Buber describes as Being-alongside, but not really Being-with. Heidegger never 
takes seriously the existential longing to overcome our isolation from the Other, 
and so fails to consider relationship dynamics in any meaningful depth. Whereas 
Buber proposed the I-Thou relationship, Heidegger never explains how our 
‘barriers’ can be ‘breached’ (BM 201). Though it does not ruin Heidegger’s theory, 
Buber’s critique shows that some important element (emphasis on relationships) is 
missing from Heidegger. 
I disregard Emmanuel Levinas’s criticisms of Buber for abandoning Jewish law as 
largely irrelevant to my thesis. I considered two possible problems with Buber: that 
he is too extreme, and that his emphasis on mutuality and reciprocity in the I-Thou 
relationship is problematic for relationships between us and non-
conscious/responsive nature. In the case of the latter it seems that Buber may offer 
little more than previous schools in ecophenomenology – to the things themselves! 
– but this does not seriously harm his philosophy. It is, however, an area that might 
benefit from further research. Similarly, I would have liked to have had time and 
space to study Levinas’s own ecophenomenology further, plus that of Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, which, based on Simon James’s account, may offer much to 
ecophenomenology.
Despite flaws, Buber’s dialogical ecophenomenology and environmental ethics 
offer something quite original to the young field of ecophenomenology. While 
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others, like Levinas, have emphasised the importance of relationships, only Buber 
advocates dialogical pluralism. His position, that we must practice certain traits 
(compassion, inclusion) in order to achieve I-Thou moments (and thus to act truly 
ethically), lends itself to social critique: if culture or dominant social structures 
repress I-Thou openness then they are contributing to alienation. Buber’s 
ecophenomenology and ethics can tell us how we should encounter the natural 
world, and it can tell us how we should structure the manmade cultural world. In 
this sense, Buber offers a far reaching and, currently, underappreciated philosophy.
Final remarks
If Buber is correct, we ought to do what we can to maximise the likelihood of I-
Thou moments. We must practice our skills of attentiveness and compassion, 
perhaps by gardening or caring for houseplants, and hope that over time we are 
more respectful and open to the irreducible and complete value of the Other.
*
In the year since I began this time-consuming thesis I have neglected my 
houseplants; I did not embark on the great pleasure of growing tomatoes this year; 
and I have turned down many chances for walks around the local hills, coast, and 
woodlands. This detachment from the natural world has convinced me as much as 
my findings here that when we are alienated from nature, our existence is lessened, 
and that rare moments of awe and intimacy with nature are to be treasured.
*
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Appendix
I contemplate a tree.
I can accept it as a picture: a rigid pillar in a flood of light, or splashes of green 
traversed by the gentleness of the blue silver ground.
I can feel it as movement: the flowing veins around the sturdy, striving core, the 
sucking roots, the breathing of the leaves, the infinite commerce with earth and air 
– and the growing itself in its darkness.
I can assign it to a species and observe it as an instance, with an eye to its 
construction and its way of life.
I can overcome its uniqueness and form so rigorously that I recognize it only as an 
expression of the law – those laws according to which a constant opposition of 
forces is continually adjusted, or those laws according to which the elements mix 
and separate.
I can dissolve it into a number, into a pure relation between numbers, and 
eternalize it. 
Throughout  all of this the tree remains my object and has its place and its time 
span, its kind and condition.
But it can also happen, if will and grace are joined, that as I contemplate the tree I 
am drawn into a relation, and the tree ceases to be an It. The power of 
exclusiveness has seized me.
This does not require me to forego any of the modes of contemplation. There is 
nothing that I must not see in order to see, and there is no knowledge that I must 
forget. Rather is everything, picture and movement, species and instance, law and 
number included and inseparably fused.
Whatever belongs to the tree is included: its form and its mechanics, its colour and 
its chemistry, its conversation with the elements and its conversation with the stars 
– all this in its entirety.
The tree is no impression, no play of my imagination, no aspect of a mood; it 
confronts me bodily and has to deal with me as I must deal with it – only 
differently.
One should not try to dilute the meaning of the relation: relation is reciprocity.
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Does the tree then have consciousness, similar to our own? I have no experience of 
that. But thinking that you have brought this off in your own case, must you again 
divide the indivisible? What I encounter is neither the soul of a tree nor a dryad, but 
the tree itself (IT 56-58).
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